|
|
Greetings. My name is John Humphrey and I am an associate professor of philosophy at Minnesota State University, Mankato. I created this page as a way to compile and share all the work I have done and will continue to do on Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982. Abbreviated as 'WRPL'). My acquaintance with the book began while I was still in graduate school at Washington University in St. Louis. I was writing my dissertation on Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics and Kripke's book had already caused quite a stir among people in the philosophy of mathematics, as well as among Wittgensteinians. I remember being sympathetic to Kripke's account at this time and no doubt saw Wittgenstein as being some sort of rule-sceptic, even if I didn't buy Kripke's whole story.
My view of Kripke's book has changed considerably since my grad student days and I now regard the book as fundamentally flawed, both as Wittgenstein exegesis and as an independent thesis. In this respect, I am certainly in good company, since similar (albeit somewhat milder) views are held by many philosophers including Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker, Noam Chomsky, John Searle, Warren Goldfarb, the late Peter Winch, Patricia Werhane, Neil Tennant, Stuart Shanker, Colin McGinn, Donald Davidson, John McDowell, David Pears, Burton Dreben, et. al. However, despite this rather impressive list of enemies, Kripke's book continues to have its supporters. To echo Kant, I regard this state of affairs, viz., the continued existence of supporters and believers in the legitimacy of Kripke's book (either as Wittgenstein exegesis or as an independent thesis) as a scandal of philosophy. Or, to vary a line from Daniel Dennett, I blush for the profession of philosophy anytime I find someone defending Kripke's book, either as a correct reading of Wittgenstein or as a viable account of rule-following or meaning, irrespective of its pedigree.
So, to lay my cards on the table, it is one of the goals of this page, if not the main goal of this page, to show just how flawed and misguided Kripke's book really is. But why then, it could be asked, devote a website to a book that is fundamentally flawed and already recognized to be such by many philosophers? Of course, one answer is that those on the other side need to be shown the error of their way. But a better answer is that despite the book's mistaken views, it is nonetheless important and interesting in a way that perhaps no correct account of Wittgenstein could possibly be. As such, bringing out its flaws and infelicities is both interesting and important, irrespective of how many people get convinced along the way. One can say of Kripke's book what is often said of Anselm's ontological argument, viz., it's interestingly wrong, i.e., its mistakes are important and significant mistakes. So the number of philosophers who "see the light" as a result of visiting my page is not the bottom line. (There are still defenders of the ontological argument after all). The bottom line is getting a clear view of Kripke's book.
After many years of reading books and articles on Kripke's book I am convinced that the definitive critique of it has yet to be written. It is also my belief that this is partly a result of certain conventions governing the dissemination of academic materials. I think that a website can avoid some of these conventions and so has a better chance of covering all the bases, or more bases than a standard book-length treatment could cover. This is not to say that one will get the definitive critique here but merely that it's likelier to come on the web than in print form. Another reason the definitive critique has yet to be written is that no one has appreciated that the main flaw of Kripke's book is his constant use of true but irrelevant statements. More often than not, I find that Kripke's contentions, although true, simply do not show what he wants his readers to think they show. (Some of my own reasons for saying this can be found in Commentary on Selected Passages from WRPL and Selected Critical Discussions of WRPL.) A bit of reflection ought to convince you that of all the ways a writer can go wrong, the most difficult error to critique is that of the true but irrelevant claim.
Despite the fact that I have been
wrestling with Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private
Language (hereafter, WRPL) for over eleven years now, I'm
presently uncertain about how to go about providing an
introduction to the text. The difficulty is that people will
arrive at this page with varying degrees of knowledge of the book,
as well as varying degrees of philosophical sophistication. This
is not to say that only philosophical sophisticates can understand
Kripke's book. On the contrary, Kripke's book is for the most part
a surprisingly straightforward and readily accessible work. I have
used it several times in my undergraduate courses on contemporary
philosophy and for the most part, students were able to grasp its
main ideas and arguments. It is to say that the web audience is
diverse and introducing a book to such a diverse audience is not
an easy thing to do.
I'll start by saying that the book is pretty readable and sucks
you in with a rather bizarre paradox right from the start and so
perhaps the best thing to say for those unacquainted with the book
is: START READING THE BOOK! Beyond this, I can say that Kripke's
book purports to give a radically new way of understanding one of
the main arguments of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical classic,
Philosophical Investigations (hereafter, PI). (If you wish
to know some details about Ludwig Wittgenstein and his
Philosophical Investigations, click
here). I'll let the following
from John Searle serve as a very brief introduction to Ludwig
Wittgenstein:
The single most influential analytic philosopher of the twentieth century, and indeed, the philosopher whom most analytic philosophers would regard as the greatest philosopher of the century, is Ludwig Wittgenstein.
It's also important to say that Wittgenstein's philosophy is commonly divided into an early period, culminating in his book, Tractatus logico-philosophicus (hereafter, TLP), and a later period, culminating in PI. In many ways, PI is a repudiation of many of the views of TLP. However, for my purposes, the most important thing to say about PI is that it contains a very famous argument that is alleged to show that a "private language" is impossible. Kripke's book makes the provocative claim that previous commentary on Wittgenstein's private language argument has failed to appreciate the real nature of Wittgenstein's argument. As Kripke puts it in his introduction:
"[WRPL] constitutes . . . 'an elementary exposition' of what I take to be the central thread of Wittgenstein's later work on the philosophy of language and philosophy of mathematics, including my interpretation of the 'private language argument', which on my view is principally to be explicated in terms of the problem of 'following a rule'."
Very briefly, Kripke finds
Wittgenstein presenting a sceptical paradox about rules and
rule-following, and, a la David Hume in his An Enquiry
concerning Human Understanding, providing a sceptical solution
to it. According to Kripke, it is Wittgenstein's sceptical
solution to the paradox that contains Wittgenstein's argument
against the possibility of private language. (I vacillate between
speaking of the views expressed in WRPL as being Kripke's or
Kripke's Wittgenstein (KW). Despite Kripke's disclaimers to the
contrary, he is doing a lot of arguing in the text). For more
introduction and information concerning the sceptical paradox, the
sceptical solution, or KW's case against private language,
click
here.
One of Kripke's most controversial claims is that Wittgenstein's
main argument against private language is completed by
paragraph 202 of PI, whereas for many years scholars held that
Wittgenstein's case against private language begins at paragraph
243! Another is that Wittgenstein, who is commonly seen as
anything but a sceptic, can be seen to propound and accept key
portions of a sceptical paradox about the possibility of
rule-following and meaningful language.
Another controversial part of the book is Kripke's claim (noted
above) that Wittgenstein's sceptical paradox (or sceptical problem
or sceptical challenge) is analogous to David Hume's famous
sceptical anlace in sections IV and V of An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding. Although some Kripke commentators have
criticized Kripke's treatment of Hume, none has made a careful
study of this part of Kripke's story. At some point, my own
analysis of Kripke's Hume and his alleged case against private
causation will appear on this page.
Although this is a very brief and rough introduction, it should be
clear that Kripke's book is filled with juicy philosophical issues
and controversies, enough to keep a lot of philosophers busy for a
long, long time. So, don't just sit there, get busy!
Finally, I welcome all comments and criticism of my ideas here,
and welcome any suggestions for improving this page. Please e-mail
me at the address below. I hope you have a fun and informative
experience. Thanks for stopping by.
Top of Page | WRPL Ultimate HomePage
Last modified Jan. 28, 2000
JAH,
Professor
Dept. of Philosophy