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Kripke's Case against Simplicity Considerations |
On pp. 37-39, Kripke seems to cease being a mere expositor of "Wittgenstein's argument as it struck Kripke" and to himself make a case against using simplicity considerations (SCs) to "solve" the sceptical puzzle, problem, or challenge he has found in Wittgenstein. It is clear from the text that Kripke himself believes that there is a fundamental mistake in supposing that appeals to simplicity can save the day against the sceptic. Unfortunately for Kripke, his certainty about the irrelevance of simplicity considerations is much stronger than any argument that he gives against SCs. Kripke's case against using SCs to solve the sceptical problem comes down to two (I think) considerations. First, Kripke contends that without facts of the sort denied by the sceptic, there's no telling what our hypotheses state. And if we can't tell what our hypotheses state, there's no sense to the claim that one hypothesis is more likely than another because it is simpler. The other consideration seems related to the first (hence my hesitation in speaking of two considerations). Kripke claims that in the absence of facts of the sort denied by the sceptic, our meaning hypotheses are not "genuine hypotheses", not "assertions of genuine matters of fact". The implicit assumption here seems to be that simplicity considerations can be used only for choosing between genuine hypotheses. Thus, the appeal to simplicity considerations to solve the sceptical problem is misplaced, wrongheaded, according to Kripke.