• The sceptical argument, then, remains unanswered. There can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word. Each new application we make is a leap in the dark; any present intention could be interpreted so as to accord with anything we may choose to do. So there can be neither accord, nor conflict. This is what Wittgenstein said in §201. (K, p. 55).
  
  
  COMMENTARY: This passage opens Kripke's chapter 3, entitled, "The Solution and the 'Private Language' Argument". In this chapter we will get KW's sceptical solution to his sceptical paradox or sceptical argument. I quote the passage above as evidence for what the sceptical problem/paradox/argument is supposed to be and how it is alleged to hook up with Wittgenstein's text. Suffice to say that many commentators, myself included, do not see Kripke's story to be a good fit with Wittgenstein's own text. In particular, it's difficult to see all that Kripke gave us in his chapter 2 to be contained in, or summarized by, Wittgenstein's remarks at §201. It's even more difficult to see the sceptical solution Kripke finds in Wittgenstein to be contained (even in barest outline) in §201. But Kripke alleges it is there to be found. Again, most commentators disagree. (Kripke does have a few defenders. See George Wilson's paper, "Semantic Realism and Kripke's Wittgenstein" for an attempt at reconciling KW with Wittgenstein's §201. I don't think Wilson's case is successful however. I will have more to say on all of this in the Problems and Projects section in the near future).
  Kripke's summary of what was allegedly shown in chapter 2 also provides an opportunity to summarize my disagreements with him. While I would allow that Kripke believes that no answer has yet been given to the sceptical argument, it's clear to me that Kripke fails to do justice to several "answers" which he discussed and rejected as inadequate. (In particular, the appeal to dispositions and the appeal to simplicity considerations are both considered by Kripke and rejected. I find Kripke's reasons for rejecting these "answers" to be unconvincing). Be this as it may however, the big problem with Kripke's case for the sceptical paradox in chapter 2 is that he never considers the most obvious complaint one can raise against the sceptic, viz., that our inability to produce a fact that shows that we meant plus rather than quus in the past, simply does not lead to the conclusion that there can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word. That is, we should be willing to admit that there are no facts of the sort sought by the sceptic but yet deny that the lack of such facts leads to the "disastrous" or "startling" or "eerie" result suggested by the sceptic, viz., the impossibility of meaning ("there can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word"). In short, the "answer" to the sceptic is a question that never gets asked in chapter 2, viz., who the heck thinks we need "meaning facts" (e.g., facts that distinguish plussing from quussing in the past) and why? Simply put, Kripke's sceptic does a wonderful job showing that there is no way around the lack of "meaning facts" but a very poor job of convincing us that the lack of such facts really leads, willy nilly, to the conclusion that meaning is impossible.
  It is no surprise then that KW's so-called sceptical solution to the sceptical paradox exploits the weakness of the sceptic's argument from the lack of "meaning facts" to the impossibility of meaning. In particular, KW will deny, in his sceptical solution, that the lack of "meaning facts" leads, willy-nilly, to the impossibility of meaning. But contrary to Kripke's suggestions, we can and ought to say, e.g., that although dispositions may not provide "meaning facts", nonetheless dispositions give the lie to the sceptic's claim that meaning is impossible. Or that dispositions and simplicity considerations don't provide "meaning facts" but nonetheless make meaning possible. Or that our behaviors, both "inner and outer", don't provide "meaning facts" but are nonetheless incompatible with the impossibility of meaning, etc. Kripke has, in short, failed to appreciate that the sceptic of chapter 2 has not shown that dispositions, behaviors ("inner and outer"), simplicity considerations, etc., are incapable of making meaning possible. Rather, the sceptic has shown, at best, that none of these considerations gives us "meaning facts" and then concluded, illegitimately, (as Kripke's chapter 3 shows) that meaning is impossible.
  
  
  
• Wittgenstein's sceptical problem is related to some work of two other recent writers who show little direct influence from Wittgenstein. . . . The first is W.V. Quine, whose well-known theses of the indeterminacy of translation and the inscrutability of reference also question whether there are any objective facts as to what we mean. . . . Quine bases his argument from the outset on behaviorist premises. . . . Further, since Quine sees the philosophy of language within a hypothetical framework of behavioristic psychology, he thinks of problems about meaning as problems of dispositions to behavior. . . . The important problem for Wittgenstein is that my present mental state does not appear to determine what I ought to do in the future. Although I may feel (now) that something in my head corresponding to the word 'plus' mandates a determinate response to any new pair of arguments, in fact nothing in my head does so. . . . Since Quine formulates the issues dispositionally, this problem cannot be stated within his framework. For Quine, since any fact as to whether I mean plus or quus will show up in my behavior, there is no question, given my disposition, as to what I mean.
  It has already been argued above that such a formulation of the issues seems inadequate. My actual dispositions are not infallible, nor do they cover all of the infinitely many cases of the addition table. (K, pp. 56-7).
  
  
  COMMENTARY: This passage is a truncated version of a long passage from Kripke's book concerning the relationship between the work of KW and Quine. I have already cast doubt on some of Kripke's claims concerning Quine. (From p. 13 commentary and p. 14 commentary, p. 21 commentary, p. 38 commentary). I find the above passage bizarre, for several reasons. First and foremost, there is Kripke's characterization of "the important problem" for Wittgenstein. If indeed the "important problem" is that my present mental state doesn't appear to determine what I oughtt to do in the future, then the celebrated sceptical problem turns out to be nothing more interesting than a case of an "is" not implying an "ought". Frankly, big deal. Second, what is the italicized "feel" all about and what is it to feel (now) that something in my head corresponding to the word 'plus' mandates a determinate response to any new pair of arguments. By my lights, the realistic answer is that I feel this way because I understand 'plus' to refer to a function, and I understand that function to have an infinite domain (it matters not whether 'plus' refers to plus or quus). And I do not see that the sceptic has provided any reason to doubt that I do so understand 'plus'. Rather, the sceptic casts doubt on my ability to know which of these two infinite functions I meant by 'plus' in the past. But now if I do understand that I use 'plus' to refer to a function, a function with infinite domain, then I also understand that 'plus' mandates a determinate response in infinitely many cases. I may not know what that response is in all of those cases but I can and ought to be credited with knowing that the function has an infinite number of cases, determined by the function. As such, it's hard to see what justifies Kripke's claim that despite my feelings, and so my understanding, nothing in my head mandates a determinate response to any new pair of arguments. I suspect that for Kripke it's the infinitude of the possible pairs of arguments which is the problem. That is, because I am finite, as are the "somethings in my head", (by Kripke's lights), I can't have infinitely many answers stored up in my head. But surely we don't need to have infinitely many answers in our head in order for there to be a mandated determinate answer to plus problems. I would contend however that our understandings are no less and no more infinite than are the functions plus and quus themselves. It's silly, in short, to say that there are or must be cases of the plus function which can't be in my head because I am finite whereas the function plus is infinite. Plus is our creation. We made it an infinite function and we have a technique for working out answers to plus problems, which is all we need to distinguish plus from quus. For they are based on different techniques. Moreover, no one has ever set out the answers to all plus problems but this is not, to borrow Wittgenstein's line, a human shortcoming. Not even God can do it. Most importantly, I don't need an infinitude of answers to plus problems to tell the difference between plus and quus.
  Be this as it may, the single most bizarre part of this passage is Kripke's claim that "[s]ince Quine formulates the issues dispositionally, this problem cannot be stated within his framework. For Quine, since any fact as to whether I mean plus or quus will show up in my behavior, there is no question, given my disposition, as to what I mean. It has already been argued above that such a formulation of the issues seems inadequate. My actual dispositions are not infallible, nor do they cover all of the infinitely many cases of the addition table." Two things are troubling here. First, Kripke claims that Wittgenstein's problem cannot be formulated in Quine's framework. This is nothing more, it seems, than a slippery way of avoiding a direct challenge to KW's case for there being no fact of the matter about which of plus or quus we meant. For if, with Quine, we hold that the linguistic dispositions for plus and quus are different, and if we hold, with Quine, that these dispositions are theoretically exhibitable, then the sceptical problem never gets off the ground, for there is a fact of the matter of which of the two we meant. That is, it's not that Wittgenstein's problem can't be stated in Quine's framework. It can be stated, it just turns out to be solvable in Quine's framework. The sceptic's claim that there are no facts distinguishing meaning plus from meaning quus is shown to be false, in Quine's framework.
  The second troubling thing here is Kripke's claim to have already, in chapter 2, established the inadequacy of Quine's would-be answer to the sceptical problem. Quine is not asking for infallible dispositions and nor should anyone else. We should not be troubled by the fact that we are not infallibly disposed to give correct answers to plus problems. Most importantly, because we are also disposed to correct our errors concerning mathematical functions. It is not difficult to determine whether our dispositions concerning 'plus' are in line with plus rather than quus or vice-versa. As such, fallibility of dispositions is a red herring. So too is the worry about the alleged finitude of these dispositions. For as Kripke himself goes on to note, Quine idealizes dispositions such that debates about cases of the sort used by Kripke's sceptic (plus, quus) are solvable and solved. The bottom line then is that Kripke's remarks to the contrary, Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation is based on a view of language learning and behavior that gives the lie to the sceptic's claim that there is no fact about whether someone means plus or quus. There is for Quine, in theory at least, a fact of the matter about this. Since KW denies that there is, even in theory, a fact about which of plus or quus we meant, it's clear that Quine's view poses a direct challenge to KW's view, a challenge that is nowhere met by Kripke.
  
  
• . . . [Quine] argues (roughly) that the interpretation of sufficiently 'theoretical' utterances, not direct observation reports, is undetermined even by all my ideal dispositions. Further, he seeks to show by examples such as 'rabbit' and 'rabbit-stage' that, even given fixed interpretation (sic) of our sentences as wholes and certainly given all our ideal dispositions to behavior, the interpretation (reference) of various lexical items is still not fixed. These are interesting claims, distinct from Wittgenstein's. Given Quine's own formulation of his theses, it appears open to a non-behaviorist to regard his arguments, if he accepts them, as demonstration that any behavioristic account of meaning must be inadequate -- it cannot even distinguish between a word meaning rabbit and one meaning rabbit-stage. But if Wittgenstein is right, and no amount of access to my mind can reveal whether I mean plus or quus, may the same not hold for rabbit and rabbit-stage? So perhaps Quine's problem arises even for non-behaviorists. This is not the place to explore the matter. (K, p. 57).
  
  
  COMMENTARY: Kripke is absolutely correct that Quine's "indeterminacy of translation" (and "inscrutability of reference") doctrines are distinct from anything to be found in his, i.e., Kripke'sWittgenstein. Although both KW and Quine deny the existence of semantic facts of the matter, they give very different arguments and end up saying very different things. For Quine, there's no fact of the matter as to which of two competing manuals of translation (i.e., manuals that are mutually incompatible but conform to all the same distributions of speech dispositions) is correct, or gives the right translation of native speech. But for Quine, unlike Kripke, there is a fact of the matter as to whether a translation manual does or does not conform to speech dispositions, be they our own or those of some native in need of radical translation. Thus for Quine, but not KW, given two manuals of translation, one which has me meaning plus by '+' and one which has me meaning quus by '+', one of them is not only at odds with my speech dispositions but is obviously at odds with them. As such, there is a fact of the matter about which of these two manuals does justice to my speech dispositions and so a fact of the matter as to whether I mean plus or quus.
  Also, lest one get the wrong impression about Quine (as John Searle does, for example; see the bibliography page), he is not claiming that we have no way of distinguishing between a word meaning rabbit and one meaning rabbit state. We do. Quine's claim is that someone charged with the task of radical translation, i.e., translating a heretofore untranslated language, would have to make analytical hypotheses about the components of the language in question, hypotheses which could be different for different translators. As a result there could be manuals that are incompatible with each other but which both do justice to the speech dispositions of the natives. Finally, do not be misled by Kripke's final suggestion of a connection between Quine and KW. As I noted earlier in my commentary, it is a serious misunderstanding to see Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation as not covering appeals to the mental. The idealization of speech dispositions allows us to suppose that whatever we have in our mind is demonstrable in behavior. Also, given the differences between Quine and KW, I see nothing that allows us to move from KW's case against the existence of something in my mind to reveal whether I mean plus or quus, to the claim that the same may hold for Quine's example of rabbit and rabbit-stage. Again, KW's argument is based on a premise Quine rejects, viz., that no matter how we idealize our dispositions, (N.B.: For Quine, speech dispositions are "actual enduring states of nerves, however ill understood") there is no behavioral difference between a plusser and a quusser. Quine's rabbit/rabbit-stage case is quite different from KW's plus/quus case. Quine's problem arises for anyone who allows that any linguistic distinctions the mind can make, are distinctions that can be made in behavior as well, which ought to be all of us who have read the real Wittgenstein.
  
  
• Nelson Goodman's discussion of the 'new riddle of induction' also deserves comparison with Wittgenstein's work. . . . [T]he basic strategy of Goodman's treatment of the 'new riddle' is strikingly close to Wittgenstein's sceptical arguments. . . . Although our paradigm of Wittgenstein's problem was formulated for a mathematical problem, it was emphasized that it is completely general and can be applied to any rule or word. In particular, if it were formulated for the language of color impressions . . . Goodman's 'grue' . . . would play the role of 'quus'. But the problem would not be Goodman's about induction -- "Why not predict that grass, which has been grue in the past, will be grue in the future?" -- but Wittgenstein's about meaning: "Who is to say that in the past I didn't mean grue by 'green', so that now I should call the sky, not the grass, 'green'?" (K, p. 58).
  
  
  COMMENTARY: I agree with Kripke that Goodman and KW give similar arguments, much more similar than Quine and KW. However, unlike some, I confess to being unable to take Goodman's riddle any more seriously than I take KW's sceptical paradox. Basically, Goodman asks why we use the predicates we do as the predicates to induct over rather than weird predicates that it takes a very bright philosopher to think up. Goodman's answer is projectibilty; my answer is lack of imagination, which in this case is a good thing, not a bad thing. Of course, Goodman's point was to cast doubt on the possibility of giving a purely formal or syntactic account of confirmability of hypotheses. And I think he successfully made this case. By analogy, we can see KW as claiming that a purely syntactic account of meaning will always fail to do justice to meaning!! Of course, if this is what he wished to show, I grant that he succeeded!
  
  
• Wittgenstein has invented a new form of scepticism. Personally I am inclined to regard it as the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date . . . . Of course he does not wish to leave us with his problem, but to solve it: the sceptical conclusion is insane and intolerable. It is his solution, I will argue, that contains the argument against 'private language'; for allegedly, the solution will not admit such a language. But it is important to see that his achievement in posing this problem stands on its own, independently of the value of his own solution of it and the resultant argument against private language. For, if we see Wittgenstein's problem as a real one, it is clear that he has often been read from the wrong perspective. . . . .[I]f I am right, . . . [Wittgenstein's] main problem is not, "How can we show private language -- or some other special form of language -- to be impossible?"; rather it is, "How can we show any language at all (public, private, or what-have-you) to be possible?" . . . Wittgenstein's main problem is that it appears that he has shown all language, all concept formation, to be impossible, indeed, unintelligible. (K, pp. 60, 62).
  
  
  COMMENTARY: A very important passage for understanding Kripke's conception of his Wittgenstein's sceptical problem and solution. It is also a passage that leads many to reject Kripke's account as being an accurate version of Wittgenstein. First and foremost, I want to say that no one, including KW himself, sees "Wittgenstein's problem as a real" problem. That is, it is at best an illusion of the presentation of the problem in Kripke's book that it could even be thought that the sceptical problem is a real one and that it threatens us with semantic and conceptual nihilism. Language is possible because its possibility does not depend in any way on finding a fact to show that we meant plus rather than quus in the past. The challenge to find a fact that shows that we meant plus rather than quus in the past is unanswerable but also unimportant. For nothing at all hangs on it, KW's sceptic notwithstanding. As suggested above, KW's sceptical solution reveals as much, since it has Wittgenstein agreeing with his putative sceptic that there is no fact to show that we meant plus rather than quus while yet showing us how it is possible to have meaning despite the nonexistence of such facts. (An aside: This passage spells trouble for George Wilson's claims (see the first commentary above) regarding Kripke's (and KW's) use of 'sceptical conclusion'. Clearly, Kripke uses 'sceptical conclusion' to refer to the sceptic's claim to that language is impossible, for that, rather than the sceptic's case against meaning facts, is what is "insane and intolerable).
  
  
• It is important and illuminating to compare Wittgenstein's new form of scepticism with the classical scepticism of Hume; there are important analogies between the two. Both develop a sceptical paradox, based on questioning a certain nexus from past to future. Wittgenstein questions the nexus between past 'intention' or 'meanings' and present practice . . . . Hume questions two other nexuses, related to each other: the causal nexus whereby a past event necessitates a future one, and the inductive inferential nexus from the past to the future. (K, p. 62).
  
  
  COMMENTARY: This passage finds Kripke characterizing Wittgenstein's problem as that of questioning the nexus between past meanings and present practice. But surely this is not right. KW is surely questioning the nexus between past practice (i.e., saying 2 + 2 is 4, 2+ 3 is 5, 2 + 8 is 10, etc., along with saying various things involving words like 'count' or 'independent'; see K, pp. 16-7) and past meaning. And then using these sceptical doubts about past meaning to claim that we are without justification for answering one way rather than another in present cases. My answers to present or future problems can only be, in short, blind leaps in the dark. In other words, KW's sceptic claims that because my past practice is compatible with my meaning many different things in the past, I don't know what I meant in the past. Since I don't know this, I have no justification for saying one thing rather than another presently or in the future. So my "present practice" is unjustified, according to the sceptic. As such, the nexus between past meaning and present practice is secure for anyone who knows what s/he meant in the past. For Kripke's sceptic, however, there simply are no such people.
  
  
• . . . [A]s we shall see [Wittgenstein's] solution to his own sceptical problem begins by agreeing with the sceptics (sic) that there is no 'superlative fact' (§192) about my mind that constitutes my meaning addition by 'plus' and determines in advance what I should do to accord with this meaning. But, he claims (in §§183-93), the appearance that our ordinary concept of meaning demands such a fact is based on a philosophical misconstrual -- albeit a natural one -- of such ordinary expressions as 'he meant such-and-such' . . . . Wittgenstein thinks that any construal that looks for something in my present mental state to differentiate between my meaning addition or quaddition, or that will consequently show that in the future I should say '125' when asked about '68 + 57', is a misconstrual and attributes to the ordinary man a notion of meaning that is refuted by the sceptical argument. (K, pp. 65-6).
  
  
  COMMENTARY: By my lights, this is the beginning of Kripke's hedge on what the sceptical paradox was all about and what it showed. In particular, note the use of 'superlative fact' and Kripke allowing that one can agree with the sceptic about the nonexistence of superlative facts without undermining the possibility of meaning. Furthermore, it is here made clear that the sceptic's case for the impossibility of meaning is based on a philosophical misconstrual about our concept of meaning, viz., that it requires "superlative facts". Unfortunately, however, Kripke is not very convincing on exactly how our ordinary conception of meaning allows us to get by without the sort of facts sought for and required by the sceptic. (More on this below). In particular, Kripke never does show how it is that we are justified, on our ordinary conception of meaning, to say of someone that s/he means plus rather than quus. As such, KW does not show us how we are able, once we give up the demand for superlative facts, to answer the sceptic's challenge, roughly, "Who is to say that quus is not the function I previously meant by '+'?" Rather, KW simply ignores this question altogether and is content to tell a story about meaning that allegedly doesn't appeal to facts and which is possible only in a community.
  The point I am making here is that the sceptic's case for the nonexistence of a superlative fact about me showing that I meant plus by '+' is based on the alleged impossibility of there being a fact that shows I meant plus rather than quus. However, unless and until KW shows us how he proposes to show that someone means plus rather than quus, he can't be said to have shown that facts fail us where something else (e.g., assertion conditions) succeeds. In short, whatever KW's account of meaning turns out to be, we ought to ask whether it can do what was required of facts, viz., distinguish someone meaning plus from meaning quus. Anticipating things a bit, I do not see that KW gives us an account of meaning which does what facts were asked to do, viz., distinguish someone's meaning plus from his/her meaning quus.
  
  
• What is a 'sceptical' solution? Call a proposed solution to a sceptical philosophical problem a straight solution if it shows that on closer examination the scepticism proves to be unwarranted; an elusive or complex argument proves the thesis the sceptic doubted. Descartes gave a 'straight' solution in this sense to his own philosophical doubts. . . . A sceptical solution of a sceptical philosophical problem begins on the contrary by conceding that the sceptic's negative assertions are unanswerable. Nevertheless our ordinary practice or belief is justified because -- contrary appearances notwithstanding -- it need not require the justification the sceptic has shown to be untenable. (K, p. 66).
  
  
  COMMENTARY: By my lights, the exact nature of KW's sceptical solution is elusive, in part because it appears to be, according to the definition above, both sceptical and straight. By clarifying this matter, much light can be shed on Kripke's entire reading of Wittgenstein and it can more easily be shown where and why it goes wrong. For starters, we need to ask about the "negative assertions" offered by KW's sceptic. I find two negative assertions by KW's sceptic. First, there is no fact that I meant plus rather than quus (and, relatedly, there is no justification for my answering, e.g., 68 + 57, one way rather than another). Second, meaning/language/rule-following is impossible. It is obvious that only one of these negative assertions is deemed to be unanswerable by KW, and just as obvious that it is the first assertion but not the second that is deemed to be so. After all, if the assertion that meaning/language/rule-following is impossible is deemed to be unanswerable, and so something that we must all accept, then not only would there be nothing more to say, we couldn't say it anyway.
  Notice above that Kripke says a straight solution to a sceptical problem is one that shows that on closer examination, "the scepticism proves to be unwarranted". Now, given that KW claims that meaning is possible, despite the nonexistence of meaning facts, it is clear that KW believes the scepticism about the possibility of meaning is unwarranted. As such, KW clearly gives a straight solution to this sceptical problem, not a sceptical one. On the other hand, it's also clear that KW agrees with his sceptic's doubts about the nonexistence of meaning facts. So he does allow that this negative assertion of the sceptic, viz., there are no "meaning facts", is "unanswerable". Furthermore, it's also clear that KW believes that our ordinary practice of meaning attributions, or our ordinary belief in meaning (whatever that means?!) is justified, despite the nonexistence of meaning facts. As such, it appears that KW has given us a sceptical solution as well. (The fussy among us might note, however, that KW does not allow that both of the sceptic's negative assertions are unanswerable, merely that one of them is such. But then if a sceptical solution requires that all of the sceptic's negative assertions be deemed unanswerable, it seems that KW does not give a sceptical solution at all). As is often the case with Kripke's book, one is forced to ask: What the heck is going on here?!
  What's going on, by my lights, is that Kripke is trying to have his cake and eat it too. He does so by defining straight and sceptical solution in such a way that the two are compatible in cases where there are two negative assertions made by the sceptic. To see this, it is useful to consider David Hume's sceptical doubts and solution to them. Hume (or Hume qua sceptic) never claims that "assurance about future matters of fact" is impossible, given that our "causal conclusions" are not or cannot be founded on reason or any process of the understanding. Rather, Hume claims to have shown only that our assurance about future matters of fact cannot be due to reason or any process of the understanding. His sceptical solution begins by granting that the case against reason is adequate (but not necessarily "unanswerable") and so we must look elsewhere for the source of our assurance. Hume's solution is custom or habit. That is, Hume solves the problem of the source of our assurance about future matters of fact while yet accepting the case against that assurance being the result of reason or some process of the understanding.
  In contrast, KW's sceptic claims that meaning is impossible because of the nonexistence of meaning facts. Now, since KW agrees with his sceptic that there are no meaning facts, either he allows that meaning is impossible or rejects the sceptic's argument from the nonexistence of meaning facts to the impossibility of meaning. But we know that KW holds that meaning is possible. Hence, KW rejects the sceptic's argument from the nonexistence of meaning facts to the impossibility of meaning. As such, scepticism about the possibility of meaning is clearly unwarranted, i.e., KW gives a straight solution to the sceptical problem of the impossibility of meaning. Of course, following Kripke's definition of "sceptical solution", KW can also be said to provide a sceptical solution (although I confess it's not at all clear what KW is sceptically solving; clearly it is not the impossibility of meaning that is sceptically solved. For that has a straight solution. On the other hand, it isn't the nonexistence of meaning facts that is sceptically solved, for that isn't solved at all but is accepted by KW). KW can be seen to give a sceptical solution since he shows that our meaning-talk is justified because it doesn't need meaning facts to justify it. The bottom line appears to be that Kripke, malgre lui , is using 'straight solution' and 'sceptical solution' in such a way that his Wittgenstein can and does provide both sorts of solutions.
  One possible way to get Kripke out of this mess would be to appeal to different senses of 'meaning' in the sceptical challenge and the sceptical solution respectively. For example, if we suppose the sceptic's "impossibility of meaning" claim makes use of a truth-conditional conception of meaning, while KW's claim that meaning is possible makes use of an assertion-conditions conception of meaning, then KW may accept that there is no answering the sceptic's claim that meaning is impossible. All we can do is offer a different notion of meaning. This move, however, seems to leave us with a KW whose solution to the problem amounts to an equivocation on 'meaning'. At least, it leaves us with an equivocal KW unless we suppose that the sceptic is making the absolutely preposterous claim that he has established the impossibility of any and all possible conceptions of meaning.
  
  
• Of course, I am suggesting that Wittgenstein's argument against private language has a structure similar to Hume's argument against private causation. . . . [Wittgenstein's] solution involves a sceptical interpretation of what is involved in such ordinary assertions as "Jones means addition by '+'." The impossibility of private language emerges as a corollary of his sceptical solution of his own paradox, as does the impossibility of 'private causation' in Hume. It turns out that the sceptical solution does not allow us to speak of a single individual, considered by himself and in isolation, as ever meaning anything. (K, pp. 68-9).
  
  
  COMMENTARY: This passage enunciates a view that leads many to reject the idea that KW = LW. Most commentators simply do not believe that Wittgenstein's celebrated argument against private language is a corollary of anything, let alone a corollary of a sceptical solution of a sceptical paradox. Anticipating things to come, one might ask how it is that a "sceptical interpretation" of our ordinary attributions of meaning could possibly lead to the impossibility of private language. Another good question here is to ask what Kripke means by "a single individual considered by himself and in isolation". In particular, are we to see KW claiming that Robinson Crusoe, whether isolated his entire life or no, cannot ever mean anything because the lack of other people keeps him from being able to mean anything, or are we to see KW saying something "more vaguely defined and more vaguely defended" than this? The answer is the latter. For an account of some of the possible vagaries, see my paper, "Kripke's Wittgenstein and the Impossibility of Private Language: The Same Old Story?". Also, for complaints against the idea that Hume establishes the impossibility of "private causation", see my paper, On Kripke’s Use of Hume's Sceptical Doubts and Sceptical Solution.

   

• [Wittgenstein] does not give a 'straight' solution, pointing out to the silly sceptic a hidden fact he overlooked, a condition in the world which constitutes my meaning addition by 'plus'. In fact, he agrees with his own hypothetical sceptic that there is no such fact, no such condition in either the 'internal' or the 'external' world. (K, p. 69).
  
  
  COMMENTARY: Kripke here says that Wittgenstein's "solution" to his sceptical problem is not a "straight solution" because Wittgenstein does not produce a meaning fact, i.e., a fact which shows that someone means plus rather than quus. Of course, it's true enough that KW's "solution" to the sceptical problem does not involve producing a meaning fact. However, this is because KW doesn't think our ordinary conception of meaning requires such facts for its legitimacy. That is, KW does not accept the sceptic's argument from the lack of meaning facts to the impossibility of (ordinary) meaning. But this poses a dilemma, due to the fact that the account of a straight solution to the sceptical problem in this passage (viz., that it involves somehow saving the possibility of meaning without appealing to meaning facts) differs from the previous account, whereby a straight solution involved showing the scepticism to be unwarranted. For KW does show that scepticism about the possibility of ordinary meaning is unwarranted, for he accepts that there are no meaning facts but denies that this results in the impossibility of ordinary meaning. In sum then, it appears that KW both does and does not offer a straight solution to his paradox. KW's solution is "not straight" (i.e., is sceptical), according to Kripke, since it does not involve the production of, indeed, makes no appeal to, meaning facts. On the other hand, KW's solution is straight insofar as it deems scepticism about the possibility of ordinary meaning to be unwarranted. (An aside: Anyone who does believes that the sceptic is guilty of asking for a fact that is of no import at all to our meaning talk, can apparently be said to offer a sceptical solution to the sceptical paradox. But why not just say that someone who thinks the sceptic is asking for something of no import to our meaning talk simply rejects the sceptical challenge as a serious mistake, not as something to be "solved", sceptically or otherwise?).
  
  
• We [i.e., Wittgenstein and right thinking philosophers everywhere] do not wish to doubt or deny that when people speak of themselves and others as meaning something by their words, as following rules, they do so with perfect right. We do not even wish to deny the propriety of an ordinary use of the phrase 'the fact that Jones meant addition by such-and-such a symbol', and indeed such expressions do have perfectly ordinary uses. We merely wish to deny the existence of the 'superlative fact' that philosophers misleadingly attach to such ordinary forms of words, not the propriety of the forms of words themselves. (K, p. 69).
  
  
  COMMENTARY: This is one of many passages in chapter 3 which finds Kripke soft-selling the force of the sceptical challenge and sceptical attack on the possibility of meaning facts. If the sceptic was not, in chapter 2, denying the propriety of our ordinary meaning talk, including especially our ordinary talk of the fact that someone means such-and-such by a particular sign, what the heck was he doing and why should anyone care about an attack on "non-ordinary meaning talk, or care about the impossibility of meaning talk that is not "ordinary"?! It sure seemed to me, and it sure seemed like it was supposed to seem to the reader, that the sceptic was attacking our ordinary talk of meaning and meaning facts. After all, many responses to the sceptical challenge canvassed by Kripke seemed pretty ordinary to me. Furthermore, Kripke speaks several times of the incredibleness, the insanity, the intolerableness of the sceptical conclusions, going so far as to say that the sceptical challenge gives rise to an "eerie feeling" in him. Now surely such reactions to the challenge make sense just insofar as we see the sceptic challenging our ordinary notions of meaning, challenging what we take to be obviously true aspects of our ordinary meaning talk. We would hardly find the sceptical conclusions insane and intolerable if we didn't think they posed a direct threat to our ordinary understanding of meaning and what it involves. Most importantly, no one who didn't want us to think that the sceptic was attacking cherished but ordinary beliefs about meaning, would say that the sceptical conclusions are insane and intolerable. As such, I think it is obvious that Kripke is guilty of offering a deliberately misleading account of (what he takes to be) Wittgenstein's sceptical paradox and sceptical solution. For there never was, apparently, a threat to our ordinary notions of meaning, to our ordinary meaning talk. But now that we know this, we can and should see the sceptical challenge to be of no real import. For at best it attacks a notion of meaning we neither know of nor make use of, and denies the existence of meaning facts that are of no import for "ordinary meaning" (whatever that is). To put this another way, there's nothing incredible, insane or intolerable about the nonexistence of "superlative facts" and so nothing insane, incredible, intolerable about the sceptical conclusions.
  However, it could at least be said that KW's sceptic supposes that he is attacking our ordinary notion of meaning, supposes that his attack poses a real threat to our usual notion of meaning. And as I've already suggested, Kripke's discussion throughout chapter 2 seems to treat the sceptical challenge as a threat to something important rather than a threat to something we don't need for meaning, viz., superlative facts. But a question arises here: Why should KW's sceptic agree with KW that the nonexistence of superlative facts poses no threat to our usual meaning-talk because our "ordinary meaning-talk" neither uses nor needs superlative facts? Most importantly, the sceptic might allow that although the nonexistence of superlative facts poses no practical difficulties for our ordinary meaning talk (mainly because we would laugh KW's sceptic out of the bank or math class) nonetheless our ordinary notion of meaning is one which theoretically requires the existence of superlative meaning facts. And though we may be able to get by without superlative facts in day to day talk of meaning, (chiefly because no one raises sceptical difficulties to our day to day meaning talk), we should appreciate that it's one thing to dismiss the sceptic as misguided because he's raising "mere theoretical" (or dare I say, philosophical), problems about meaning, it's another thing to claim that the sceptic can be dismissed because his attack is aimed at a bogus theory of meaning, and it's a third thing to dismiss the sceptic by showing why or how his theory of meaning is bogus. By my lights, KW is not claiming that the sceptic is raising "mere theoretical" worries that can be dismissed in our day to day talk. Rather, KW dismisses the sceptic by claiming that the sceptic is attacking a bogus theory of meaning. But KW fails, it seems to me, to show how or why the sceptic's theory of meaning is bogus.
  For the sceptic, "facts or truth conditions are of the essence of meaningful assertions" (see K, p. 77). And while it may be true that we need not take facts or truth conditions to be "of the essence of meaningful assertion", it's another thing altogether to say that our ordinary notion of meaning does not take facts or truth conditions to be of the essence of meaningful assertion. Furthermore, it is surely fallacious (i.e., question begging) for KW to claim that our ordinary conception of meaning must be different from the sceptic's because whereas the sceptic has meaning being impossible (for want of meaning facts) we know meaning is possible. Similar remarks apply to those who would see KW as giving a reductio of a realist or truth conditional account of meaning. The fact (assuming it is one) that a realist/truth conditional account of meaning is impossible shows neither that our ordinary conception is not a realist one nor that such a conception cannot be right. For we could still be realists about meaning and simply make the best of the fact that meaning is impossible (e.g., by appreciating that, practically speaking, the lack of meaning facts poses no difficulty at all). Echoing a thought from Wittgenstein's remarks on contradiction, don't suppose that the sceptic's case for the impossibility of meaning, even if successful, rules out our making sense of any meaning claims whatsoever!
  The bottom line appears to be that Kripke has not, and probably cannot, give a convincing argument to show that our ordinary conception of meaning is not such that facts or truth conditions are of the essence of meaningful assertion. Ultimately, it seems that KW is offering a conception of meaning that does not require "superlative meaning facts" but without being able to show that this conception is our ordinary one or that it has any other virtues besides allegedly avoiding the sceptic's attack on meaning. By my lights, unless and until KW can show that his conception of meaning allows us to show that someone means plus rather than quus (albeit without appeal to facts, for KW allegedly agrees there are no such facts), his claim that the sceptic has not challenged our ordinary conception of meaning must be regarded as nothing more than an ad hoc maneuver.
  
  
• Whenever our opponent insists on the perfect propriety of an ordinary form of expression (e.g., that 'the steps are determined by the formula', 'the future application is already present'), we can insist that if these expressions are properly understood, we agree. The danger comes when we try to give a precise formulation of exactly what it is that we are denying -- what 'erroneous interpretation' our opponent is placing on ordinary means of expression. . . . Nevertheless I choose to be so bold as to say: Wittgenstein holds, with the sceptic, that there is no fact as to whether I mean plus or quus. But if this is to be conceded to the sceptic, is this not the end of the matter? What can be said on behalf of our ordinary attributions of meaningful language to ourselves and others? Has not the incredible and self-defeating conclusion, that all language is meaningless, already been drawn? (K, p. 71).
  
  
  COMMENTARY: The final line here perhaps harks back to p. 13 of Kripke's text where he offers us an argument which allegedly shows how the impossibility of meaning follows, willy-nilly, from the nonexistence of "meaning facts". Since Kripke here is so bold as to say that Wittgenstein agrees that there are no such facts, the conclusion that language is impossible seems to have "already been drawn". As suggested above, it is clear that KW takes himself to somehow wriggle out of the alleged airtight argument offered earlier in chapter 2. Perhaps it wasn't as airtight as it seemed to Kripke in chapter 2. More particularly, the "problem" with the argument on p. 13 appears to be that there are conceptions of meaning for which the nonexistence of the sorts of facts sought by the sceptic poses no problem at all. One complaint about this way around the argument is that it does not succeed in showing that meaning is not impossible, in the sceptic's sense of 'meaning'. Rather, it simply changes the subject. However, KW's justification for changing the subject is to claim that the sceptic's assumed notion of meaning is not or cannot be our "ordinary" notion of meaning. Of course, KW supports this by claiming that our ordinary notion of meaning is not really undone by the sceptic! I think we have a circle here. The bottom line appears to be that KW agrees with his sceptic about the impossibility of his (the sceptic's) notion of meaning and will offer as a "sceptical solution" to this problem an alternative notion of meaning which is unchallenged (indeed, unconsidered) by the sceptical argument. My main difficulty in all of this is why speak of a "sceptical solution" to the sceptical challenge to the possibility of meaning? For KW never solves that problem. Rather, he agrees with his sceptic that meaning of the sort attacked by the sceptic is impossible. On the other hand, KW's offering up an alternative notion of "meaning" to the one he agrees is impossible and saying that this solves, albeit sceptically, the problem of the impossibility of meaning, is strange stuff indeed. For surely the sceptic ought not be thought to have argued that it was impossible to invent something called, "meaning", which invention is immune to the sceptical challenge. Of course, if the notion of meaning which escapes the sceptic's argument is no invention but is alleged to be our "ordinary notion of meaning", then the sceptical challenge should have been rejected from the start as misguided.
  
  
• In reply [viz., to the question whether the "incredible and self-defeating conclusion that all language is meaningless" has not already been drawn] we must say something about the change in Wittgenstein's philosophy of language from the Tractatus to the Investigations. . . . [A]s Dummett says, "the Investigations contains implicitly a rejection of the classical (realist) Frege--Tractatus view that the general form of explanation of meaning is a statement of the truth conditions". In the place of this view, Wittgenstein proposes an alternative rough general picture. . . . Wittgenstein replaces the question, "What must be the case for this sentence to be true?" by two others: first, "Under what conditions may this form of words be appropriately asserted (or denied)?"; second, given an answer to the first question, "What is the role, and the utility, in our lives of our practice of asserting (or denying) the form of words under these conditions?" (K, p. 71, p.73).
  
  
  COMMENTARY: This passage is the heart of the so-called sceptical solution. It finds KW rejecting one notion of meaning for another, making clear that indeed, KW is changing the subject rather than solving the sceptic's challenge to the impossibility of meaning. KW seems to hold then that for want of meaning facts, truth conditional meaning is impossible. However, KW takes himself to sceptically solve this problem (i.e., without appeal to, or production of, meaning facts) by offering an alternative notion of meaning, one which does not require meaning facts. But unless we suppose some sort of Platonic notion of meaning (i.e., we suppose that 'meaning' really means "assertion condition meaning" rather than ""truth conditional meaning"), it's clear that we must see KW and his sceptic as simply talking by each other. KW's sceptic says truth conditional meaning is impossible. KW apparently agrees but claims that "assertion condition meaning" is not impossible. But is the sceptic supposed to disagree with this? Is the sceptic to regard this as a solution to his problem? Again, KW has done nothing more than change the subject.
  Still, there are other problems here. First, Kripke is apparently unaware that the first of the two replacement questions can also be asked and answered on the classical realist view. Indeed, the classical realist view takes itself to be offering an answer to this very question. For on the classical realist view of meaning, a form of words may be appropriately asserted (or denied) just when there are (are not) facts that correspond to the form of words. That is, on the classical realist view, a form of words is appropriately asserted (or denied) just when it's true (or false). As for the second question, it is, as many commentators have noted, perverse and no part of Wittgenstein's concern, and not very important for KW either. Peter Winch notes that use, as in the Wittgensteinian slogan,"meaning is use" and utility, are very different notions indeed. Also, Warren Goldfarb, in "Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules", fn. 14, notes: "Kripke adds a second requirement, namely, that there be an account of the role and utility in our lives of the practice of ascribing meaning. This requirement is puzzling. It is hard to see any content in a general notion of "role and utility in our lives"; what does it rule out? Textual support in Wittgenstein is tenuous, at best. However, Kripke does not exploit such a general requirement in his argument." As such, a more accurate characterization of KW's "sceptical solution" is to see it as offering a different answer to the first of his two questions from that offered by the classical realist approach. But this means that KW and his sceptic are judging the legitimacy of meaning attributions by different criteria, which further supports the claim that KW and his sceptic are talking by each other. However, we'll see below that things are not even this good for KW!
  
  
• . . . we can say that Wittgenstein proposes a picture of language based, not on truth-conditions, but on assertability conditions or justification conditions: under what circumstances are we allowed to make a given assertion? (K, p. 74).
  
  
  COMMENTARY: This passage gives the terminology for the Tractatus notion of meaning and the Philosophical Investigations notion of meaning respectively.
  
  
• Recall Wittgenstein's sceptical conclusion: no facts, no truth conditions, correspond to statements such as "Jones means addition by '+'." . . . Now if we suppose that facts, or truth conditions, are of the essence of meaningful assertion, it will follow from the sceptical conclusion that assertions that anyone ever means anything are meaningless. On the other hand, if we apply to these assertions the tests suggested in Philosophical Investigations, no such conclusion follows. All that is needed to legitimize assertions that someone means something is that there be roughly specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately assertable . . . . No supposition that 'facts correspond' to those assertions is needed. (K, pp. 77-8).
  
  
  COMMENTARY: Once again, Kripke unabashedly announces that his Wittgenstein "solves" the problem of the impossibility of meaning by shifting from a truth conditions account of meaning to an assertability conditions account. But what is truly strange about this particular passage is the simplicity of Kripke's criterion for legitimate meaning attributions, viz., there must be "roughly specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately assertable". The problem with this criterion is not that it's false but that it's trivially true. Indeed, it can be granted even by fans of truth conditional accounts of meaning. For truth conditionalists claim that the circumstances under which meaning attributions are legitimately assertable are those wherein particular facts obtain, facts to which the meaning attribution correspond.
  Clearly, in order to give us a substantive claim here, Kripke (or KW) must tell us something about the conditions which allegedly legitimate our meaning attributions. In particular, Kripke must tell us something about the circumstances under which, "Jones means plus by '+'", can be legitimately asserted. However, it's one thing to offer us such circumstances and it's another thing to verify that such circumstances can in fact do the job of legitimating some particular meaning attribution. The latter matter deals with the question of what we are going to require of our putative legitimating circumstances in order for them to count as legitimating circumstances. For not any old thing that anyone wants to call a legitimating circumstance can be allowed to count as a legitimating circumstance. It has long been my contention that one of the crucial flaws in Kripke's account of Wittgenstein is that the so-called sceptical solution to the sceptical paradox simply ignores the problem which allegedly did in a truth-conditional or fact-based account of meaning, viz., the problem that any circumstance we cite as a legitimating circumstance is capable of legitimating more than one meaning attribution.
  Recall that KW's reason for rejecting a truth conditional or fact-based account of meaning in favor of an assertion conditions account is the alleged nonexistence of any fact that shows we meant/mean plus rather than quus by '+'. We must also remind ourselves that the sceptic did not show that there were no facts to support the claim that Jones means plus by '+'. The sceptic showed, allegedly, that whatever facts we have to support the claim that Jones means plus by '+' are also facts that support claiming that Jones means quus by '+'. The upshot is that KW believes that so long as some putative legitimating circumstance allows us to legitimate more than one meaning attribution, it fails to be a genuine legitimating circumstance. In short, facts cannot provide, or be included in our account of, circumstances which legitimate meaning attributions. However, once we appreciate that the case against facts being part of our story about legitimating circumstances rests on the claim that facts allow us to legitimate too many meaning attributions at any one time, we should ask of any account of legitimating circumstances whether it doesn't permit us to legitimate more than one meaning attribution at a time. But once we appreciate this, it isn't hard to see that no account of legitimating circumstances is likely to pass muster, for it's hard to imagine any account of legitimating circumstances that will be immune to the problem of legitimating too many meaning attributions for its own good. This is especially so given the alleged failure of a truth conditional account to provide unique legitimating circumstances.
  By my lights, the conjuring trick of Kripke's story is that the sceptical considerations that allegedly give rise to the impossibility of a truth conditions account of meaning (viz., couldn't Jones just as well mean quus rather than plus, given the facts at hand) simply disappear once the shift is made to an assertions conditions account of meaning. But there is no reason sceptical considerations cannot be brought to bear on an assertion conditions account. Kripke here seems to think that all we need to avoid the impossibility of meaning is to give up on the need for facts, or facts corresponding to meaning attributions. To be sure, by giving up on the need for facts, we need no longer be troubled by the sceptic's argument against the existence of meaning facts. However, before we can be sure that a non-fact based conception of meaning is possible, we must insure that the sceptic's arguments against meaning facts cannot be modified so that they apply just as well to alternative accounts of meaning, in this case, an assertion conditions account. This Kripke simply does not do. Furthermore, I claim it cannot be done because KW's assertion conditions are no better at avoiding or answering sceptical worries about meaning than are truth conditions or fact conditions. Indeed, the only way an assertion conditions account of meaning can avoid the problems the sceptic finds for a truth conditions account is for it to ignore the requirement of uniqueness, that is, the requirement that no "circumstance" or condition that can legitimate more than one meaning attribution can be a genuine legitimating circumstance. Of course, if we make a similar proviso in the case of a truth conditions account (and I see nothing to prevent this), then it too can avoid the wrath of the sceptical argument. I claim then that KW's assertion conditions account of meaning is really no better off as regards sceptical worries than is a truth conditions account.
  In sum then, Kripke or KW thinks an assertion conditions of meaning succeeds where a truth conditions account fails precisely because he no where asks the assertion conditions account to produce conditions or circumstances which legitimate saying, "Jones means plus rather than quus by '+'". (For the record, I do not believe that the sceptical attack on meaning facts is entirely successful. While I allow that nothing in my past behavior or thought, no matter how idealized, shows that I meant plus rather than quus, I do not think, contra Kripke, or KW or KW's sceptic, that this means that my future responses to problems involving '+' are completely unjustified, no better than leaps in the dark. For my future responses to problems involving '+' provide a fact of the matter about which of plus or quus I mean. Again, see Putnam's paper, "On Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics").

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