Ron Yezzi
Philosophy Department
Minnesota State U., Mankato
©2001 by Ron Yezzi
(May be downloaded for per-
sonal, non-commercial use)
1. Example of a Correspondence Rule: A straight line as defined in the formal language of Euclidean Geometry is associable with a straight line drawn on a chalkboard.
1. It exemplifies the optimal limits of rationality;
2. It establishes precise, well-defined terms and clear statements—unencumbered by the obscurity and complexity of ordinary language;
3. It makes possible the deduction of a rich array of statements;
4. It establishes a system of necessary truths.
The program makes possible progress toward a true, or at least well-confirmed, objective description of nature in so far as the meaning postulates (or correspondence rules) are able to relate to the fundamental elements of our empirical experience—namely, atomic propositions (Russell) or protocol-sentences (Carnap), expressed in phenomenalist or physicalist language, and the verifiability principle eliminates meaningless speculation.
1. Phenomenalist Language = language of sense data (that is, sensations of color, touch, etc.)
2. Physicalist language = language of the objects of gross experience
1. The meaning of a term referring to the natural world is determined through its sensory verification.
a. Its meaning is found in its use
b. Operational Definitions As an Example - E.g. length is what is determined by laying a standardized measuring stick alongside an object.
2. Many traditional philosophical issues relating to metaphysics, theology, and ethics consist mainly of meaningless statements.
a. Is the universe monistic or pluralistic?
b. Does God or the soul exist?
c. Is stealing wrong? - Emotive Theory of Ethics
3. Verifiability Principle - A statement is meaningful if and only if you can state what sense observations would determine whether it is true or false.
1. Deduction through symbolic logic and use of correspondence rules are the instruments of reduction.
2. Sociology reducible to Psychology - reducible to Biology - reducible to Chemistry - reducible to physics (mathematical physics)
Rudolph Carnap, A. J. Ayer, Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, Hans Reichenback, Carl Hempel, Herbert Feigl, Gustave Bergmann, C. L. Stevenson
1. The value of the development of a formal language for science is questionable - No major scientists or philosophers are seeking to transcribe the various sciences into the language of symbolic logic.
2. The status of a formal language in terms of the analystic-synthetic distinction has been challenged (most notably by Quine).
3. There have been problems in producing a formal language for induction and in interpreting induction.
1. There is a slipperiness to meaning postulates. They are supposed to be stipulations that are arbitrary. As stipulations, they can remain constant regardless of evidence although, as happens historically, they change according to the accumulation of observations ( in Glymour, "Realism and the Nature of Theories").
2. No successful phenomenalist language has been developed.
3. Physicalist language does not seem to account fully for the meaning of scientific terms. For example, length seems to be something more than its operational definition.
4. Quantum mechanics may establish the impossibility of establishing accounts of nature that are not dependent on variable features of the observer (in Glymour, "Realism and the Nature of Theories").
1. The verifiability principle does not succeed in eliminating metaphysical and theoretical elements.
a. The Verifiability Principle itself is a metaphysical principle not subject to empirical verification.
b. Even the most primitive observation statements are theory-laden.
2. The consideration of theological and ethical claims is more complicated than the Verifiability Principle allows.
a. Theological claims often rest upon factual claims. For example, in the design argument for the existence of God, you have the factual claim that only a predesigning intelligence could produce the complexity and order of the universe generally and of living things specifically. Physical and biological evolution provides empirical evidence that falsifies (disconfirms, reduces the probability of) this claim.
b. Value judgments arise (nearly always - Yezzi) because of reasons that are factual claims and are therefore capable of sensory verification or falisification—although it may be difficult to settle these claims.
1. The proposed reductions have not occurred.
2. There are serious doubts as to whether the meanings of reductionist terminology are commensurate. That is, can biology really be completely explainable in terms of chemistry, even if there is a deductive reduction?
3. Reductionism may well distort the complexities of some sciences—particularly those studying human behavior.
a. Wholes may not be wholly explainable in terms of their parts.
b. Oversimplifications may occur—where what is most suitable for a reduction is not most fully descriptive of the phenomena being investigated.
1. Science always depends upon metaphysical world views and theory-laden descriptions.
2. Science does not produce objective accounts of reality.
a. Despite the alleged objective controls in science there always is a problem of underdetermination for the basic theories.
b. Values and commitment have a fundamental role in scientific work.
3. There is a problem with the commensurability of meaning for different theories or world views, even when they seem to be relatable.
E-mail Messages:? ronald.yezzi@mnsu.edu
Last updated 9/2/01