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When people label some actions as "unnatural," they usually want to register their shock and disgust. In more abstract moral terms though, they are claiming that an action is so contrary to the values demanded by human nature itself that it no longer expresses human nature but, rather, is unnatural. So they regard unnatural acts clearly to be morally wrong.
Some candidates for unnatural acts at various times are incest, homosexuality, a mother killing her child, artificial contraception, oral sex, interracial dating or sexual relations, and cloning. (It is worth wondering about, as an aside, why the term "unnatural" so often seems to be attached to various sexual acts, in particular.)
How firmly grounded are claims about unnatural acts?
Regarding one's own human nature, no act that is an expression of oneself can be unnatural—since it is an expression of one's own nature. So the claim that an act is unnatural with respect to one's own nature would require evidence that the act was not truly an expression of oneself. While there is an issue here worthy of investigation, this is not the primary focus of interest in unnatural acts.
Ordinarily, claims about unnatural acts refer to actions contrary to human nature generally or to some special group human nature. This is the area of investigation we shall examine here.
As a first consideration, we should recognize that actions are not unnatural simply because they happen to be unusual relative to most persons’ normal activities. The operations of a neurosurgeon are not unnatural just because the vast majority of us are not neurosurgeons.
Accordingly, any allegation about unnatural acts based upon their being unusual relative to most persons’ activity must be based upon some fundamental aspect of human nature.
Here we shall consider three substantial analyses that may warrant a claim that some acts are unnatural: (1) The way things are naturally intended to be, (2) Not fooling with Mother Nature, and (3) Natural adaptive dispositions..
(1) The Way Things Are Naturally Intended To Be
According to a common way of thinking, an action is unnatural when it goes against "the natural way of things" or "the way things are naturally intended to be." There is a reverence for the natural way that may derive from a mystique associated with Nature or from theological beliefs.
To the extent that this reverence has vague, intuitive origins, there is a danger in this way of thinking: Resistance to social change, or worse yet, the prejudices of some group, may lead to claims about the demands of nature itself when, in fact, persons are appealing to nothing more than what is presently comforting or socially acceptable to them.
One attempt to ground this reverence in theological belief is the doctrine of natural law within Roman Catholicism. According to the Catholic position, we can determine, through human reason, purposes imprinted in nature by God and we are not to act contrary to those purposes. For example, reason can establish that reproduction is the natural function of the sexual organs, since it is the sexual organs that make possible the production of offspring and thus the continuance of the human race. Pleasure, on the other hand, is not the natural purpose of the sexual organs. Accordingly, actions that thwart the natural function of the sexual organs for the mere purpose of obtaining pleasure are contrary to natural law and therefore are immoral. It follows then that various sexual practices—such as sterilization, homosexual acts, oral sex, anal sex, masturbation, and artificial methods of contraception—are contrary to natural law and hence immoral.
(Note: The Catholic position does not assert that all sexual pleasure is wrong. It only asserts that the pursuit of sexual pleasure completely independent of respect for reproduction as the natural function of the sexual organs is wrong.)
I have problems with the Catholic natural law position, beginning first with skepticism about attempts to establish the existence of the God of Christianity. (See my Philosophical Problems: God, Free Will, and Determinism, Chapter 2.) Yet even if we presume the existence of the Christian God, attempts to establish God's permanent purposes for the world are highly doubtful.
In the presence of life-threatening illnesses, what does God intend? Should we leave the illness in the hands of God and let nature take its course? Or does God intend that we do everything possible to preserve life? Does God intend that we prescribe antibiotics but not do surgery? Is a cesarean section an unnatural method of childbirth and therefore contrary to God’s intent? Does God intend that we do appendectomies and heart bypasses, but not organ transplants? Is genetic surgery going too far in terms of God's intentions? How much pain does God intend patients to suffer during an illness?
I encounter numerous opinions about God's purposes. But I strongly suspect that they express the perspective of the opinion-holder rather than any objective determination of God's intent.
When some theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries offered reasoned arguments that the earth could not be orbiting around the sun because such movement would be contrary to God's purposes for the universe, they were trying to give divine authority to familiar beliefs that they found more comforting. Similarly, when the Catholic Church pronounces that reproduction is the only essential use of sexual functions consistent with God's purposes, I think that they are making the same mistake.
The most basic problem however with this appeal to natural law is its limitation on our acting as moral agents. We have a capacity and duty as moral agents to recognize changing human needs and to transform life for the better. We cannot engage in the transformation though if we simply accept the status quo as a demand of the "natural order." Multiple goods of life are human creations dependent upon a willingness to break with what seemed to be the natural order of things—whether the breakthrough involved advancement in knowledge, technology, medical procedures, social institutions, or the interests of everyday life.
With respect to sexual pleasure specifically, we also can make a solid case for its value as a natural way of fulfilling human needs and enhancing a human social relationship—quite apart from reproduction.
Natural Law in Political and Legal Theory
In political and legal theory, there sometimes are non-theological appeals to natural law in order to justify fundamental human rights that are prior to government or social conventions. These appeals are especially useful, I think, if we interpret natural law negatively. That is, we can assert a claim like this: There is nothing in the natural order of things that establishes that some human beings have moral entitlements over others. Consequently, all human beings have basic rights to liberty and equality. This use of natural law however has little bearing on the specific issue of separating natural from unnatural acts.
(2) Not Fooling with "Mother Nature"
The expression, "You can't fool with Mother Nature," might be a way of labeling some actions as unnatural.
There are however two ways of interpreting the expression—the first a folksy view, the second a scientific one. The folksy view tends to ascribe a mystique and intentions to nature; it thus is subject to criticisms already mentioned (p. 58, left column). The scientific view is more neutral with respect to the natural world. It merely asserts that natural processes that have evolved over millions or even billions of years have proven their survival value and that any departure from them is likely to be harmful rather than beneficial. Environmentalists often appeal to this view as a way of warning about the dangers of pollution and development.(1)
Note though that the scientific view focuses on the issue of potential future harm rather than upon the "unnaturalness" of defying Mother Nature. This focus has the advantage that it requires an examination of the observable benefits and harms associated with human activities. Accordingly, judgments are less likely to be affected by hindering attitudes such as resistance to social change or the prejudices of some group.
(3) Natural Adaptive Dispositions
Scientifically, we can say that there are natural adaptive dispositions, that is, natural tendencies that developed during human evolutionary history through adaptation to environmental circumstances. So we can say that the heart has a natural adaptive disposition to pump blood or that fingers and the hand have a natural adaptive disposition to hold and manipulate objects.(2) When there is a function failure, for example, a heart not pumping blood, we probably would not describe the failure as unnatural although we might well describe the heart as defective. The heart is clearly defective with respect to its natural adaptive disposition.
If persons ascribe this notion of defect to human actions, then they might view some—such as homosexuality or oral sex—as defective relative to some natural adaptive disposition developed in the evolutionary process. For example, if being heterosexual is such a disposition because heterosexual relations were necessary to preserve the human species, then homosexual acts are defective with respect to this normal natural disposition. They might then add that the action is sufficiently defective to legitimize use of the term "unnatural" for such actions.
One problem with such claims is the difficulty of transferring the initial notion of defect to more complex activities. The heart that fails to pump blood is defective because this is the single, essential function that it performs and it is not likely to take on additional essential functions. Yet the situation is not always so simple. In the case of the sexual organs, even if there was a natural adaptive disposition developed with respect to reproduction, they now have associated with them as well a natural adaptive disposition to produce pleasure. Moreover, there is no reason to view the production of sexual pleasure itself as a defect. In fact, just the opposite holds: A defect here would be the failure to experience sexual pleasure through the sexual organs.
Another problem arises if we consider celibacy or any other disciplined abstinence from exercise of the sexual organs. By the standard of natural adaptive dispositions, such abstinence also signifies a defect due to function failure—whether the issue is reproduction or sexual pleasure. But it is highly unlikely that persons will regard celibacy as unnatural and hence morally wrong.
A third problem develops because conditions can change so that the requirements of adaptation become different. For there to be natural adaptive dispositions, there has to be some evolutionary advantage associated with the adaptation that occurred and this advantage had to remain over considerable periods of time. Nothing however guarantees that the adaptive advantage is permanent. In the case of reproduction, the human population now is sufficiently large, even too large, so that uncontrolled reproduction has adaptive disadvantages. Moreover, the needs of developed technological societies favor smaller families due to greater life expectancy as well as the time and resources required to develop skills for functioning well. Accordingly, rather than regarding prevention of reproduction as a defect, we need to rethink allegiance to reproduction as a natural adaptive disposition of the sexual organs.
General Conclusions About Unnatural Acts
Generally, we need to be extremely skeptical whenever persons claim that an action is "unnatural." Most likely, they are revealing more about their own attitudes than the natural order.
At this point in human history, we live in an environment strongly modified through the knowledge and choices of human beings. We live in an artificial environment in the sense that it is considerably removed from the more primitive "natural" environment of pre-historical times. We do not merely hunt and gather for food; we do not live in caves; we regularly use machines to manufacture clothing; we often travel by vehicle rather than on foot; we fly in airplanes, although we lack wings ourselves; we use machines to replace, and surpass, brute physical labor; we use machines such as computers to replace, and surpass, various kinds of mental labor; we have instruments that modify and extend the use of our senses; we often communicate electronically; we alter our bodies with pharmaceutical and surgical procedures; we have planned parenthood; we have elaborate, formal education systems to transmit culture and skills; we maintain complex governmental structures.
The fact that somebody at some time labels some subset of these activities as being "unnatural," as has happened, requires an examination of the objector's attitudes more than acceptance of the way nature supposedly is meant to be. All these activities exemplify the capabilities of human nature. They also can be attempts to transform human life for the better. Accordingly, there is nothing inherently unnatural in them. Moreover, we need to recognize the tendency of many people to resist change and to maintain comfortable beliefs (no matter how naïve, narrow-minded, or prejudiced they happen to be).
Labeling an action "unnatural," in my judgment, usually is an attempt to attach a notion of inherent evil to what persons find odd and uncomfortable to them. It provides a simple, blanket condemnation. Rather than weighing the actual benefits, harms, and risks associated with an activity, persons declare it out of bounds.
To be sure, we do need to question the desirability of some activities. Nothing about change or unusual actions in themselves guarantees that benefits will outweigh harms or that risks are worth taking. Removing the label "unnatural" from an action is not equivalent to a voucher that certifies the acceptability of the action. While the removal probably makes the moral case for disapproving the action more complicated, we may well still have moral grounds for such disapproval. For example, with respect to sexual activities, we need to take seriously the significance of so many societies placing restrictions. The restrictions at least suggest a prima facie case for abstaining from or forbidding some sexual activities. Moreover, there are sufficient cases of exploitation in sexual activities and sufficient occasions where sex breaks down valued human relationships to warrant careful scrutiny rather than simple acceptance of sex under any circumstances as a "natural" way to act.
We also need to take seriously the scientific warning that practices and processes with a proven track record of success in adaptation within the natural world should not be cast aside lightly. But we should assess the warning without the label "unnatural" as a barrier to serious thought.
Suppose that we now consider some more specific matters.
Interracial Dating and Sexual Relations
If someone claims that interracial dating and sexual relations are "unnatural," most people in the United States today would judge this to be an expression of racist prejudice—especially when the claim appears along with assertions about superiority of one race over another.
If the claim rests upon the religious belief that God, by creating separate races, declared that they were not to intermingle, then most religious persons would reject the claim out of hand—as being akin to the expression, "If God wanted humans to fly, then God would have given them wings." Generally, religious persons do not demand that we accept everything in the world as it is because they fear departing from God’s intentions in creating the world. It probably also is the case that these religious racial purists have departed sufficiently from "nature as God created it" in their own lives enough to cast doubt on the authenticity or credibility of their religious claim.
Any attempt to base opposition to interracial dating and sexual relations on allegedly "scientific" grounds has no credibility within the scientific community. If racial intermingling were unnatural in some sense of being harmful, reproductive success would be unlikely. Yet there is no evidence that racial mixing is impossible or likely to produce defective offspring. Moreover, many scientists now assert that racial classifications themselves are social rather than natural—that is, the separation of human beings into races is a social classification rather than a distinction based upon observed natural (biological) differences. At the very least, there is a consensus among scientists that pure races do not exist. This scientific consensus follows from analysis of genetic similarities and differences that go beyond more obvious physical characteristics such as skin color, hair, and bone structure.(3)
Note on Social Reasons
Sometimes persons advance social reasons for opposing interracial dating and sexual relations—such as the need to maintain group identity and self-esteem or difficulties in life associated with the reactions of other people to racial intermingling. Since the issue here however is unnatural acts, I will not explore these social reasons further.
Incest
Ample reasons exist to condemn incest—namely, (a) its misuse of power within the family, (b) the exploitative nature of the relationship, and (c) its detrimental effect on the psychological development of a child. No matter how powerful these listed reasons however, they are insufficient to explain fully the incest taboo—since we have no evidence that these reasons established the taboo. The reasons express more the claims of our contemporary society than the judgments of ancient societies. So further explanation is necessary.
What probably contributes to the tendency to call incest "unnatural" are (a) the ancient origins of the incest taboo, (b) the taboo's apparent universality, and (c) awareness of the harmful risks associated with inbreeding.
Explanations of the Incest Taboo
In a survey of explanations of the incest taboo(4), historian Carl Degler points out that the taboo varies somewhat from society to society, with there being just two universal features—namely, the forbidding of mating between mother son and also some extension of the taboo, in various ways, beyond the nuclear family. So its universality requires some qualification. A number of scientists also doubt that the incest taboo is natural in the sense of being innate and thus compulsory, since societies find it necessary to institute rules against incest. There also is the fact that incest sometimes occurs.
According to Degler, the currently most accepted explanations of the origin of the incest taboo focus upon (a) evolutionary selection whereby avoidance of incest contributed to survival by lessening the likelihood of genetic deficiencies associated with inbreeding and (b) the diminution of sexual emotions among persons familiar with one another during their developmental years within the nuclear family.(5)
Comments
For myself, I do not think that we can describe incest as unnatural because, for the initiator of an incestuous relationship, it is inseparable from a more general sexual desire. Since I see no reason to describe sexual desire as unnatural in human beings, I do not think that we have any way of isolating incest as unnatural.
I also do not think that incest is wrong simply because of the past prevalence of the taboo. As human beings, we are not bound by the past. Moreover, to the extent that the taboo rests upon the danger of genetic harm to offspring, contemporary methods of birth prevention can circumvent the danger considerably.
On the other hand, I personally would welcome any natural inclinations against incest, whether they are based upon past evolutionary development or the familiarity of family life.
As I made clear at the beginning of this section, there are strong reasons for forbidding incest as morally wrong. It is a direct and cruel violation of the protective environment associated with family life—whether the perpetrator is a parent, sibling, grandparent, uncle, aunt, or cousin.(6) The fact that the family environment provides so many more opportunities for more powerful family members to take advantage of more vulnerable ones increases the degree of moral violation.
Artificial Methods of Contraception, Oral Sex, and Masturbation
Is there anything "unnatural" about the pleasure associated with artificial methods of contraception, oral sex, and masturbation?
The pleasures of sexual stimulation and orgasm are firmly embedded biologically and psychologically in human experience. Moreover, if we compare the roles of sexual pleasure and a desire for reproduction as intentions during human copulation, we find that sexual pleasure is the far more frequent and dominant intention. So whatever past evolutionary advantage there was for a strong biological association of sexual pleasure with reproduction has led to circumstances now where desire for sexual pleasure typically is dominant psychologically. Given this psychological dominance, it is understandable that persons are quite capable of separating the desire for sexual pleasure from reproduction. There also is nothing unnatural in the separation—just as there is nothing unnatural in enjoying the taste of food quite apart from the need to eat to survive. So sexual pleasure by itself, that is, apart from reproduction, is not unnatural.
Masturbation, oral sex, or sexual relations involving artificial methods of contraception are occasions where sexual pleasure occurs independently of reproduction. Accordingly from what was just stated, they also are not unnatural—unless someone can show that the sexual pleasure involved in these practices is quite different in nature from that involved in penile-vaginal intercourse without contraceptive measures. This difference in nature however is hard to establish, I think. Granting that the sexual activities considered here are physically distinguishable and granting that each may have a different psychological meaning to a participant or fulfill a different psychological need (interest), I do not see that these sorts of differences establish so great a difference in the nature of the sexual pleasure involved. The sexual stimulation and orgasm that occur are basically similar. So there does not seem to be sufficient reason for asserting that the sexual pleasure of, say, masturbation, is unnatural.
Homosexuality
As in the cases of interracial dating and sexual relations, incest, masturbation, oral sex, and artificial methods of contraception, I reject the term "unnatural" to describe homosexual acts.
In so far as sexual pleasure is separable from reproduction and there is nothing unnatural in sexual pleasure experienced apart from reproduction, I do not view the sexual pleasure experienced in a homosexual act to be unnatural. There also is a strong case for the moral acceptability of sexual pleasure apart from reproduction in terms of contemporary social needs. Accordingly, I do not think that homosexuality is a defect by reference to a natural adaptive dispositions argument. Finally, the fact that the vast majority of people are heterosexual does not establish that homosexual acts are unnatural.
Since a growing collection of evidence indicates that persons discover, rather than choose, their sexual orientation, there are sound reasons for accepting persons' homosexuality as an expression of their group human nature—which again weighs against the claim that homosexuality is unnatural. In a brief survey of studies on biology and homosexuality in the Atlantic Monthly, journalist Chandler Burr concludes,
Burr's reference to psychiatric and biological evidence, in my judgment, does not show that every person who engages in a homosexual act is homosexual. Nor does it show that sexual orientation is as definite as an on-off switch, that is, that every person is simply and exclusively either heterosexual or else homosexual. But the evidence indicates that homosexuality, for a significant but relatively small group of persons, is not a chosen lifestyle that goes against their basic human nature. So we need to avoid the label "unnatural."
How then should we explain the high degree of discrimination, ridicule, disgust, vilification, and even violence directed at homosexuals?
We ordinarily do not become so obsessed with the sexual habits of our families, neighbors, or friends that we are unable to relate to them in terms of their other character traits and actions. Honesty, loyalty, love, good will, friendliness, competence, talent, effort, consideration for others all are important. When the issue is homosexuality however, too often persons tend to make this the only feature of a life that defines what someone is as a human being. This tendency is a case of self-deception, according to the philosopher Jean Paul Sartre: The totality of what a person is as a human being is not reducible to one particular course of action.
There can be reasonable worries about homosexuality. Children are vulnerable, curious, interested, and unclear about the role of sexuality in their lives. I would not want my children or grandchildren approached by a sexually precocious or aggressive child or adult, whether homosexual or heterosexual. I would be especially concerned about tendencies toward greater male sexual aggressiveness—again, homosexual as well as heterosexual. There also are situations where adults are vulnerable. And homosexuals are no more immune from the risks associated with sexually transmitted diseases than heterosexuals are.
These reasonable worries though are not nearly enough to explain the depth of the antagonism towards gays and lesbians.
I offer this deeper explanation: Since the homosexual community is so small in comparison with the heterosexual community and people take their own sense of sexual identity very seriously, heterosexuals tend to be homophobic. In addition, traditional cultural norms enhance the homophobia.
When we have a strong sense of sexual identity that is comfortable to us, this is a precious possession important to our lives. We do not want to be insecure about it ourselves and we don't want others doubting its presence. It is a very rare heterosexual who can defend the rights of gays and lesbians without making clear, at some point in some way, the person's own heterosexuality. I am reminded amusedly of the very open-minded professor friend who chose to wear jeans to class one day but admitted to feeling very uncomfortable when he learned that campus gays had called for wearing jeans that day as a sign of gay solidarity. I recall my own discomfort whenever I discuss in class passages by Sartre on homosexuality—out of fear over what students may think of my own sexual orientation. Sexual identity is a very sensitive issue for all of us; and it easily leads into insecurities and irrational fears.
The social stigma traditionally attached to homosexuality intensifies these insecurities and irrational fears. This is a case of the tyranny of a majority over a minority. Most people fear being associated with a shunned minority, whether as actual members or as sympathetic allies. Moreover, as members of a very large majority, most people often feel comfortable with the majority's attitude and show little or no sensitivity to the minority's interests. And they find negative views of homosexuality constantly reinforced by the majority attitude.
Because of our intense concern for our own sense of sexual identity and the strong heterosexual majority, I doubt that homosexual acts would ever be as socially acceptable as heterosexual acts. Moreover, since the subject is sex, there are numerous reasonable concerns about the morality of various actions involving homosexuals—just as there are equivalent concerns about the actions of heterosexuals. So the notion that recognizing the rights of persons with a homosexual orientation will cause moral decadence by initiating an epidemic of homosexual propositioning and relationships is far-fetched.
What we especially do not need however in considering homosexuality is an "unnatural" label to cloud our thinking.
Cloning
As a laboratory-type procedure, cloning seems to be quite different from incest, homosexual acts, or an artificial method of contraception such as using a condom. Yet the procedure raises similar concerns about "fooling with mother nature" and acting contrary to "the natural way of things" or "the way things are naturally intended to be." So some people regard it to be an "unnatural act."
Reproducing an individual with the same genotype as another individual by removing the nucleus from a body cell of the second individual and implanting it in an egg with its own nucleus already removed is a fundamental departure from the usual methods of reproduction. In cloning the sheep, "Dolly," in 1996, the scientists removed the nucleus from a cell of an adult sheep's mammary gland, interrupted its cell cycle by depriving it of nutrients, implanted the nucleus in an enucleated egg, and used electrical current to induce the cell division normally associated with fertilization.13
Such a laboratory-induced, asexual way of bringing a new individual into the world—if done with human beings—strikes many people as a way of manufacturing human beings in the same way that we manufacture cups, clocks, and computers. Instead of recognizing the fundamental dignity of human beings, cloning seems to treat human beings as objects to be manipulated technologically. Critics can view the possibility of cloning human beings as the culmination of a dangerous technological urge to dominate nature.
Finding significant ethical objections to cloning human beings however is far different from establishing that cloning is an unnatural act. Cloning is not coming upon us as a sudden quantum leap from the time-honored way of having children so that it is clearly "unnatural" in contrast with the natural way. Instead there has been a continuum of procedures assisting or interfering with the original "natural" ways of having children—for example, cesarean sections, use of tools such as a forceps, bottle feeding, epidural anesthesia, incubators for premature infants, artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, fertility drugs, fetal surgery, surrogate motherhood. To be sure, the use of these procedures has accelerated during the past half century—just as so many other new technologies have entered into and affected our lives. But the fact remains that technological interventions in reproduction do not begin with cloning and cloning is not a sudden introduction of artificial, or "unnatural," controls over ways of having children.
What does make cloning different from these other procedures though is the potential for significantly greater control over offspring. In cloning, one selects the specific and entire genetic structure of the individual to be born; and what one selects is a replication of the genetic structure of an already existing individual. Just as nuclear weapons signify an ultimate power in the sense that they make possible the total destruction of all human life on earth, cloning also signifies an ultimate power in the sense that it makes possible the biological construction of human beings.
Not surprisingly, some people refer to cloning as "playing God"—which takes us back to the claim that cloning is unnatural because it is contrary to the way nature is intended to be. As I have already noted however, determining nature's or God's intentions is a highly speculative, doubtful task. And it is rather late for human beings to worry about "playing God" after they already have made so many alterations in human life and in their environment.
If we want to assess the desirability of cloning, we can make up a lengthy list of practical and ethical concerns that we should take into account. I just don't think that calling cloning "unnatural" adds a constructive element to our considerations.
Notes
(1) This scientific view need not be resistant to all change. Even if the majority of
changes are harmful, some will be beneficial—as evolutionary development has shown.
So import of the view is precautionary rather than final. So it would be a mistake for
people to think that environmentalists are opposed to all change.
(2) For the heart example as well as some stimulation of my thinking on natural adaptive
dispositions, I am indebted to a paper, working on a different topic, by John F. Post,
“How to Get an Ought from a Biological Is.” The paper was read at a meeting of
the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association in the spring of 2000.
(3) For more discussion of biology and the race issue, see Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My
Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992), pp. 35-39 and Monroe W. Strickler, Evolution (Boston: Jones and
Bartlett Publishers, 1996), 2nd ed., Ch. 23.
I myself lean more toward Strickler's view than Appiah's. It is interesting that each
relies upon work by researchers M. Nei and A.K. Roychoudhury. As a matter of general
evolutionary principle, I would expect that the relative geographical isolation of human
groups that occurred over tens of thousands of years would lead to differences based upon
an accompanying relative genetic reproductive isolation. Their differences however are
irrelevant to the issue-at-hand. Both Appiah and Strickler would agree that there are no
pure races and no biological basis for opposing racial intermingling.
(4) See Carl N. Degler, In Search of Human Nature (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1991), Ch. 10, “The Case of the Origin of the Incest Taboo.”
(5) For more details, see Ibid. For more information about the genetic dangers of
inbreeding, see Strickler, op. cit., pp. 495-498.
(6) I suppose that the reasons become weaker, if the participants are consenting adults.
Yet there still are reasons for regarding the situations to be exploitative.
(7) Chandler Burr, “Homosexuality and Biology,” Atlantic Monthly, June,
1997.
A more detailed consideration of the issue is available in Burr's A Separate Creation:
The Search for the Biological Origins of Sexual Orientation : Hyperion, 1996. For
those who may wonder how a “homosexual gene” could survive evolutionary natural
selection, some consideration of kin selection is necessary. Even though homosexual
persons may not have offspring themselves, their genes may have a significant
representation in the genes of family members. Moreover, if they have a tendency to make
sacrifices such that their relatives survive in greater numbers, there will be a greater
likelihood of survival for their genes.
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