Ron Yezzi
Philosophy Department
Minnesota State U., Mankato
©2001 by Ron Yezzi
(May be downloaded for per-
sonal, non-commercial use)
Philosophy 437 Lecture Notes
Michel Foucault (1926 - 1984)
I. Mechanisms of Power
II. Critique of Knowledge
A. From the Preface of Foucault's The Order
of Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences:
"This passage [in Borges] quotes a 'certain Chinese encyclopedia' in which it is written that 'animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i.) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very find camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies.' In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that."
1. While most people would regard this classification of animals to be ludicrous, Foucault views it as an opportunity to recognize the limitations of our own classificatory system by which we would not think of this alternative.
2. While most people merely presume that their own presently accepted classification scheme represents an objective reality, there really are numerous alternative classification schemes.
3. A particular classification scheme really is a cultural code of interpretation, what Foucault usually calls "a discursive formation"—that is, a set of deep rules for ordering that is embedded in our language.
B. Archeology - During the earlier stages of his work, the resurrection (deconstruction) of a discursive formation is a task of "archeological" reconstruction, where one studies historically the remains of the past to find out how a culture came to develop a particular system of classification.
1. People are generally unaware of the ways cultural power molds their systems of thought and behavior, hence the need for archeology.
2. A particular discursive formation could be archeologically resurrected in isolation, rather like the study of a paradigm.
C. Genealogy - During later stages of his work, Foucault turned more toward what he called a "genealogical" approach (a borrowing from Nietzsche), paying attention to transitional transformations as well.
D. Rejection of Global Theories and
Resurrection of Subjugated Knowledges
1. What mainly characterizes contemporary critiques of knowledge is the rejection of global theories of explanation (as provided by, say, Marxism or psychoanalysis) that have represented the goal of knowledge traditionally.
a. This rejection parallels his claims for studying micro-mechanisms of power.
b. Ideology also is associated with global theories.
2. This rejection of globalism then makes possible a return to more localized (decentralized) kinds of knowledge, what Foucault calls "subjugated knowledges."
a. Traditionally, subjugated knowledges have been "buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence of formal systemisation" (P/K, p. 81)
b. There are "naïve" or "popular" knowledges that have been "disqualified as inadequate" in the hierarchy of knowledge traditionally.
c. Genealogies provides a way of revealing the struggles of subjugated knowledges. They bring forth "the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects" (P/K, p. 83).
d. These genealogies amount to "anti-sciences," in contrast with traditional divisions of knowledge.
e. Example from Foucault: Whereas prison theorists are concerned with the motivations of criminals and how they can change them to rid the world of criminality, the actual day-to-day existence of what happens in prisons is ignored.
f. Example from Feminism: The everyday experiences and struggles of women get ignored in the usual hierarchy of research interests.
3. The resurrection of subjugated knowledges reveals everyday struggles and, more clearly, the relationship between truth and power.
E. Truth and Power
1. Claims for a neutral, objective pursuit of knowledge that culminates in truth independent of the pursuit and exercise of power is an illusion.
2. The separation of truth from power is suggested by the nature of physical science as the model for all science. When we turn to the human (social/behavioral) sciences, however, the relation between truth and power becomes much clearer.
3. Power and Truth are interchangeable: "Each society has its regime of truth, it 'general politics' of truth; that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who charged with saying what counts as true" (P/K, p. 131).
4. Truth is produced under the control of political, cultural, and economic dominating forces (e.g. the universities, army, writers, or the media).
5. "Truth is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements" (P/K, p. 133).
6. The Task: We cannot separate truth from power; but we can liberate truth from the presently dominating powers.
F. Knowledge and Human Nature
1. Foucault is particularly concerned with
classification developed in the human (social/behavioral) sciences to arrive at
a concept of human nature.
2. He turns upside down the usual notion that human sciences represent progress in dealing with human beings. For example, we might presume that our sophisticated judicial system has achieved progress by eliminating the execution of criminals for minor crimes such as stealing a loaf of bread, compared with past times. But Foucault might argue that the concepts of crime, criminals, prisoners, and justice developed through the human sciences produces social circumstances worse than those earlier executions for minor crimes.
3. The ways by which the human sciences have defined human nature are too limiting conceptually and too stifling for human potentialities—all the while proceeding as if they were describing an objective reality.
G. The Role of Intellectuals
1. In the past, intellectuals (as 'universal' intellectuals) have been associated with the writing of global theories and with the production of ideologies.
2. Now is the time for 'specific' intellectuals who focus their expertise on the localized struggles of everyday life.
III. Critique of Society
A. The application of Foucault's critique of knowledge to society—for example, in his studies of prisoners, mental patients, medical patients, and sexuality—leads to a call for the restructuring of the powers presently dominating society.
B. Struggle and Repression Rather than
Sovereignty as the Nature of Political Power
1. The decline
of monarchy has led to a mistaken attempt to analyze political power in terms
of sovereignty, whereby a type of exchange or social contract
establishes the basis for political rights and authority.
a.
This juridical-political theory of sovereignty focuses attention on the State
apparatus (e.g. the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government
in the
b. The
juridical-political theory of sovereignty disguises the more basic type of disciplinary
power that has arisen in bourgeois society.
c. Disciplinary power amounts to a mechanism of normalization by which people are transformed and controlled: Whether it be the school, the clinic, the asylum, prison, or sexual practices—people are molded to conform to the powers that be.
d. Disciplinary power is especially insidious because it comes to be internalized by persons it molds.
e. The application of the human sciences to society and social arrangements is a fundamental mechanism of this disciplinary power.
2. Political power is best understood through the repression and struggles that occur. This follows both from the critique of knowledge and the real impact of disciplinary power.
C. Surveillance and Panopticism (The Lessons of Foucault's Discipline and Punish)
1. The system of surveillance introduced into the prisons since the nineteenth century (based on Jeremy Bentham's panopticon plan) is a prime example of disciplinary power in action.
a. Prisoners are under surveillance during every aspect of their lives under the guise of reforming them for the better rather than merely seeking retribution for their crimes.
b. Since the system of surveillance does not always exhibit when prisoners are observed or not observed, the prisoners themselves incorporate a system of self-surveillance within themselves—restricting their actions themselves as if they were being observed.
2. What happens in the prisons is a model of what happens in our present bourgeois society.
D. Justice
1. The justice system itself makes justice impossible—by setting up a social power structure where a supposedly neutral judge pronounces supposedly neutral judgments in a setting of organized superiority and subservience.
2. Revolutionary groups cannot establish a more acceptable justice unless they move away the justice system itself; otherwise they re-institute the unjust bourgeois concept of justice.
3. Popular justice (which Foucault favors), while requiring some form, is a relatively spontaneous expression of the masses and occurs outside a justice system.
4. Justice, for Foucault, tends to be a bourgeois conception, suggesting some ideal concept of justice to be striven for, and thus probably is less important than the strategies and tactics of power.
E. The Social Self
1. There is no transcendental subject at the base of experience, no autonomous self, no independent will.
2. So liberal political theory (based upon social contracts and individual rights) is inadequate.
3. Ideology, representing a conscious social plan to be implemented through conscious effort is likewise an illusory source of social power and change.
4. The subject, as the starting point of Existential choice, is also an illusion.
5. The self always is the product of social interaction, with the mechanisms of power molding body and mind.
6. There is no escape from the political; "the personal is the political."
F. Sexuality
1. Sex as desire for pleasure is different from sexuality, the systemization of pleasure according to supposed laws of sex.
2. Sexuality is another form and product of disciplinary power.
3. ". . . power created sexuality as a device to say no to sex" (P/K, p. 190).
4. Sexuality is a way of repressing the body by molding it to fit social norms.
IV. Foucault and X
A. X = Marxism
1. Pro-Marxist Leanings
2. Anti-Marxist Leanings
B. X = Postmodernism
1.
Modernism - the view that reason assures ever-increasing progress in developing
an objective account of reality
a.
Presumably, human life benefits from this progress.
2.
Foucault's Rejection of Modernism
a.
He denies that rational knowledge produces objective accounts of reality
b.
He denies that rational knowledge represents progress in directing human life.
3.
Foucault's Contribution to Deconstruction
a.
His archeologies and genealogies are means of
deconstructing the illusionary rational, objective accounts of the modernists.
C. X = The Future
1. Foucault calls for a liberation from the present system of powers in society, but without any precise goals for the future and without any reliance on a vision of individual freedom as a goal (since the individual never escapes from social interactions and the powers therein).
2. For Foucault, it is a mistake to seek a unity of interpretation and goals too soon in laying out a social movement.
V. My Final Thoughts on Foucault
A. Challenge and Overstatement - Foucault is very successful in challenging some basic assumptions about knowledge and society—e.g. objectivity, truth, hierarchies of knowledge, the significance of the social/behavioral sciences, the power structures of society, the nature of the self, sovereignty in political theory, justice, the stultifying dictatorship of contemporary social norms. In the end though, from my point of view (admittedly one far more traditional and moderate than Foucault's), whatever good points lie in his critiques get buried in a barrage of overstatement. The genuine problems he raises require our attention, but not his proposed drastic solutions.
1. Example 1: Foucault's insistence on the study of localized problems and powers is not an especially novel approach in the social/behavioral sciences. So much work is carried out in these sciences that a lot of specialized, localized areas come under scrutiny. Moreover, they do so in a straightforward way without overarching (ideological?) schemas of interpretation like panopticism. For example, the everyday functioning of gangs in prisons has been a matter of much recent sociological interest. No doubt, there are localized areas of knowledge that have been ignored (such as studies and consideration of the everyday activities of women, as feminists have pointed out and tried to introduce) and that require more research. But there is little, if anything, in the nature of contemporary science that precludes additional research into these areas, following already accepted criteria of scientific investigation.
2.
Example 2: Study of micro-mechanisms of power is worthwhhile;
but the study of State power and major institutions also is extremely
important—since these macro-powers have such important influence on human
actions in a society. (In fairness to Foucault, I suppose he could reply that
he is not denying the influence of major social institutions but only that he
is uncovering micro-mechanisms of power with largely unobserved rules that have
not been recovered previously. But once one admits this qualification, the study of mechanisms of power extend beyond the bounds of
essential elements in Foucault’s analysis.)
3.
Example 3: According to Foucault, the process of normalization, or adherence to
social norms, is internalized in us through the mechanisms of disciplinary
power. As a severe critic of contemporary society, this process is abhorrent to
him. But we may find numerous advantages to this process that he ignores. For
example, campaigns against smoking from early childhood through adulthood can
contribute to better health, a significant value to people; likewise, regular
checkups and continual prenatal care also improve human health, in addition to
defining us as medical clients within a medical establishment system. Because
of such advantages, any deficiencies may require reforms rather than the more
drastic revolution against the contemporary power structures.
B.The Problem with Micro-(Infinitesimal-)Mechanisms of Power
1. Foucault’s focus upon micro-mechanisms of power is reminiscent of Leo Tolstoi’s theory of history whereby higher positions in the chain of command of a social structure (such as an army) decrease influence upon actual events.
2.
If one takes these micro-mechanisms seriously though, one never formulates more
general, overarching judgments that are important in a society. It is a case of
"not seeing the forest for the trees." For example, arriving at a
general conception of justice becomes very difficult if one insists on the
uniqueness of localized social power structures. Foucault’s not formulating
exactly the nature of justice is not surprising simply because the
micro-mechanism approach does not permit such generalizaations—quite
apart from his rejection of what he sees as the anti-justice structures of a
bourgeois justice system.
3.
Similarly, his call for a decentralized social power structure follows from the
micro-mechanism approach as much as it follows from his archeologies
and genealogies.
C.
Objectivity
1. Foucault’s rejection of modernism follows in important ways from his views that our selves are social constructions and that truth is an expression of political power. As a result, there is no objective account of reality to be gained through the exercise of reason.
2.
Foucault’s view exemplifies a mistaken position I usually call "sociocentrism." Sociocentrism
presumes that just because our beliefs are inseparable from social origins and
constructions they cannot be anything more than social constructions. A problem
here arises because social constructions can still be affected by something
external. Landing someone on the moon requires an enormous amount of social
cooperation and social constructions (such as socially developed uses of
language, social organizations, socially developed
theories). But no social engineering gets a person to the moon by simply waving
one’s arms and flying there. There are limitations set by what I call "the
external" that social constructions must recognize and master for a person
to get to the moon. When we assert the possibility of objective accounts, we
need not be projecting an account that is independent of human thinking. How
could we, as human beings, ever possess an account that was beyond being a
human creation or human description? Objectivity is really a limit we
approximate to in human thinking by introducing objective controls that
decrease our subjectivity or common social limitations. For example, there is a
culture (or social construction) of Christian fundamentalism that can be
broadened by the objective controls of scientific inquiry so that evolution
becomes a more adequate objective account of the world. It is not that any
given account in science is a final objective account; but it can be more objective
than previous accounts. And it is the limit we approach as we continue to use objective
controls that we identify as the goal of objectivity.