Commentary
on passages from Wittgenstein on Rules and Private
Language, pp. 55-77
The sceptical
argument, then, remains unanswered. There can be no such thing as
meaning anything by any word. Each new application we make is a
leap in the dark; any present intention could be interpreted so as
to accord with anything we may choose to do. So there can be
neither accord, nor conflict. This is what Wittgenstein said in
§201. (K, p. 55).
COMMENTARY: This passage
opens Kripke's chapter 3, entitled, "The Solution and the 'Private
Language' Argument". In this chapter we will get KW's sceptical
solution to his sceptical paradox or sceptical argument. I quote
the passage above as evidence for what the sceptical
problem/paradox/argument is supposed to be and how it is alleged
to hook up with Wittgenstein's text. Suffice to say that many
commentators, myself included, do not see Kripke's story to be a
good fit with Wittgenstein's own text. In particular, it's
difficult to see all that Kripke gave us in his chapter 2 to be
contained in, or summarized by, Wittgenstein's remarks at
§201. It's even more difficult to see the sceptical solution
Kripke finds in Wittgenstein to be contained (even in barest
outline) in §201. But Kripke alleges it is there to be found.
Again, most commentators disagree. (Kripke does have a few
defenders. See George Wilson's paper, "Semantic Realism and
Kripke's Wittgenstein" for an attempt at reconciling KW with
Wittgenstein's §201. I don't think Wilson's case is
successful however. I will have more to say on all of this in the
Problems
and Projects section
in the near future).
Kripke's summary of what was allegedly shown in chapter 2 also
provides an opportunity to summarize my disagreements with him.
While I would allow that Kripke believes that no answer has yet
been given to the sceptical argument, it's clear to me that Kripke
fails to do justice to several "answers" which he discussed and
rejected as inadequate. (In particular, the appeal to dispositions
and the appeal to simplicity considerations are both considered by
Kripke and rejected. I find Kripke's reasons for rejecting these
"answers" to be unconvincing). Be this as it may however, the big
problem with Kripke's case for the sceptical paradox in chapter 2
is that he never considers the most obvious complaint one can
raise against the sceptic, viz., that our inability to produce a
fact that shows that we meant plus rather than quus in the past,
simply does not lead to the conclusion that there can be no such
thing as meaning anything by any word. That is, we should be
willing to admit that there are no facts of the sort sought by the
sceptic but yet deny that the lack of such facts leads to the
"disastrous" or "startling" or "eerie" result suggested by the
sceptic, viz., the impossibility of meaning ("there can be no such
thing as meaning anything by any word"). In short, the "answer" to
the sceptic is a question that never gets asked in chapter 2,
viz., who the heck thinks we need "meaning facts" (e.g., facts
that distinguish plussing from quussing in the past) and why?
Simply put, Kripke's sceptic does a wonderful job showing that
there is no way around the lack of "meaning facts" but a very poor
job of convincing us that the lack of such facts really leads,
willy nilly, to the conclusion that meaning is impossible.
It is no surprise then that KW's so-called sceptical solution to
the sceptical paradox exploits the weakness of the sceptic's
argument from the lack of "meaning facts" to the impossibility of
meaning. In particular, KW will deny, in his sceptical solution,
that the lack of "meaning facts" leads, willy-nilly, to the
impossibility of meaning. But contrary to Kripke's suggestions, we
can and ought to say, e.g., that although dispositions may not
provide "meaning facts", nonetheless dispositions give the lie to
the sceptic's claim that meaning is impossible. Or that
dispositions and simplicity considerations don't provide "meaning
facts" but nonetheless make meaning possible. Or that our
behaviors, both "inner and outer", don't provide "meaning facts"
but are nonetheless incompatible with the impossibility of
meaning, etc. Kripke has, in short, failed to appreciate that the
sceptic of chapter 2 has not shown that dispositions, behaviors
("inner and outer"), simplicity considerations, etc., are
incapable of making meaning possible. Rather, the sceptic has
shown, at best, that none of these considerations gives us
"meaning facts" and then concluded, illegitimately, (as Kripke's
chapter 3 shows) that meaning is impossible.
Wittgenstein's
sceptical problem is related to some work of two other recent
writers who show little direct influence from Wittgenstein. . . .
The first is W.V. Quine, whose well-known theses of the
indeterminacy of translation and the inscrutability of reference
also question whether there are any objective facts as to what we
mean. . . . Quine bases his argument from the outset on
behaviorist premises. . . . Further, since Quine sees the
philosophy of language within a hypothetical framework of
behavioristic psychology, he thinks of problems about meaning as
problems of dispositions to behavior. . . . The important problem
for Wittgenstein is that my present mental state does not appear
to determine what I ought to do in the future. Although I
may feel (now) that something in my head corresponding to
the word 'plus' mandates a determinate response to any new pair of
arguments, in fact nothing in my head does so. . . . Since Quine
formulates the issues dispositionally, this problem cannot be
stated within his framework. For Quine, since any fact as to
whether I mean plus or quus will show up in my behavior, there is
no question, given my disposition, as to what I mean.
It has already been argued above that such a formulation of the
issues seems inadequate. My actual dispositions are not
infallible, nor do they cover all of the infinitely many cases of
the addition table. (K, pp. 56-7).
COMMENTARY: This
passage
is a truncated version
of a long passage from Kripke's book concerning the relationship
between the work of KW and Quine. I have already cast doubt on
some of Kripke's claims concerning Quine. (From p.
13 commentary and
p.
14 commentary,
p.
21 commentary,
p.
38 commentary). I
find the above passage bizarre, for several reasons. First and
foremost, there is Kripke's characterization of "the important
problem" for Wittgenstein. If indeed the "important problem" is
that my present mental state doesn't appear to determine what I
oughtt to do in the future, then the celebrated sceptical
problem turns out to be nothing more interesting than a case of an
"is" not implying an "ought". Frankly, big deal. Second, what is
the italicized "feel" all about and what is it to feel
(now) that something in my head corresponding to the word 'plus'
mandates a determinate response to any new pair of arguments. By
my lights, the realistic answer is that I feel this way
because I understand 'plus' to refer to a function, and I
understand that function to have an infinite domain (it matters
not whether 'plus' refers to plus or quus). And I do not see that
the sceptic has provided any reason to doubt that I do so
understand 'plus'. Rather, the sceptic casts doubt on my ability
to know which of these two infinite functions I meant by 'plus' in
the past. But now if I do understand that I use 'plus' to refer to
a function, a function with infinite domain, then I also
understand that 'plus' mandates a determinate response in
infinitely many cases. I may not know what that response is in all
of those cases but I can and ought to be credited with knowing
that the function has an infinite number of cases, determined by
the function. As such, it's hard to see what justifies Kripke's
claim that despite my feelings, and so my understanding, nothing
in my head mandates a determinate response to any new pair of
arguments. I suspect that for Kripke it's the infinitude of the
possible pairs of arguments which is the problem. That is, because
I am finite, as are the "somethings in my head", (by Kripke's
lights), I can't have infinitely many answers stored up in my
head. But surely we don't need to have infinitely many answers in
our head in order for there to be a mandated determinate answer to
plus problems. I would contend however that our understandings are
no less and no more infinite than are the functions plus and quus
themselves. It's silly, in short, to say that there are or must be
cases of the plus function which can't be in my head because I am
finite whereas the function plus is infinite. Plus is our
creation. We made it an infinite function and we have a technique
for working out answers to plus problems, which is all we need to
distinguish plus from quus. For they are based on different
techniques. Moreover, no one has ever set out the answers to all
plus problems but this is not, to borrow Wittgenstein's line, a
human shortcoming. Not even God can do it. Most importantly, I
don't need an infinitude of answers to plus problems to tell the
difference between plus and quus.
Be this as it may, the single most bizarre part of this passage is
Kripke's claim that "[s]ince
Quine formulates the issues dispositionally, this problem cannot
be stated within his framework. For Quine, since any fact as to
whether I mean plus or quus will show up in my behavior, there is
no question, given my disposition, as to what I mean. It has
already been argued above that such a formulation of the issues
seems inadequate. My actual dispositions are not infallible, nor
do they cover all of the infinitely many cases of the addition
table." Two things are
troubling here. First, Kripke claims that Wittgenstein's problem
cannot be formulated in Quine's framework. This is nothing more,
it seems, than a slippery way of avoiding a direct challenge to
KW's case for there being no fact of the matter about which of
plus or quus we meant. For if, with Quine, we hold that the
linguistic dispositions for plus and quus are different, and if we
hold, with Quine, that these dispositions are theoretically
exhibitable, then the sceptical problem never gets off the ground,
for there is a fact of the matter of which of the two we meant.
That is, it's not that Wittgenstein's problem can't be stated in
Quine's framework. It can be stated, it just turns out to be
solvable in Quine's framework. The sceptic's claim that there are
no facts distinguishing meaning plus from meaning quus is shown to
be false, in Quine's framework.
The second troubling thing here is Kripke's claim to have already,
in chapter 2, established the inadequacy of Quine's would-be
answer to the sceptical problem. Quine is not asking for
infallible dispositions and nor should anyone else. We should not
be troubled by the fact that we are not infallibly disposed to
give correct answers to plus problems. Most importantly, because
we are also disposed to correct our errors concerning mathematical
functions. It is not difficult to determine whether our
dispositions concerning 'plus' are in line with plus rather than
quus or vice-versa. As such, fallibility of dispositions is a red
herring. So too is the worry about the alleged finitude of these
dispositions. For as Kripke himself goes on to note, Quine
idealizes dispositions such that debates about cases of the sort
used by Kripke's sceptic (plus, quus) are solvable and solved. The
bottom line then is that Kripke's remarks to the contrary, Quine's
thesis of the indeterminacy of translation is based on a view of
language learning and behavior that gives the lie to the sceptic's
claim that there is no fact about whether someone means plus or
quus. There is for Quine, in theory at least, a fact of the matter
about this. Since KW denies that there is, even in theory, a fact
about which of plus or quus we meant, it's clear that Quine's view
poses a direct challenge to KW's view, a challenge that is nowhere
met by Kripke.
. . .
[Quine] argues (roughly) that the interpretation of
sufficiently 'theoretical' utterances, not direct observation
reports, is undetermined even by all my ideal dispositions.
Further, he seeks to show by examples such as 'rabbit' and
'rabbit-stage' that, even given fixed interpretation (sic) of our
sentences as wholes and certainly given all our ideal dispositions
to behavior, the interpretation (reference) of various lexical
items is still not fixed. These are interesting claims, distinct
from Wittgenstein's. Given Quine's own formulation of his theses,
it appears open to a non-behaviorist to regard his arguments,
if he accepts them, as demonstration that any behavioristic
account of meaning must be inadequate -- it cannot even
distinguish between a word meaning rabbit and one meaning
rabbit-stage. But if Wittgenstein is right, and no amount of
access to my mind can reveal whether I mean plus or quus, may the
same not hold for rabbit and rabbit-stage? So perhaps Quine's
problem arises even for non-behaviorists. This is not the place to
explore the matter. (K, p. 57).
COMMENTARY: Kripke is
absolutely correct that Quine's "indeterminacy of translation"
(and "inscrutability of reference") doctrines are distinct from
anything to be found in his, i.e., Kripke'sWittgenstein. Although
both KW and Quine deny the existence of semantic facts of the
matter, they give very different arguments and end up saying very
different things. For Quine, there's no fact of the matter as to
which of two competing manuals of translation (i.e., manuals that
are mutually incompatible but conform to all the same
distributions of speech dispositions) is correct, or gives the
right translation of native speech. But for Quine, unlike Kripke,
there is a fact of the matter as to whether a translation manual
does or does not conform to speech dispositions, be they our own
or those of some native in need of radical translation. Thus for
Quine, but not KW, given two manuals of translation, one which has
me meaning plus by '+' and one which has me meaning quus by '+',
one of them is not only at odds with my speech dispositions but is
obviously at odds with them. As such, there is a fact of
the matter about which of these two manuals does justice to my
speech dispositions and so a fact of the matter as to whether I
mean plus or quus.
Also, lest one get the wrong impression about Quine (as John
Searle does, for example; see the bibliography page), he is not
claiming that we have no way of distinguishing between a word
meaning rabbit and one meaning rabbit state. We do. Quine's claim
is that someone charged with the task of radical translation,
i.e., translating a heretofore untranslated language, would have
to make analytical hypotheses about the components of the language
in question, hypotheses which could be different for different
translators. As a result there could be manuals that are
incompatible with each other but which both do justice to the
speech dispositions of the natives. Finally, do not be misled by
Kripke's final suggestion of a connection between Quine and KW. As
I noted earlier in my commentary, it is a serious misunderstanding
to see Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of translation as not
covering appeals to the mental. The idealization of speech
dispositions allows us to suppose that whatever we have in our
mind is demonstrable in behavior. Also, given the differences
between Quine and KW, I see nothing that allows us to move from
KW's case against the existence of something in my mind to reveal
whether I mean plus or quus, to the claim that the same may hold
for Quine's example of rabbit and rabbit-stage. Again, KW's
argument is based on a premise Quine rejects, viz., that no matter
how we idealize our dispositions, (N.B.: For Quine, speech
dispositions are "actual enduring states of nerves, however ill
understood") there is no behavioral difference between a plusser
and a quusser. Quine's rabbit/rabbit-stage case is quite different
from KW's plus/quus case. Quine's problem arises for anyone who
allows that any linguistic distinctions the mind can make, are
distinctions that can be made in behavior as well, which ought to
be all of us who have read the real Wittgenstein.
Nelson Goodman's
discussion of the 'new riddle of induction' also deserves
comparison with Wittgenstein's work. . . . [T]he basic
strategy of Goodman's treatment of the 'new riddle' is strikingly
close to Wittgenstein's sceptical arguments. . . . Although our
paradigm of Wittgenstein's problem was formulated for a
mathematical problem, it was emphasized that it is completely
general and can be applied to any rule or word. In particular, if
it were formulated for the language of color impressions . . .
Goodman's 'grue' . . . would play the role of 'quus'. But the
problem would not be Goodman's about induction -- "Why not predict
that grass, which has been grue in the past, will be grue in the
future?" -- but Wittgenstein's about meaning: "Who is to say that
in the past I didn't mean grue by 'green', so that now I should
call the sky, not the grass, 'green'?" (K, p. 58).
COMMENTARY: I agree with
Kripke that Goodman and KW give similar arguments, much more
similar than Quine and KW. However, unlike some, I confess to
being unable to take Goodman's riddle any more seriously than I
take KW's sceptical paradox. Basically, Goodman asks why we use
the predicates we do as the predicates to induct over rather than
weird predicates that it takes a very bright philosopher to think
up. Goodman's answer is projectibilty; my answer is lack of
imagination, which in this case is a good thing, not a bad thing.
Of course, Goodman's point was to cast doubt on the possibility of
giving a purely formal or syntactic account of confirmability of
hypotheses. And I think he successfully made this case. By
analogy, we can see KW as claiming that a purely syntactic account
of meaning will always fail to do justice to meaning!! Of course,
if this is what he wished to show, I grant that he succeeded!
Wittgenstein has
invented a new form of scepticism. Personally I am inclined to
regard it as the most radical and original sceptical problem that
philosophy has seen to date . . . . Of course he does not wish to
leave us with his problem, but to solve it: the sceptical
conclusion is insane and intolerable. It is his solution, I will
argue, that contains the argument against 'private language'; for
allegedly, the solution will not admit such a language. But it is
important to see that his achievement in posing this problem
stands on its own, independently of the value of his own solution
of it and the resultant argument against private language. For, if
we see Wittgenstein's problem as a real one, it is clear that he
has often been read from the wrong perspective. . . .
.[I]f I am right, . . . [Wittgenstein's] main
problem is not, "How can we show private language -- or
some other special form of language -- to be impossible?";
rather it is, "How can we show any language at all (public,
private, or what-have-you) to be possible?" . . .
Wittgenstein's main problem is that it appears that he has shown
all language, all concept formation, to be
impossible, indeed, unintelligible. (K, pp. 60, 62).
COMMENTARY: A very
important passage for understanding Kripke's conception of his
Wittgenstein's sceptical problem and solution. It is also a
passage that leads many to reject Kripke's account as being an
accurate version of Wittgenstein. First and foremost, I want to
say that no one, including KW himself, sees "Wittgenstein's
problem as a real" problem. That is, it is at best an illusion of
the presentation of the problem in Kripke's book that it could
even be thought that the sceptical problem is a real one and that
it threatens us with semantic and conceptual nihilism. Language is
possible because its possibility does not depend in any way on
finding a fact to show that we meant plus rather than quus in the
past. The challenge to find a fact that shows that we meant plus
rather than quus in the past is unanswerable but also unimportant.
For nothing at all hangs on it, KW's sceptic notwithstanding. As
suggested above, KW's sceptical solution reveals as much, since it
has Wittgenstein agreeing with his putative sceptic that there is
no fact to show that we meant plus rather than quus while yet
showing us how it is possible to have meaning despite the
nonexistence of such facts. (An aside: This passage spells trouble
for George Wilson's claims (see the first commentary above)
regarding Kripke's (and KW's) use of 'sceptical conclusion'.
Clearly, Kripke uses 'sceptical conclusion' to refer to the
sceptic's claim to that language is impossible, for that, rather
than the sceptic's case against meaning facts, is what is "insane
and intolerable).
It is important and
illuminating to compare Wittgenstein's new form of scepticism with
the classical scepticism of Hume; there are important analogies
between the two. Both develop a sceptical paradox, based on
questioning a certain nexus from past to future.
Wittgenstein questions the nexus between past 'intention' or
'meanings' and present practice . . . . Hume questions two other
nexuses, related to each other: the causal nexus whereby a past
event necessitates a future one, and the inductive inferential
nexus from the past to the future. (K, p. 62).
COMMENTARY: This passage
finds Kripke characterizing Wittgenstein's problem as that of
questioning the nexus between past meanings and present practice.
But surely this is not right. KW is surely questioning the nexus
between past practice (i.e., saying 2 + 2 is 4, 2+ 3 is 5, 2 + 8
is 10, etc., along with saying various things involving words like
'count' or 'independent'; see K, pp. 16-7) and past meaning. And
then using these sceptical doubts about past meaning to claim that
we are without justification for answering one way rather than
another in present cases. My answers to present or future problems
can only be, in short, blind leaps in the dark. In other words,
KW's sceptic claims that because my past practice is compatible
with my meaning many different things in the past, I don't know
what I meant in the past. Since I don't know this, I have no
justification for saying one thing rather than another presently
or in the future. So my "present practice" is unjustified,
according to the sceptic. As such, the nexus between past meaning
and present practice is secure for anyone who knows what s/he
meant in the past. For Kripke's sceptic, however, there simply are
no such people.
. . . [A]s
we shall see [Wittgenstein's] solution to his own
sceptical problem begins by agreeing with the sceptics (sic) that
there is no 'superlative fact' (§192) about my mind that
constitutes my meaning addition by 'plus' and determines in
advance what I should do to accord with this meaning. But, he
claims (in §§183-93), the appearance that our ordinary
concept of meaning demands such a fact is based on a philosophical
misconstrual -- albeit a natural one -- of such ordinary
expressions as 'he meant such-and-such' . . . . Wittgenstein
thinks that any construal that looks for something in my present
mental state to differentiate between my meaning addition or
quaddition, or that will consequently show that in the future I
should say '125' when asked about '68 + 57', is a
misconstrual and attributes to the ordinary man a notion of
meaning that is refuted by the sceptical argument. (K, pp.
65-6).
COMMENTARY: By my
lights, this is the beginning of Kripke's hedge on what the
sceptical paradox was all about and what it showed. In particular,
note the use of 'superlative fact' and Kripke allowing that one
can agree with the sceptic about the nonexistence of superlative
facts without undermining the possibility of meaning. Furthermore,
it is here made clear that the sceptic's case for the
impossibility of meaning is based on a philosophical misconstrual
about our concept of meaning, viz., that it requires "superlative
facts". Unfortunately, however, Kripke is not very convincing on
exactly how our ordinary conception of meaning allows us to get by
without the sort of facts sought for and required by the sceptic.
(More on this below). In particular, Kripke never does show how it
is that we are justified, on our ordinary conception of meaning,
to say of someone that s/he means plus rather than quus. As such,
KW does not show us how we are able, once we give up the demand
for superlative facts, to answer the sceptic's challenge, roughly,
"Who is to say that quus is not the function I previously meant by
'+'?" Rather, KW simply ignores this question altogether and is
content to tell a story about meaning that allegedly doesn't
appeal to facts and which is possible only in a community.
The point I am making here is that the sceptic's case for the
nonexistence of a superlative fact about me showing that I meant
plus by '+' is based on the alleged impossibility of there being a
fact that shows I meant plus rather than quus. However, unless and
until KW shows us how he proposes to show that someone means plus
rather than quus, he can't be said to have shown that facts fail
us where something else (e.g., assertion conditions) succeeds. In
short, whatever KW's account of meaning turns out to be, we ought
to ask whether it can do what was required of facts, viz.,
distinguish someone meaning plus from meaning quus. Anticipating
things a bit, I do not see that KW gives us an account of meaning
which does what facts were asked to do, viz., distinguish
someone's meaning plus from his/her meaning quus.
What is a
'sceptical' solution? Call a proposed solution to a sceptical
philosophical problem a straight solution if it shows that
on closer examination the scepticism proves to be unwarranted; an
elusive or complex argument proves the thesis the sceptic doubted.
Descartes gave a 'straight' solution in this sense to his own
philosophical doubts. . . . A sceptical solution of a
sceptical philosophical problem begins on the contrary by
conceding that the sceptic's negative assertions are unanswerable.
Nevertheless our ordinary practice or belief is justified because
-- contrary appearances notwithstanding -- it need not require the
justification the sceptic has shown to be untenable. (K, p.
66).
COMMENTARY: By my
lights, the exact nature of KW's sceptical solution is elusive, in
part because it appears to be, according to the definition above,
both sceptical and straight. By clarifying this matter, much light
can be shed on Kripke's entire reading of Wittgenstein and it can
more easily be shown where and why it goes wrong. For starters, we
need to ask about the "negative assertions" offered by KW's
sceptic. I find two negative assertions by KW's sceptic. First,
there is no fact that I meant plus rather than quus (and,
relatedly, there is no justification for my answering, e.g., 68 +
57, one way rather than another). Second,
meaning/language/rule-following is impossible. It is obvious that
only one of these negative assertions is deemed to be unanswerable
by KW, and just as obvious that it is the first assertion but not
the second that is deemed to be so. After all, if the assertion
that meaning/language/rule-following is impossible is deemed to be
unanswerable, and so something that we must all accept, then not
only would there be nothing more to say, we couldn't say it
anyway.
Notice above that Kripke says a straight solution to a sceptical
problem is one that shows that on closer examination, "the
scepticism proves to be unwarranted". Now, given that KW claims
that meaning is possible, despite the nonexistence of meaning
facts, it is clear that KW believes the scepticism about the
possibility of meaning is unwarranted. As such, KW clearly gives a
straight solution to this sceptical problem, not a sceptical one.
On the other hand, it's also clear that KW agrees with his
sceptic's doubts about the nonexistence of meaning facts. So he
does allow that this negative assertion of the sceptic,
viz., there are no "meaning facts", is "unanswerable".
Furthermore, it's also clear that KW believes that our ordinary
practice of meaning attributions, or our ordinary belief in
meaning (whatever that means?!) is justified, despite the
nonexistence of meaning facts. As such, it appears that KW has
given us a sceptical solution as well. (The fussy among us might
note, however, that KW does not allow that both of the sceptic's
negative assertions are unanswerable, merely that one of them is
such. But then if a sceptical solution requires that all of the
sceptic's negative assertions be deemed unanswerable, it seems
that KW does not give a sceptical solution at all). As is often
the case with Kripke's book, one is forced to ask: What the heck
is going on here?!
What's going on, by my lights, is that Kripke is trying to have
his cake and eat it too. He does so by defining straight and
sceptical solution in such a way that the two are compatible in
cases where there are two negative assertions made by the sceptic.
To see this, it is useful to consider David Hume's sceptical
doubts and solution to them. Hume (or Hume qua sceptic) never
claims that "assurance about future matters of fact" is
impossible, given that our "causal conclusions" are not or cannot
be founded on reason or any process of the understanding. Rather,
Hume claims to have shown only that our assurance about future
matters of fact cannot be due to reason or any process of the
understanding. His sceptical solution begins by granting that the
case against reason is adequate (but not necessarily
"unanswerable") and so we must look elsewhere for the source of
our assurance. Hume's solution is custom or habit. That is, Hume
solves the problem of the source of our assurance about future
matters of fact while yet accepting the case against that
assurance being the result of reason or some process of the
understanding.
In contrast, KW's sceptic claims that meaning is impossible
because of the nonexistence of meaning facts. Now, since KW agrees
with his sceptic that there are no meaning facts, either he allows
that meaning is impossible or rejects the sceptic's argument from
the nonexistence of meaning facts to the impossibility of meaning.
But we know that KW holds that meaning is possible. Hence, KW
rejects the sceptic's argument from the nonexistence of meaning
facts to the impossibility of meaning. As such, scepticism about
the possibility of meaning is clearly unwarranted, i.e., KW gives
a straight solution to the sceptical problem of the impossibility
of meaning. Of course, following Kripke's definition of "sceptical
solution", KW can also be said to provide a sceptical solution
(although I confess it's not at all clear what KW is sceptically
solving; clearly it is not the impossibility of meaning that is
sceptically solved. For that has a straight solution. On the other
hand, it isn't the nonexistence of meaning facts that is
sceptically solved, for that isn't solved at all but is accepted
by KW). KW can be seen to give a sceptical solution since he shows
that our meaning-talk is justified because it doesn't need meaning
facts to justify it. The bottom line appears to be that Kripke,
malgre lui , is using 'straight solution' and 'sceptical
solution' in such a way that his Wittgenstein can and does provide
both sorts of solutions.
One possible way to get Kripke out of this mess would be to appeal
to different senses of 'meaning' in the sceptical challenge and
the sceptical solution respectively. For example, if we suppose
the sceptic's "impossibility of meaning" claim makes use of a
truth-conditional conception of meaning, while KW's claim that
meaning is possible makes use of an assertion-conditions
conception of meaning, then KW may accept that there is no
answering the sceptic's claim that meaning is impossible. All we
can do is offer a different notion of meaning. This move, however,
seems to leave us with a KW whose solution to the problem amounts
to an equivocation on 'meaning'. At least, it leaves us with an
equivocal KW unless we suppose that the sceptic is making the
absolutely preposterous claim that he has established the
impossibility of any and all possible conceptions of meaning.
Of course, I am
suggesting that Wittgenstein's argument against private language
has a structure similar to Hume's argument against private
causation. . . . [Wittgenstein's] solution involves a
sceptical interpretation of what is involved in such ordinary
assertions as "Jones means addition by '+'." The impossibility of
private language emerges as a corollary of his sceptical solution
of his own paradox, as does the impossibility of 'private
causation' in Hume. It turns out that the sceptical solution does
not allow us to speak of a single individual, considered by
himself and in isolation, as ever meaning anything. (K, pp.
68-9).
COMMENTARY: This passage
enunciates a view that leads many to reject the idea that KW = LW.
Most commentators simply do not believe that Wittgenstein's
celebrated argument against private language is a corollary of
anything, let alone a corollary of a sceptical solution of a
sceptical paradox. Anticipating things to come, one might ask how
it is that a "sceptical interpretation" of our ordinary
attributions of meaning could possibly lead to the impossibility
of private language. Another good question here is to ask what
Kripke means by "a single individual considered by himself and in
isolation". In particular, are we to see KW claiming that Robinson
Crusoe, whether isolated his entire life or no, cannot ever mean
anything because the lack of other people keeps him from being
able to mean anything, or are we to see KW saying something "more
vaguely defined and more vaguely defended" than this? The answer
is the latter. For an account of some of the possible vagaries,
see my paper, "Kripke's
Wittgenstein and the Impossibility of Private Language: The Same
Old Story?". Also,
for complaints against the idea that Hume establishes the
impossibility of "private causation", see my paper,
On
Kripkes Use of Hume's Sceptical Doubts and Sceptical
Solution.
[Wittgenstein]
does not give a 'straight' solution, pointing out to the silly
sceptic a hidden fact he overlooked, a condition in the world
which constitutes my meaning addition by 'plus'. In fact, he
agrees with his own hypothetical sceptic that there is no such
fact, no such condition in either the 'internal' or the 'external'
world. (K, p. 69).
COMMENTARY:
Kripke here says that Wittgenstein's
"solution" to his sceptical problem is not a "straight solution"
because Wittgenstein does not produce a meaning fact, i.e., a fact
which shows that someone means plus rather than quus. Of course,
it's true enough that KW's "solution" to the sceptical problem
does not involve producing a meaning fact. However, this is
because KW doesn't think our ordinary conception of meaning
requires such facts for its legitimacy. That is, KW does not
accept the sceptic's argument from the lack of meaning facts to
the impossibility of (ordinary) meaning. But this poses a dilemma,
due to the fact that the account of a straight solution to the
sceptical problem in this passage (viz., that it involves somehow
saving the possibility of meaning without appealing to meaning
facts) differs from the previous account, whereby a straight
solution involved showing the scepticism to be unwarranted. For KW
does show that scepticism about the possibility of ordinary
meaning is unwarranted, for he accepts that there are no meaning
facts but denies that this results in the impossibility of
ordinary meaning. In sum then, it appears that KW both does and
does not offer a straight solution to his paradox. KW's solution
is "not straight" (i.e., is sceptical), according to Kripke, since
it does not involve the production of, indeed, makes no appeal to,
meaning facts. On the other hand, KW's solution is straight
insofar as it deems scepticism about the possibility of ordinary
meaning to be unwarranted. (An aside: Anyone who does believes
that the sceptic is guilty of asking for a fact that is of no
import at all to our meaning talk, can apparently be said to offer
a sceptical solution to the sceptical paradox. But why not just
say that someone who thinks the sceptic is asking for something of
no import to our meaning talk simply rejects the sceptical
challenge as a serious mistake, not as something to be "solved",
sceptically or otherwise?).
We [i.e., Wittgenstein and right
thinking philosophers everywhere] do not wish to doubt or deny
that when people speak of themselves and others as meaning
something by their words, as following rules, they do so with
perfect right. We do not even wish to deny the propriety of an
ordinary use of the phrase 'the fact that Jones meant addition by
such-and-such a symbol', and indeed such expressions do have
perfectly ordinary uses. We merely wish to deny the existence of
the 'superlative fact' that philosophers misleadingly attach to
such ordinary forms of words, not the propriety of the forms of
words themselves. (K, p. 69).
COMMENTARY:
This is one of many passages in chapter
3 which finds Kripke soft-selling the force of the sceptical
challenge and sceptical attack on the possibility of meaning
facts. If the sceptic was not, in chapter 2, denying the propriety
of our ordinary meaning talk, including especially our ordinary
talk of the fact that someone means such-and-such by a particular
sign, what the heck was he doing and why should anyone care about
an attack on "non-ordinary meaning talk, or care about the
impossibility of meaning talk that is not "ordinary"?! It sure
seemed to me, and it sure seemed like it was supposed to seem to
the reader, that the sceptic was attacking our ordinary talk of
meaning and meaning facts. After all, many responses to the
sceptical challenge canvassed by Kripke seemed pretty ordinary to
me. Furthermore, Kripke speaks several times of the
incredibleness, the insanity, the intolerableness of the sceptical
conclusions, going so far as to say that the sceptical challenge
gives rise to an "eerie feeling" in him. Now surely such reactions
to the challenge make sense just insofar as we see the sceptic
challenging our ordinary notions of meaning, challenging what we
take to be obviously true aspects of our ordinary meaning talk. We
would hardly find the sceptical conclusions insane and intolerable
if we didn't think they posed a direct threat to our ordinary
understanding of meaning and what it involves. Most importantly,
no one who didn't want us to think that the sceptic was attacking
cherished but ordinary beliefs about meaning, would say that the
sceptical conclusions are insane and intolerable. As such, I think
it is obvious that Kripke is guilty of offering a deliberately
misleading account of (what he takes to be) Wittgenstein's
sceptical paradox and sceptical solution. For there never was,
apparently, a threat to our ordinary notions of meaning, to our
ordinary meaning talk. But now that we know this, we can and
should see the sceptical challenge to be of no real import. For at
best it attacks a notion of meaning we neither know of nor make
use of, and denies the existence of meaning facts that are of no
import for "ordinary meaning" (whatever that is). To put this
another way, there's nothing incredible, insane or intolerable
about the nonexistence of "superlative facts" and so nothing
insane, incredible, intolerable about the sceptical
conclusions.
However, it could at least be said that KW's sceptic supposes that
he is attacking our ordinary notion of meaning, supposes that his
attack poses a real threat to our usual notion of meaning. And as
I've already suggested, Kripke's discussion throughout chapter 2
seems to treat the sceptical challenge as a threat to something
important rather than a threat to something we don't need for
meaning, viz., superlative facts. But a question arises here: Why
should KW's sceptic agree with KW that the nonexistence of
superlative facts poses no threat to our usual meaning-talk
because our "ordinary meaning-talk" neither uses nor needs
superlative facts? Most importantly, the sceptic might allow that
although the nonexistence of superlative facts poses no
practical difficulties for our ordinary meaning talk
(mainly because we would laugh KW's sceptic out of the bank or
math class) nonetheless our ordinary notion of meaning is one
which theoretically requires the existence of superlative meaning
facts. And though we may be able to get by without superlative
facts in day to day talk of meaning, (chiefly because no one
raises sceptical difficulties to our day to day meaning talk), we
should appreciate that it's one thing to dismiss the sceptic as
misguided because he's raising "mere theoretical" (or dare I say,
philosophical), problems about meaning, it's another thing to
claim that the sceptic can be dismissed because his attack is
aimed at a bogus theory of meaning, and it's a third thing to
dismiss the sceptic by showing why or how his theory of meaning is
bogus. By my lights, KW is not claiming that the sceptic is
raising "mere theoretical" worries that can be dismissed in our
day to day talk. Rather, KW dismisses the sceptic by claiming that
the sceptic is attacking a bogus theory of meaning. But KW fails,
it seems to me, to show how or why the sceptic's theory of meaning
is bogus.
For the sceptic, "facts or truth conditions are of the essence of
meaningful assertions" (see K, p. 77). And while it may be true
that we need not take facts or truth conditions to be "of the
essence of meaningful assertion", it's another thing altogether to
say that our ordinary notion of meaning does not take facts or
truth conditions to be of the essence of meaningful assertion.
Furthermore, it is surely fallacious (i.e., question begging) for
KW to claim that our ordinary conception of meaning must be
different from the sceptic's because whereas the sceptic has
meaning being impossible (for want of meaning facts) we know
meaning is possible. Similar remarks apply to those who would see
KW as giving a reductio of a realist or truth conditional account
of meaning. The fact (assuming it is one) that a realist/truth
conditional account of meaning is impossible shows neither that
our ordinary conception is not a realist one nor that such a
conception cannot be right. For we could still be realists about
meaning and simply make the best of the fact that meaning is
impossible (e.g., by appreciating that, practically speaking, the
lack of meaning facts poses no difficulty at all). Echoing a
thought from Wittgenstein's remarks on contradiction, don't
suppose that the sceptic's case for the impossibility of meaning,
even if successful, rules out our making sense of any meaning
claims whatsoever!
The bottom line appears to be that Kripke has not, and probably
cannot, give a convincing argument to show that our ordinary
conception of meaning is not such that facts or truth conditions
are of the essence of meaningful assertion. Ultimately, it seems
that KW is offering a conception of meaning that does not require
"superlative meaning facts" but without being able to show that
this conception is our ordinary one or that it has any other
virtues besides allegedly avoiding the sceptic's attack on
meaning. By my lights, unless and until KW can show that his
conception of meaning allows us to show that someone means plus
rather than quus (albeit without appeal to facts, for KW allegedly
agrees there are no such facts), his claim that the sceptic has
not challenged our ordinary conception of meaning must be regarded
as nothing more than an ad hoc maneuver.
Whenever our opponent insists on the
perfect propriety of an ordinary form of expression (e.g., that
'the steps are determined by the formula', 'the future application
is already present'), we can insist that if these expressions are
properly understood, we agree. The danger comes when we try to
give a precise formulation of exactly what it is that we
are denying -- what 'erroneous interpretation' our
opponent is placing on ordinary means of expression. . . .
Nevertheless I choose to be so bold as to say: Wittgenstein holds,
with the sceptic, that there is no fact as to whether I mean plus
or quus. But if this is to be conceded to the sceptic, is this not
the end of the matter? What can be said on behalf of our
ordinary attributions of meaningful language to ourselves and
others? Has not the incredible and self-defeating conclusion, that
all language is meaningless, already been drawn? (K, p. 71).
COMMENTARY:
The final line here perhaps harks back to p. 13 of Kripke's text
where he offers us an argument which allegedly shows how the
impossibility of meaning follows, willy-nilly, from the
nonexistence of "meaning facts". Since Kripke here is so bold as
to say that Wittgenstein agrees that there are no such facts, the
conclusion that language is impossible seems to have "already been
drawn". As suggested above, it is clear that KW takes himself to
somehow wriggle out of the alleged airtight argument offered
earlier in chapter 2. Perhaps it wasn't as airtight as it seemed
to Kripke in chapter 2. More particularly, the "problem" with the
argument on p. 13 appears to be that there are conceptions of
meaning for which the nonexistence of the sorts of facts sought by
the sceptic poses no problem at all. One complaint about this way
around the argument is that it does not succeed in showing that
meaning is not impossible, in the sceptic's sense of 'meaning'.
Rather, it simply changes the subject. However, KW's justification
for changing the subject is to claim that the sceptic's assumed
notion of meaning is not or cannot be our "ordinary" notion of
meaning. Of course, KW supports this by claiming that our ordinary
notion of meaning is not really undone by the sceptic! I think we
have a circle here. The bottom line appears to be that KW agrees
with his sceptic about the impossibility of his (the sceptic's)
notion of meaning and will offer as a "sceptical solution" to this
problem an alternative notion of meaning which is unchallenged
(indeed, unconsidered) by the sceptical argument. My main
difficulty in all of this is why speak of a "sceptical solution"
to the sceptical challenge to the possibility of meaning? For KW
never solves that problem. Rather, he agrees with his sceptic that
meaning of the sort attacked by the sceptic is impossible. On the
other hand, KW's offering up an alternative notion of "meaning" to
the one he agrees is impossible and saying that this solves,
albeit sceptically, the problem of the impossibility of meaning,
is strange stuff indeed. For surely the sceptic ought not be
thought to have argued that it was impossible to invent something
called, "meaning", which invention is immune to the sceptical
challenge. Of course, if the notion of meaning which escapes the
sceptic's argument is no invention but is alleged to be our
"ordinary notion of meaning", then the sceptical challenge should
have been rejected from the start as misguided.
In reply [viz., to the question
whether the "incredible and self-defeating conclusion that all
language is meaningless" has not already been drawn] we must
say something about the change in Wittgenstein's philosophy of
language from the Tractatus to the Investigations. .
. . [A]s Dummett says, "the Investigations contains
implicitly a rejection of the classical (realist)
Frege--Tractatus view that the general form of explanation
of meaning is a statement of the truth conditions". In the place
of this view, Wittgenstein proposes an alternative rough general
picture. . . . Wittgenstein replaces the question, "What must be
the case for this sentence to be true?" by two others: first,
"Under what conditions may this form of words be appropriately
asserted (or denied)?"; second, given an answer to the first
question, "What is the role, and the utility, in our lives of our
practice of asserting (or denying) the form of words under these
conditions?" (K, p. 71, p.73).
COMMENTARY:
This passage is the heart of the so-called sceptical solution. It
finds KW rejecting one notion of meaning for another, making clear
that indeed, KW is changing the subject rather than solving the
sceptic's challenge to the impossibility of meaning. KW seems to
hold then that for want of meaning facts, truth conditional
meaning is impossible. However, KW takes himself to sceptically
solve this problem (i.e., without appeal to, or production of,
meaning facts) by offering an alternative notion of meaning, one
which does not require meaning facts. But unless we suppose some
sort of Platonic notion of meaning (i.e., we suppose that
'meaning' really means "assertion condition meaning" rather
than ""truth conditional meaning"), it's clear that we must see KW
and his sceptic as simply talking by each other. KW's sceptic says
truth conditional meaning is impossible. KW apparently agrees but
claims that "assertion condition meaning" is not impossible. But
is the sceptic supposed to disagree with this? Is the sceptic to
regard this as a solution to his problem? Again, KW has
done nothing more than change the subject.
Still, there are other problems here. First, Kripke is apparently
unaware that the first of the two replacement questions can also
be asked and answered on the classical realist view. Indeed, the
classical realist view takes itself to be offering an answer to
this very question. For on the classical realist view of meaning,
a form of words may be appropriately asserted (or denied) just
when there are (are not) facts that correspond to the form of
words. That is, on the classical realist view, a form of words is
appropriately asserted (or denied) just when it's true (or false).
As for the second question, it is, as many commentators have
noted, perverse and no part of Wittgenstein's concern, and not
very important for KW either. Peter Winch notes that use, as in
the Wittgensteinian slogan,"meaning is use" and utility, are very
different notions indeed. Also, Warren Goldfarb, in "Kripke on
Wittgenstein on Rules", fn. 14, notes: "Kripke adds a second
requirement, namely, that there be an account of the role and
utility in our lives of the practice of ascribing meaning. This
requirement is puzzling. It is hard to see any content in a
general notion of "role and utility in our lives"; what does it
rule out? Textual support in Wittgenstein is tenuous, at best.
However, Kripke does not exploit such a general requirement in his
argument." As such, a more accurate characterization of KW's
"sceptical solution" is to see it as offering a different answer
to the first of his two questions from that offered by the
classical realist approach. But this means that KW and his sceptic
are judging the legitimacy of meaning attributions by different
criteria, which further supports the claim that KW and his sceptic
are talking by each other. However, we'll see below that things
are not even this good for KW!
. . . we can say that Wittgenstein
proposes a picture of language based, not on
truth-conditions, but on assertability conditions or
justification conditions: under what circumstances are we
allowed to make a given assertion? (K, p. 74).
COMMENTARY:
This passage gives the terminology for the Tractatus
notion of meaning and the Philosophical Investigations
notion of meaning respectively.
Recall Wittgenstein's sceptical
conclusion: no facts, no truth conditions, correspond to
statements such as "Jones means addition by '+'." . . . Now if we
suppose that facts, or truth conditions, are of the essence of
meaningful assertion, it will follow from the sceptical conclusion
that assertions that anyone ever means anything are meaningless.
On the other hand, if we apply to these assertions the tests
suggested in Philosophical Investigations, no such
conclusion follows. All that is needed to legitimize assertions
that someone means something is that there be roughly specifiable
circumstances under which they are legitimately assertable . . . .
No supposition that 'facts correspond' to those assertions is
needed. (K, pp. 77-8).
COMMENTARY:
Once again, Kripke unabashedly announces that his Wittgenstein
"solves" the problem of the impossibility of meaning by shifting
from a truth conditions account of meaning to an assertability
conditions account. But what is truly strange about this
particular passage is the simplicity of Kripke's criterion for
legitimate meaning attributions, viz., there must be "roughly
specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately
assertable". The problem with this criterion is not that it's
false but that it's trivially true. Indeed, it can be granted even
by fans of truth conditional accounts of meaning. For truth
conditionalists claim that the circumstances under which meaning
attributions are legitimately assertable are those wherein
particular facts obtain, facts to which the meaning attribution
correspond.
Clearly, in order to give us a substantive claim here, Kripke (or
KW) must tell us something about the conditions which allegedly
legitimate our meaning attributions. In particular, Kripke must
tell us something about the circumstances under which, "Jones
means plus by '+'", can be legitimately asserted. However, it's
one thing to offer us such circumstances and it's another thing to
verify that such circumstances can in fact do the job of
legitimating some particular meaning attribution. The latter
matter deals with the question of what we are going to require of
our putative legitimating circumstances in order for them to count
as legitimating circumstances. For not any old thing that anyone
wants to call a legitimating circumstance can be allowed to count
as a legitimating circumstance. It has long been my contention
that one of the crucial flaws in Kripke's account of Wittgenstein
is that the so-called sceptical solution to the sceptical paradox
simply ignores the problem which allegedly did in a
truth-conditional or fact-based account of meaning, viz., the
problem that any circumstance we cite as a legitimating
circumstance is capable of legitimating more than one meaning
attribution.
Recall that KW's reason for rejecting a truth conditional or
fact-based account of meaning in favor of an assertion conditions
account is the alleged nonexistence of any fact that shows we
meant/mean plus rather than quus by '+'. We must also remind
ourselves that the sceptic did not show that there were no facts
to support the claim that Jones means plus by '+'. The sceptic
showed, allegedly, that whatever facts we have to support the
claim that Jones means plus by '+' are also facts that support
claiming that Jones means quus by '+'. The upshot is that KW
believes that so long as some putative legitimating circumstance
allows us to legitimate more than one meaning attribution, it
fails to be a genuine legitimating circumstance. In short, facts
cannot provide, or be included in our account of, circumstances
which legitimate meaning attributions. However, once we appreciate
that the case against facts being part of our story about
legitimating circumstances rests on the claim that facts allow us
to legitimate too many meaning attributions at any one time, we
should ask of any account of legitimating circumstances whether it
doesn't permit us to legitimate more than one meaning attribution
at a time. But once we appreciate this, it isn't hard to see that
no account of legitimating circumstances is likely to pass muster,
for it's hard to imagine any account of legitimating circumstances
that will be immune to the problem of legitimating too many
meaning attributions for its own good. This is especially so given
the alleged failure of a truth conditional account to provide
unique legitimating circumstances.
By my lights, the conjuring trick of Kripke's story is that the
sceptical considerations that allegedly give rise to the
impossibility of a truth conditions account of meaning (viz.,
couldn't Jones just as well mean quus rather than plus, given the
facts at hand) simply disappear once the shift is made to an
assertions conditions account of meaning. But there is no reason
sceptical considerations cannot be brought to bear on an assertion
conditions account. Kripke here seems to think that all we need to
avoid the impossibility of meaning is to give up on the need for
facts, or facts corresponding to meaning attributions. To be sure,
by giving up on the need for facts, we need no longer be troubled
by the sceptic's argument against the existence of meaning facts.
However, before we can be sure that a non-fact based conception of
meaning is possible, we must insure that the sceptic's arguments
against meaning facts cannot be modified so that they apply just
as well to alternative accounts of meaning, in this case, an
assertion conditions account. This Kripke simply does not do.
Furthermore, I claim it cannot be done because KW's assertion
conditions are no better at avoiding or answering sceptical
worries about meaning than are truth conditions or fact
conditions. Indeed, the only way an assertion conditions account
of meaning can avoid the problems the sceptic finds for a truth
conditions account is for it to ignore the requirement of
uniqueness, that is, the requirement that no "circumstance" or
condition that can legitimate more than one meaning attribution
can be a genuine legitimating circumstance. Of course, if we make
a similar proviso in the case of a truth conditions account (and I
see nothing to prevent this), then it too can avoid the wrath of
the sceptical argument. I claim then that KW's assertion
conditions account of meaning is really no better off as regards
sceptical worries than is a truth conditions account.
In sum then, Kripke or KW thinks an assertion conditions of
meaning succeeds where a truth conditions account fails precisely
because he no where asks the assertion conditions account to
produce conditions or circumstances which legitimate saying,
"Jones means plus rather than quus by '+'". (For the
record, I do not believe that the sceptical attack on meaning
facts is entirely successful. While I allow that nothing in my
past behavior or thought, no matter how idealized, shows that I
meant plus rather than quus, I do not think, contra Kripke, or KW
or KW's sceptic, that this means that my future responses to
problems involving '+' are completely unjustified, no better than
leaps in the dark. For my future responses to problems involving
'+' provide a fact of the matter about which of plus or quus I
mean. Again, see Putnam's paper, "On Wittgenstein's Philosophy of
Mathematics").