Commentary
on Plato's Apology (17-26a)
The First and Only "Socratic Dialogue"
In
most collections of Plato's dialogues it is usually the Apology which begins the book, and rightly so, for the Apology is the dialogue which recounts
an important, indeed, perhaps the single most important event in Plato's life.
The event recorded in the Apology is
very likely the event which is the seed from which the
Platonic corpus was to grow and so the seed from which Western Philosophy was
to grow as well. I want to say that had this event not taken place, it is
unlikely there would be any Platonic dialogues at all. But perhaps I am wrong;
perhaps the seeds of Plato's philosophical journey had been sown long before
the event "recorded" in the Apology
took place. Certainly most of Plato's dialogues consist of accounts of
discussions and conversations that, if actual, would have taken place long before
the event in question. So there certainly could have been a Platonic corpus
even without THE event. But it does seem unlikely. Less likely still is that
the dialogues we have would have been the same in the absence of Socrates'
defense before his fellow Athenians.
As my
heading reveals, I regard the Apology
as a Socratic, rather than a Platonic, dialogue. For in Apology, Socrates speaks more as himself than in any other Platonic
dialogue. Indeed, Apology is not really a Platonic
dialogue at all (in not being apoetic, e.g.) but rather a combination of
Socratic autobiography and impassioned self-defense of Socrates' way of life.
More than any other Platonic dialogue, we find the Apology offering us a Socrates who is doing something different
from, and much more important than, teaching others by asking them questions
and offering criticism of their answers (although he does some of that too). In
the Apology, Socrates offers us his raison d'être, along with the raison d'être for the so-called Socratic
method. For this reason then it is clear that in the Apology, we find a Socrates who "begins at the
beginning". Thus the Apology
marks a proper beginning for anyone interested in the Platonic corpus.
The Beginning of Apology
Plato’s
Apology begins with what appear to be
Socrates' opening remarks to defend himself against the charges of impiety and
corrupting the youth before his fellow Athenians in an Athenian court. (There
are, of course, a variety of academic divisions of the dialogue. I will ignore
them here for the most part. I will simply plow through the dialogue as I see
fit). These opening remarks reveal that Socrates is responding to those who
have already pleaded their case for Socrates being impious and a corrupter of
the youth, although it will be some time into the dialogue that all of this
information is set out. The opening remarks are important and instructive,
however, and are as follows:
I do not know what effect my accusers have had upon you, gentlemen, but for my own part I was almost carried away by them -- their arguments were so convincing. On the other hand, scarcely a word of what they said was true. I was especially astonished at one of their many misrepresentations; I mean when they told you that you must be careful not to let me deceive you -- the implication being that I am a skillful speaker. . . . [In fact] I have not the slightest skill as a speaker -- unless, of course, by a skillful speaker they mean one who speaks the truth.
. . . My accusers, then, as I maintain, have said little or nothing that is true, but from me you shall hear the whole truth -- not, I can assure you, gentlemen, in flowery language like theirs, decked out with fine words and phrases. . . . It would hardly be suitable, gentlemen, for a man of my age to address you in the artificial language of a schoolboy orator. (17 a-c).
Now for
anyone who doesn't worship at the feet of Socrates, these opening remarks would
be regarded as, one, the usual (and useless) tripe of any convicted person (all
who are accused claim to be innocent, don't they?!)
and two, as exhibiting a case of Socratic irony or cluelessness, viz., when
Socrates suggests that his accusers' warning to avoid being deceived by
Socrates is misplaced, since Socrates traffics only in the truth, never
deception. The claim that my accusers are liars, or are telling falsehoods,
goes hand in hand with claiming that I am telling the truth. But the key
matter, of course, is who is telling the truth and this is not to be established
by being given Socrates' own view of the matter. As for Socrates' contention
that his accuser's misrepresent his skills as a
speaker, some have seen it as ironic (i.e., such that "something contrary
to what is said is to be understood"). And some have criticized those who
see it as ironic. This debate matters not. What's important is that Socrates
has done nothing more here than contend he is no deceiver and that anyone who
suggests otherwise is a liar. No doubt there is a sense in which Socrates truly
believes this. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that Socrates is
completely unaware that many in Athens regard him as a skillful speaker or as
capable of deceiving people, in some sense. If he has no clue about his
reputation in Athens, he's been talking to people without hearing or seeing
them. The bottom line then is that Socrates is, in a perfectly legitimate
sense, a skillful speaker who can and does deceive people. (More on this below;
in particular, I am not claiming that Socrates is guilty of deceiving people in
the same way that dishonest salespeople deceive people, or in the way that
liars deceive people. Nor am I claiming that Socrates is always aware that he
is deceiving people. The primary way in which Socrates deceives people, I assert,
is by contending that his elenchus has
shown that they are not virtuous, or don't know or care what virtue is, etc.
Since Socrates' claims rest, I believe, on faulty ideas about virtue, and what
knowledge of virtue involves or requires (not to mention occasionally
using questinable techniques in arriving at a refutation of his interlocutors'
claims), they are deceptive. Again, more on all of this as I go. If I am
correct, Socrates' promise to offer the jurors nothing but the truth is already
in trouble.).
Socrates
goes on to distinguish between his "earliest accusers" and his
"later accusers". The earliest accusers include "a great many
people", who have "for a great many years", filled the jurors'
minds (from childhood on) "with untrue accusations" against Socrates
as follows:
There is a wise man called Socrates who has theories about the heavens and has investigated everything below the earth, and can make the weaker argument defeat the stronger. (18b).
Socrates
also claims that those who make these "untrue accusations" are his
"dangerous accusers, not only because of their number, their anonymity
(Aristophanes notwithstanding) and the length of time they have been spreading
their lies but also because such wise men are thought by all to be atheists.
The later accusers are Anytus, Meletus and Lycon, who claim
Socrates is impious (believes in false gods or no gods at all) and by his
teaching corrupts the youth. Socrates begins his defense by dealing with his
earlier accusers.
Socrates'
defense against Aristophanes, et. al.
Early
in this part of the Apology, Socrates
says to the jurors:
You have seen it yourselves in the play by Aristophanes, where Socrates goes whirling round, proclaiming that he is walking on air, and uttering a great deal of other nonsense about things of which I know nothing whatsoever . . . [and] I take no interest in it. . . . The fact is that there is nothing in any of these charges, and if you have heard anyone say that I try to educate people and charge a fee, there is no truth in that either.
. . . I happened to meet a man who has paid more in Sophists' fees than all the rest put together -- I mean Callias . . . . So I asked him -- he has two sons, you see -- . . . whom do you intend to get as their instructor? Who is the expert in perfecting the human and social qualities? . . . Who is he, and where does he come from . . . [a]nd what does he charge? Evenus of Paros, Socrates, said he, and his fee is five minas. . . . I should certainly plume myself and give myself airs if I understood these things, but in fact, gentlemen, I do not. (19c--20c).
Socrates is
here defending himself against the charge that he is either a natural scientist
type of wise man or a Sophist (paid teacher of virtue) and although he is
neither scientist nor Sophist his defense seems a bit odd, for it is dubious
that many Athenians took him to be either. Socrates is, in short, attacking
something of a straw man. Socrates moves closer to the point when he offers to
explain to the jurors why he has attained a certain sort of "false
notoriety", and offers to explain what he has done that has led so many to
misrepresent his activities and beliefs.
At 20d,
Socrates claims that his reputation is due to "nothing more or less than a
kind of wisdom", a human wisdom. However, Socrates "shall call as
witness to [his] wisdom, such as it is, the god at Delphi." (20e).
Socrates then relates the story about his friend Chaerephon going to the oracle
at Delphi and asking: Is there anyone wiser than Socrates?,
and getting the answer, No one. Once Socrates was told the story by Chaerephon,
he felt obliged to "check the truth" of the oracle's decree. So he
hunted up a man with a reputation for wisdom (a politician), gave a thorough
examination to the man, which examination convinced him that the man was not
wise at all. However,
. . . when I began to try to show him that he only thought he was wise and was not really so, my efforts were resented both by him and by many of the other people present. (21d).
Socrates
walked away from the encounter reflecting that he was certainly wiser than the
politician but that neither he nor the politician had any knowledge worth
boasting about. However, Socrates reflected that he, unlike the politician, was
conscious of his ignorance and this made him wiser than the politician.
Socrates' wisdom then consists of his not thinking he knows what he does not
know. (21d). So long then as Socrates doesn't think he knows what he does not
know, no one will be wiser than him, for this is precisely what Socratic wisdom
comes to, i.e., not thinking you know what you do not know.
This sort of
experience was repeated, says Socrates, when he questioned poets and then
followed that up with examination of skilled craftsmen. In the case of both,
however, Socrates admitted that "they understood things which [he] did
not" but both groups were guilty of thinking they knew things
which they did not know. This led Socrates to conclude
that "this error more than outweighed their positive wisdom."
Socrates goes on to claim that the effect of his work aroused a great deal of
hostility toward him and led to "various malicious suggestions, including
the description of [Socrates] as a professor of wisdom." (23a). Socrates
contends that the description is due to the fact that when he succeeds in
disproving another person's claim to wisdom, bystanders think he knows
everything about the subject in question. But the truth,
says Socrates, is that "real wisdom is the property of God" and
"human wisdom has little or no value" (23a). Socrates concludes that
the oracle only uses his name as an example, as if to say
that "the wisest of humans is he who has realized, like Socrates,
that in respect of wisdom he is really worthless." (23b).
Socrates
also claims that he is on a mission from God (yes, like Jake and Elwood) to
prove to those who think they are wise that they are not wise. He says that his
mission has kept him too busy for either politics or his own affairs and that
he has been "reduced to extreme poverty".
Finally,
Socrates says another cause of his unpopularity is that "a number of young
men with wealthy fathers and plenty of leisure" have attached themselves
to Socrates and enjoy watching him performing his elenchus, so much so that
they take up the practice themselves, questioning others a la Socrates. The "victims" of these young men blame
Socrates for filling the young men with false ideas. According to Socrates,
"[i]f you ask [his critics] what he does, and
what he teaches that has this effect, they have no answer . . . ." (23d).
As such, says Socrates, his critics do nothing more than offer the "stock
charges against any philosopher", including that of making the weaker
argument defeat the stronger. Socrates also claims that Meletus offers his
complaints on behalf of the poets, Anytus on behalf of the craftsmen and Lycon
on behalf of the politicians and orators.
Socrates'
account of the origin of his notoriety reveals, I think, not only that many of
his fellow Athenians regard him as a bothersome old
fool capable of making the weaker argument defeat the stronger argument but
also why they do so. As such, Socrates pretty much admits that the old slanders
and misrepresentations against him are not slanders or misrepresentations at
all but are pretty accurate. (Is a juror supposed to believe that all
politicians, poets and craftspeople are really as ignorant as Socrates claims
to have shown they are? Is a juror supposed to believe that the bystanders who
became angry with Socrates were too blind to see the legitimacy of Socrates'
techniques and arguments?). Socrates admits that spectators became angry with
him. Surely they did so because they believed that Socrates had not in fact
established that his interlocutor was not really wise and that Socrates'
techniques were not aimed at truth so much as refutation. And Socrates admits
here that his main goal, in the name of the god at Delphi (Apollo) of course,
is to refute his opponents so as to reveal that human wisdom has little or no
value. Socrates and his community are obviously at odds over the matter of the
worth of the Socratic mission from God. He sees himself doing God's work (which
must, by definition be good and right!) while the community regards him as a
crazed old man who is positively deluded about the force of his arguments and the
worth of his mission. It should be appreciated, however, that Socrates has not
provided the jurors any reason to doubt the accuracy of the
"slanders" against him, and so no reason to agree with him that the
popular characterizations of him as a "philosopher", "free
thinker", or "someone who makes the stronger argument the
weaker" are "misrepresentations" of him and his work. On the
contrary, it seems that a right thinking juror who hears Socrates claiming to
have "disproved" the claims of wisdom of politicians, poets and
craftsmen, and admitting to have earned the ire of bystanders, would and should
conclude that perhaps there is truth in the characterizations of Socrates as
the purveyor of an "unjust logic".
This point
seems to have been missed or ignored by many a commentator on the Apology, most of whom are inclined to be
sympathetic and more to Socrates' characterizations of his work and its
results. To take a notable example, C.D.C. Reeve in his Socrates in the Apology (all Reeve references here will be to this
book, unless otherwise noted), does his best to try to convince the reader of
the sincerity of Socrates' disclaiming any knowledge of science and oratory
attributed to him by Aristophanes in
the Clouds. While Reeve makes a
convincing case for Socrates' sincerity, his arguments are rendered irrelevant
by his claim that "Socrates' disclaimer of
oratory should not be taken to extend to the elenchus or its unintended
inculcation through practice." (Reeve, p. 19).
While this conveniently allows Socrates' disclaimer to be sincere, it also
renders the disclaimer of no import to the jurors. For the jurors (whether
rightly or wrongly, it matters not), the question of whether Socrates is or is
not a practitioner of "unjust logic" just is the question of whether
he does or does not buttonhole people and try to refute their answers in an
attempt to reveal their "ignorance", i.e., it's a question of whether
or not Socrates practices the elenchus. Since Socrates freely admits that he does
so, the jurors have no choice but to hold that Socrates is a practitioner of
"unjust logic". Indeed, from the jurors' perspective, if Socrates
does refuse to include his elenchus within the boundaries of oratory (as Reeve
claims) then his disclaiming any knowledge of oratory will appear to be nothing
more than verbal sleight of hand, a sneaky way of trying to deny that he is a
practitioner and teacher of "unjust logic", someone who tries to make
the weaker argument defeat the stronger. In short, Socrates' disclaimer will
serve as wonderful example to the jurors of precisely the sort of thing that
Socrates disclaims any knowledge of, or ability to do. Is it any wonder they
will find him guilty?!
Be this as
it may, interesting questions can be raised about Socrates' claim that
"human wisdom has little or no value" and his claim, "the wisest
human is he who realizes that in respect of wisdom he is really
worthless". It surely doesn't take a Ph.D. to appreciate that these claims
sound odd. The first phrase sounds odd in that it seems to allow that there is
such a thing as "human wisdom" and yet says it has little or no
value. This is like saying there is something called human happiness and it has
little or no value, or that there is human good but it has little or no value,
etc. But if these are accepted then what is one to say of human ignorance,
human sadness and human evil? It seems right to say they have no value but then
why prefer human wisdom to human ignorance, or happiness to sadness or good to
evil? Surely the value of human wisdom far exceeds the "value" of
human ignorance. Socrates' other claim suggests that humans are not capable of
genuine or true wisdom and so have none. Putting them together we get something
like: Human wisdom isn't really wisdom (or Wisdom) at all and so is of little
or no value. This sounds right, or at least better than either one alone,
whether one agrees with it or not. Thus, I will interpret Socrates' mission as
based on his belief (which he gets from the god at Delphi, of course) that
human wisdom isn't really wisdom (or Wisdom) and thus is of little or no value.
In this form, Socrates' key belief, the belief on which he based his later
life's work, has a very obvious Platonic flavor. Like Plato, Socrates can be
read as saying that human wisdom is a pale shadow, a poor imitator of the real
deal and the sooner we appreciate this the better off we will be. (I'm not sure
why we'll be better off or how this "knowledge" of the uselessness of
human wisdom will help us. It seems to me to suggest just the opposite of what
Socrates thinks we ought to be doing, i.e., it suggests that the search for
"real wisdom" (Wisdom), and so virtue (or Virtue), is futile. If so,
wouldn't we all do better turning our backs on "the examined life"
and focus on having fun?! And could any conclusion be
more at odds with Socratic doctrine?!).
Socrates'
defense against Meletus
At 24b,
Socrates announces his intent to defend himself against his later accusers,
beginning with Meletus. About this part of the Apology, C.D. C. Reeve says:
Nothing in the Apology has evoked more unanimous response than the . . . cross-examination of Meletus. Almost everyone, even the most cautious, is convinced that it does not establish, is perhaps not even intended to establish, that Socrates is innocent. Socrates "entraps" Meletus into saying things he does not mean -- the story goes -- and then "refutes" him with arguments at once irrelevant to his charges and fallacious. (Reeve, p. 74).
Though I
will quote more from this passage from Reeve below, let me say here that Reeve
is correct (more or less) about how "the [usual] story goes" and that
the usual story offers, more or less, the only sane and non-sophistic reading
of this part of the Apology. Although
we will see Reeve challenging the usual reading below, his challenge reveals
him to be (although this hardly needed revealing) a Socratic disciple, utterly
unable to see his master guilty of any wrong, let alone serious wrongs like
entrapping interlocutors and giving irrelevant and fallacious arguments.
Although I have great respect for Reeve's erudition and philosophical skills,
it is sad to see him using his considerable talents and knowledge to try to get
around (and soft-sell) Socrates' obvious sophisms in this section of the Apology. It is such behavior that lends
support to those who hold, first, that there are as many truths as there are
interpreters and that philosophers are those who are
good at making the weaker argument appear to defeat the stronger argument.
To see that
the usual story is on the mark, one need look no
further than Socrates' opening gambit against Meletus. After laying out the
charges against him (viz., corrupting the youth and impiety) Socrates uses the
all-too common and all-too faulty ploy of the accused, viz., claiming that
one's accusers are also guilty of something or other. In particular, Socrates claims that "Meletus is guilty of treating a serious
matter with levity . . . and professes concern and keen anxiety in matters
about which he has never had the slightest interest." (24c). And then
Socrates says the he "will try to prove this to [the jury's]
satisfaction." (24c). But the jurors should be saying, "Don't bother
Socrates, for it matters not what Meletus is or is not guilty of; show us you
are not a corrupter of the youth or impious." There is no legitimate way
to avoid concluding that Socrates is guilty here of "trying Meletus"
when the matter before the court is Socrates' guilt or innocence. It would be
nice if we could just call this spade a spade and ignore all sophistic
arguments trying to show otherwise. But let's look at the evidence.
Of Socrates'
"proof" that his charges against Meletus are true, irrelevant though
it is, there is much not to like. Socrates asks Meletus to say who it is that
influences the young for the better, insisting that Meletus "must know, if [he] is so much interested". The text then finds
Meletus slow to answer, at which point Socrates hastily concludes that
"Meletus . . . cannot answer" and then declares that Meletus'
inability is "a sufficient proof in itself of what I said, that [Meletus
has] no interest in the subject [of the welfare of the young]." (24d).
Socrates is simply wrong on both counts, viz., wrong that Meletus must know who
influences the young for the better if he is interested in the young's welfare,
and wrong that Meletus' inability to answer is proof of lack of interest.
Meletus might claim that no one in present-day Athens influences the young for
the better, in which case a non-answer, or the answer, no one, would be
compatible with an interest in the welfare of the young. But even if Meletus
admitted that he didn't know who uplifts the young and had never bothered to
investigate the matter, his failure is obviously compatible with an interest in
the matter. He could have claimed that his focus up till now has been on those
who are the most obvious corrupters of the young, a task which is
simultaneously easier and more likely to produce results than that of finding
the uplifters of the youth. Socrates' "proof" then proves nothing at
all.
Eventually,
however, Socrates gets an answer from Meletus, who claims that the laws make
the young good. Socrates does not accept this answer, insisting that he wants
to know "the person whose first
business it is to know the laws." (24e). Meletus cites a group of such
people, viz., the members of the jury. Eventually, Socrates gets Meletus to say
that everyone in Athens, except for Socrates, "has a refining effect upon
the young", and thus that Socrates alone demoralizes them. Now although
Meletus' view is hopelessly optimistic, as well as highly implausible, it is
obvious that its implausibility or even falsity cannot be taken to establish
Socrates' innocence. For the statement's implausibility and likely falsity is
due to the unlikelihood of everyone other than Socrates being a benefactor of
the young, or Socrates being their only corrupter, rather than on the
implausibility or likely falsity of Socrates being a corrupter. Socrates,
however, tries to make the case that Meletus' claim is not merely implausible
but that it in fact reverses the truth of things. It is much more likely, says
Socrates, that improvers of mankind are few in number while the corrupters are
many. Socrates' argument is based on an analogy with horse trainers, with
Socrates claiming that the ability to improve horses lies with a few (viz.,
horse trainers) whereas "most people, if they have to do with horses and
make use of them, do them harm". (25b). Even allowing that there is a
viable analogy between the help and harm of horses and that of young people (a
rather generous assumption, don't you think!), the conclusion that benefactors
are few while non-benefactors or harmers are many, does much to establish the
obvious, viz., the implausibility of Meletus' contention, but nothing to
establish that Socrates is not a corrupter of the youth. Most importantly,
Socrates' conclusion does not warrant the conclusion Socrates wishes to draw,
viz., that Meletus has "never bothered his head about the young". For
as noted above, his concern for the young can be said to be evident by his
effort to rid the streets of Socrates. Whether one agrees with this or not, we
can't forget that Meletus' bothering or not bothering his head about the young
is irrelevant, not only because it is Socrates that is on trial but also
because Socrates' corrupting influence may be so obvious that it is capable of
being detected even by someone who has "never taken the slightest interest
in the welfare of the young".
The
fallacious character of Socrates' next maneuver against Meletus is perhaps the
most difficult to spot but once seen, cannot be denied. After setting out some
preliminary truisms (everyone prefers to be benefited by others rather than
harmed, and it's better live in a good rather than a bad community, etc.),
Socrates gets Meletus to say that Socrates corrupts the youth
"intentionally" rather than unintentionally. Socrates then goes on to
bellow that he would never intentionally corrupt the young and so it must be
that he either does not corrupt the young or he does so unintentionally.
Socrates then adds that the proper procedure for unintentional wrongdoing
"is not to summon the culprit before the court, but to take him aside privately
for instruction and reproof, because obviously if my eyes are opened, I shall
stop doing what I do not intend to do." (26a). Clearly Socrates is being
disingenuous here, for nothing will convince him that his mission corrupts the
youth and nothing will deter him from his mission. But the truth is that
Socrates deliberately performs his elenchus. Meletus regards this as youth-corrupting and so contends, rightly, that Socrates
deliberately corrupts the youth. That is, Meletus is claiming here that
Socrates intentionally performs the actions which
Meletus deems corrupting, i.e., the elenchus. The point in dispute then is
whether Socrates' elenchic activities corrupt the young. No one cares that
Socrates does not intentionally perform actions he himself regards as
corrupting. Indeed, as Socrates himself says, only a fool would do such a
thing. Meletus is not then, claiming that Socrates is deliberately doing something which he, Socrates, regards as youth-corrupting.
As such, this entire episode about deliberateness is little more than a red
herring to try to make Meletus look silly. Not exactly the sort of behavior one
expects from someone on a mission from God (but then again, it depends on one's
notion of God; some there are who regard their God as a trickster).
The bottom
line however is that since Socrates would readily allow that he performs his
elenchic activities intentionally, deliberately, the only way for Socrates to
convince the jurors that he does not corrupt the youth intentionally is to show
that his elenchic activities do not, Meletus' contentions notwithstanding,
corrupt the young. At the very least, it ought to be agreed that the whole
"either I do not corrupt or I do so unintentionally" maneuver smacks
of sophistry, not to mention hypocrisy, and ought not be a part of any honest
attempt to meet the charges before Socrates.
Last modified September 16, 2011
JAH,
Professor
Dept. of Philosophy