The Factualist/Nonfactualist Debate among Kripke Commentators

Visitors to this site are no doubt aware however, that a couple of recent papers by Alex Byrne and George Wilson respectively, challenge the claim that KW espouses a nonfactualist account of MAs. At this point, I am struck by the question: Given that most commentators do not criticize KW for espousing nonfactualism, one wonders what, beyond simply getting Kripke right, depends on KW being or not being a nonfactualist. One really gets no good answer from Byrne. He plows ahead with his case for a "prevalent misunderstanding" on this matter but says almost nothing about why or how the misunderstanding caused Kripke's critics to be wildly off target in their criticisms of KW or how getting KW right can be used to save him from his critics. And frankly, one gets no better answer from Wilson. Although Wilson claims that taking KW to be a nonfactualist is somehow connected with a common, but by Wilson's lights, bogus, charge that KW's view is incompatible with claims made by Wittgenstein at Philosophical Investigations §201, he fails to convince me that commentators are wrong to hold that KW is incompatible with §201. Thus, even if I allow that reading KW as a nonfactualist is the source of the charge that KW is incompatible with §201 (which I don't), that Wilson seems to be wrong about the compatibility of KW and §201, suggests that the issue of whether KW is or is not a nonfactualist is not a significant one.

By my lights, the dispute about KW's nonfactualism is misplaced for the simple reason that Kripke clearly admits that in some sense of 'fact', whatever it may be, there are no facts for meaning attributions to describe, state, be made true by, etc. As I note in my reply to Wilson, Kripke explicitly allows that his Wittgenstein's solution has the consequence that meaning attributions "are neither to be regarded as stating facts, nor to be thought of as explaining our behavior . . . ." (K, p. 31, fn. 22). So in some sense of 'fact', KW is a nonfactualist.

My own view is that Kripke begins by trying to make his Wittgenstein a nonfactualist (i.e., for some reason K thinks it's important for Wittgenstein to agree with his sceptic that there are no facts that show that someone means plus rather than quus, and all that that entails, viz., that meaning attributions don't state facts), begins with the goal of making some sort of significant distinction between facts and truth conditions on the one hand and "roughly specifiable circumstances" and assertability conditions on the other, but then can't, in the end, pull it all off. That is, KW does not succeed in giving us a viable or plausible account of meaning, (more precisely, does not give us a viable or plausible account of the assertability conditions for meaning attributions) that makes no appeal to what he and the sceptic allegedly both deny exists, viz., something which shows "how I am justified in giving the answer '125' (rather than, e.g., '5') to '68 + 57'." As such, it's not hard to make a case for KW being a factualist of some sort, since it is clear that his sceptical solution account of the justification of meaning attributions does appeal to facts, viz., the usual ones, facts about what someone has said and when, and how, etc. But what Kripke's apologists fail to appreciate is that KW's appeal to such facts is incompatible with KW's agreeing with his sceptic that there are no such facts available to properly justify meaning attributions. Either such facts were sufficient to answer the sceptic initially, in which case the sceptic is wrong about there being no facts that justify meaning attributions or else such facts are insufficient to justify our meaning attributions. The alleged "out" here, of course, is to claim, as Kripke attempts to claim, that the sort of justification sought by the sceptic is somehow illegitimate or based on a "philosophical misconstrual" of our meaning talk. The main problem with this manuever is rather straightforward: the only reason Kripke offers us for saying that the sceptic is guilty of a misconstrual of our ordinary meaning talk is because if he isn't regarded as guilty of this, we couldn't justify our meaning attributions!

As a result, KW ends up as a factualist but only because Kripke's attempt to make him a nonfactualist and have him provide a viable or plausible account of meaning attributions, was a hopeless cause. Thus, KW is a factualist, malgre Kripke (not lui). However, as such, KW cannot be said to have offered a SCEPTICAL solution to his sceptical paradox. And herein lies the rub. In simple form, here is the dilemma facing Kripke apologists. Either they respect KW's professed acceptance of his sceptic's denial of meaning facts, which then forces them to conclude that KW's attempt to properly justify meaning attributions fails miserably (because of KW's denial of meaning facts; ), or they must claim that KW's sceptical solution account of meaning attributions leans on facts, since the account cannot be both viable and nonfactual. Unfortunately, the factualist account makes KW's solution straight, not sceptical.

Top of Page | WRPL Ultimate HomePage