1. His parents were Pietists and he attended a Pietist directed school from age 8 to age 16. Generally, the Pietists stressed faith, repentance, and immediate appeal to God (rather than emphasis upon the church and clergy). The religious schooling was a combination of piety and terror that eventually had a negative impact on Kant.
2. He entered the University of Koenigsberg in 1740 and eventually received a
doctoral degree in 1755.
a. The period
included considerable poverty and some private tutoring to earn some money.
b. In 1755,
he became a University lecturer at Koenigsberg, but only as a private teacher
who was dependent for his pay on the number of students willing to pay to take
his courses. His chosen subjects were directed more toward science than
philosophy.
c. Finally,
after two rejections, he was granted a professorship in 1770.
d. Although
his written work never shows it, Kant apparently was a lively, interesting
lecturer.
3. The Critique of Pure Reason was published in 1781, followed by the Critique of Practical Reason in 1788, and the Critique of Judgment in 1790.
4. Other major works included the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783), Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), and Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793).
5. His religious views were controversial enough for Kant to be pressured to keep quiet about them.
6. Kant was a person known for the regularity of his life; he never traveled any great distance from Koenigsberg, although he made up for this lack of travel by considerable reading.
1. Kant produced one of the grand systems of western philosophy―showing inventiveness, boldness, systematic effort, and consistency.
2. He proclaimed a "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy. Just as Copernicus caused a scientific revolution by changing from an earth-centered to a sun-centered system, Kant caused a philosophical revolution by changing from a nature-centered to a knower-centered interpretation of human knowledge.
3. Kant established a single moral law as the basis for ethics and founded what is now called deontological ethics.
4. Key elements of Kant’s terminology have become standard terms in the treatment of subsequent philosophy: transcendentalism, analytic and synthetic propositions, synthetic a priori propositions, Ding-an-sich (thing-in-itself), noumena, a good will, categorical imperative, autonomy of the will.
5. Kant produced a grand synthesis of rationalism and empiricism.
a. He
retained the empirical science of the empiricists but added a transcendental
level of knowing to justify a purely rational science as well.
b. He turned
many of Hume’s innovative empirical concepts into transcendental ones.
a. Pure Reason, that is, reason functioning independent of (sensory) experience, can produce absolutely certain propositions; but the propositions are not descriptive of reality as it is in itself, that is, of the thing-in-itself (Ding-an-sich).
b. Whatever we experience is filtered through the internal structure of the mind (that is, the transcendental structure of the mind), a structure that is uniform and describable. The absolute certainty in propositions thus derives from this structure of the mind rather than from external reality. In other words, we only have experience in so far as whatever is "out there" is structured in some special way by the mind.
c. This transcendental structure includes intuitions in space and time (from which geometry and arithmetic arise, respectively), pure concepts of the understanding, and pure principles of nature. The Table below is taken from the Prolegomena:
LOGICAL TABLE OF JUDGMENTS
1 2
As to Quantity As to Quality
Universal
Affirmative
Particular
Negative
Singular
Infinite
3 4
As to Relation As to Modality
Categorical
Problematic
Hypothetical
Assertoric
Disjunctive
Apodictic
TRANSCENDENTAL TABLE OF THE CONCEPTS
OF THE UNDERSTANDING
1 2
As to Quantity As to Quality
Unity (Measure)
Reality
Plurality (Magnitude)
Negation
Totality (Whole)
Limitation
3 4
As to Relation As to Modality
Substance
Possibility
Cause
Existence
Community
Necessity
PURE PHYSICAL TABLE OF THE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES OF
THE SCIENCE OF NATURE
Axioms of Intuition Anticipations of Perception
3 4
Analogies of Experience Postulates of Empirical Thinking
a. Judgments (propositions) are analytic if their predicates are already contained in the concept of their subjects (e.g. All bodies are extended); judgments are synthetic if the predicates are not contained in their subjects (e.g. Some bodies are heavy).
b. Analytic judgments are based upon the principle of contradiction, whereas synthetic judgments are not—although synthetic judgments cannot violate the principle.
c. While it was generally granted that analytic judgments are absolutely certain, this was not granted with respect to synthetic judgments--since they are a posteriori, that is, dependent on (sensory) experience.
d. Kant however argued that there were also synthetic a priori judgments, which included statements in mathematics as well as laws of nature, that were absolutely certain.
e. The absolute certainty of these synthetic a priori propositions derives from the structure of the mind rather than from experience.
a. Pure
mathematics provides Kant’s model for synthetic a priori judgments.
1) He argues that "7 + 5 = 12" is a synthetic a priori judgment—that we
cannot know the sum of "7 + 5" until we add to "7" successive units (through an
intuition) leading us to "12."
2) Similarly, he argues that "A straight line is the shortest path between two
points" is synthetic a priori because the concept of straightness as a
quality contains nothing about quantity.
b. Pure mathematical cognition proceeds through the construction of concepts through pure intuition rather than through concepts themselves.
c. Pure (a priori) intuition consists in a form of sensibility by which any actual perception is ordered in space and time. These intuitions are prior to any of the empirical intuitions that constitute our actual perceptions.
d. "Geometry is based upon the pure intuition of space. Arithmetic brings about its concept of numbers by the successive addition of units in time." (Prolegomena)
e. "That
all-encompassing space . . . has three dimensions and cannot have any more is
based on the proposition that no more than three lines can intersect at right
angles in one point; but this proposition cannot be shown from concepts by any
means but rests immediately on intuition and, indeed, on pure a priori
intuition, because it is apodeictically certain."
1) This statement creates problems for Kant in terms of non-Euclidean geometries
applicable to space.—RY
f. As
intuitions and as forms of sensibility, space and time do not describe
things-in-themselves.
1) As proof that spatial perceptions depend upon an intuitive space rather than
reflecting things in themselves, Kant offers the example of our image in a
mirror whereby our right hand becomes a left hand in the mirror and requires
sorting out through spatial intuition.
2) ". . . mental space [as the form of sensibility] renders possible physical
space itself, i.e., the extension of matter; . . . this pure [mental] space is
not at all a quality of things in themselves, but a form of our sensible faculty
of representation; and . . . all objects in space are mere appearances, i.e.,
not things in themselves but representations of our sensible intuition."
a. Judgments initially are merely judgments of perception and thus have only subjective validity, that is, validity only for ourselves as individuals.
b. But judgments of perception can become judgments of experience possessing objective validity when they are brought under pure concepts of the understanding. (See the Table of Pure Concepts of the Understanding in the Overview.)
c. "When the sun shines on a stone, it grows warm. This judgment, however often I and others may have perceived it, is a mere judgment of perception and contains no necessity; perceptions are only usually conjoined in this manner. But if I say: The sun warms a stone, I add to the perception a concept of the understanding, namely that of cause, which connects the concept of heat with that of sunshine as a necessary consequence and the synthetic judgments becomes universally valid and consequently objective, and is converted from a perception into experience."
d. Pure
concepts of the understanding constitute the a priori principles of all
possible experience.
1) For Kant, the list of twelve pure concepts of the understanding is both
complete and necessarily true.
e. If we then divide things into objects of experience (empirical objects), objects of possible experience, and things-in-themselves, we find that the objects of possible experience provide the foundation for pure natural science. Objects of experience are the subject of empirical natural science.
f. "Thus the understanding is the origin of the universal order of nature in that it comprehends all appearances under its own laws and thereby first constructs a priori experience (as to its form) by means of which whatever is to be cognized only through experience is necessarily subjected to its laws."
g. Pure concepts of understanding generate a priori universal laws of nature like the following: "Substance is permanent" or "Every event is determined by a cause according to constant laws."
h. Laws of motion (see Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science) and the law of universal gravitation (see text, p. 609) are apodeictically certain judgments of this pure natural science.
a. It lies beyond our understanding since all appearances and representations come to be produced through our own faculties of intuition and pure concepts of the understanding.
b. By reason of having appearances, the understanding recognizes that there must be things in themselves that underlie the appearances (see text, p. 606).
a. Pure metaphysics has the problem that it tries to describe what lies beyond all possible experience; but, as we have seen, the understanding is incapable of going beyond the power of its own faculties of understanding.
b. Pure metaphysics however can establish a boundary by which we recognize that there is something beyond the sensible world. And while what lies beyond this boundary is beyond speculative reason, it may be describable in terms of practical principles, that is, in terms of principles of action from a moral point of view.
c. As
speculative reason, pure metaphysics cannot establish the immortality of the
soul, free will, or God’s existence. Hence they must be established, if at all,
through the moral realm of action.
1) The soul or self as we know it through the understanding can only apply to
experience; so there is no way of applying it after death, which is the end of
experience.
2) Natural necessity, through cause and effect, is the rule for judgment of the
sensible world. (The issue is more complex than what is suggested here; in
the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant is concerned with arguments for two
competing views. See the statement of Antinomies, text, pp. 617-618.—RY)
3) In addition to problems Kant finds with ontological and cosmological
arguments for the existence of God, he argues that the understanding and will
that governs our experience is not applicable in any way to God.
(from my Philosophical Problems: God Free Will, and Determinism)
Kant argues that God's existence is a practical demand of morality in so far as human beings, being obligated to live according to the moral law as their highest good, must seek a goal that is possible and only God can assure the achievability of that goal. In Kant's words,
... the acting rational being in the world is not the cause of the world and of nature itself. There is not the least ground, therefore, in the moral law for a necessary connexion between morality and proportionate happiness in a being that belongs to the world as part of it, and therefore dependent on it, and which for that reason cannot by his will be a cause of this nature, nor by his own power make it thoroughly harmonize, as far as his happiness is concerned, with his practical principles. Nevertheless, in the practical problem of pure reason, Le., the necessary pursuit of the summum bonum [highest good], such a connexion is postulated as necessary: we ought to endeavour to promote the summum bonum, which, therefore, must be possible. Accordingly, the existence of a cause of all nature, distinct from nature itself and containing the principle of this connexion, namely, of the exact harmony of happiness with morality, is also postulated. Now, this supreme cause, must contain the principle of the harmony of nature, not merely with the will of rational beings, but with the conception of this law, in so far as they make it the supreme determining principle of the will and consequently not merely with the form of morals, but with their morality as their motive, that is, with their moral character. Therefore, the summum bonum is possible in the world only on the supposition of a supreme Being having a causality corresponding to moral character. Now a being that is capable of acting on the conception of laws is an intelligence (a rational being), and the causality of such a being according to this conception of laws is his will; therefore the supreme cause of nature, which must be presupposed as a condition of the summum bonum, is a being which is the cause of nature by intelligence and will consequently its author, that is God. It follows that the postulate of the possibility of a highest derived good (the best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality of a highest original good, that is to say, of the existence of God. Now it was seen to be a duty for us to promote the summum bonum; consequently it is not merely allowable, but it is a necessity connected with duty as a requisite, that we should presuppose the possibility of this summum bonum; and as this is possible only on condition of the existence of God, it inseparably connects the supposition of this with duty; that is, it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God.
According to Kant, moral striving must have some attainable goal; this goal for rational beings is the highest good, or activity according to the moral law-, the possibility of real happiness rests upon achievement of this goal; but human beings lack the power over nature to assure a degree of happiness proportional to their degree of moral striving-, hence God, a supremely moral being, must exist to assure the proportionate happiness. From this standpoint, it appears then that God must exist in order for human beings to receive their just reward for being moral.
With respect to moral directives for human beings, Kant's version has somewhat different implications from those following from the earlier statement of the moral argument. For Kant, the moral law holds for all rational beings, human or divine, and does not require any direct sanction from God. Indirectly perhaps we can say that God's existence is necessary, however, so that acting according to the moral law has its just reward. By contrast, in the earlier statement of the moral argument in the text, God directly sanctions an absolute morality--being both the source and sustainer of it. Thus, we should not find it surprising that Kant's ethical system is not "God-centered" as much as that of theists who stress the moral argument and state it somewhat differently.
(from my Directing Human Actions)
Perhaps we can best understand Immanuel Kant's position by beginning with his assertion that the activities of animals, being governed entirely by sensory stimuli, are wholly determined and exhibit no free will. To the extent that human activities similarly arise from a sensory nature-that is, from feelings, desires, and inclinations-they too are determined. The matter does not end there, however. For human beings possess, in addition, the faculty of reason by which they can transcend their sensory naturethereby escaping the determinism of the sensory world and exhibiting free will. Accordingly, for Kant, the degree of free will present is proportional to the degree of rationality in making judgments about actions.
Human beings are most free when they are most rational in making judgments about actions. It happens though that this highest stage of rationality occurs precisely when, in judging, they will actions according to the moral law, or categorical imperative. Hence, human freedom is synonymous with willing the categorical imperative. In willing it, however, human beings are not simply obeying an external principle; rather they are laying down for themselves the moral law-that is, they are exhibiting what Kant calls "autonomy of the will." Reason, freedom, autonomy of the will, and the moral law are inseparable
.4What is probably most bothersome about Kant's position here is the limiting of freedom simply to willing the categorical imperative. We ask: How can we truly act freely if we are compelled to act in only one way? From Kant's standpoint though, we must eliminate the word "compelled" here. In exhibiting autonomy of the will, that is, in exhibiting our freedom, we will the moral law for and lo ourselves without being compelled to recognize an obligation to accept it. And in so far as no compulsion is present, the freedom is real. Moreover, while many of us may prefer a more wide-ranging, less confining freedom in our everyday activities, Kant is insistent that no freedom exists when we act according to our sensory nature, which is subject to deterministic forces of the natural world. To be free, we must act through our intelligible nature; that is, we must use our reason; and to be rational in making judgments about practical actions is identical with willing the categorical imperative.
When we take up the issue of moral responsibility associated with this conception of free will, Kant's position becomes somewhat complicated because the intelligible world where reason reigns is not necessarily sufficient to direct what we do in practice. In effect, the moral force associated with autonomy of the will may be, and often is, overcome by the feelings, desires, and inclinations of our sensory nature. Now, in so far as our sensory nature is determined, we might well conclude that we are not morally responsible when feelings, desires, and inclinations become the driving force for actions. Nevertheless, Kant does not draw this conclusion. In so far as some moral force is associated with autonomy of the will and we recognize some of our actions as definitely falling short of what the moral law requires, we should not make excuses or deny moral responsibility because of our sensory nature. According to Kant,
In judging actions I must pay no heed to the infirmity of human nature. The law in us must be holy, and the sentence of this law must be applied to the actions of men with all exactness. Fragilitas humana cannot be a ground for lessening our responsibility coram foro humano inferno. [Human weakness cannot be a ground for lessening our responsibility in the presence of the inner human judge (conscience). The judge within us is just. He takes the action for what it is and makes no allowance for human defectiveness, if only we have the will to listen for his voice and do not stifle it. Assume, for instance, that on the spur of the moment I give offence to some one by a hasty word: I cannot dismiss it from my mind and I long for an opportunity to make amends; try as I may I cannot rid myself of reproaches; I may find all manner of excuses which would satisfy an earthly judge, I may urge that I am only human and that it is the easiest thing in the world to let a word slip, but the judge within us will not be satisfied; it is nothing to him that human nature is frail, his concern is only with the action as it is. This makes it clear that there are in human nature purely moral grounds of impulse, and that it is not necessary to decry human nature so sorely for its weakness.
If there were no moral force within us, "purely moral grounds of impulse," and no judgment according to the moral law, "the judge within us," then we should not be held morally responsible because of our sensory nature. Since such is not the case, however, we are morally responsible even when feelings, desires, and inclinations are the springs of action. Although we must be hard upon ourselves and not make excuses because we are capable of making judgments according to the moral law, Kant thinks that we should be more lenient in judging others-possibly because of the absence of any assurance that they, too, make judgments according to the moral law. Similarly, we do not attribute moral responsibility to children, lunatics, and drunken persons because of their inability to make judgments according to the moral law.
(from my Directing Human Actions)
For Immanuel Kant, the good life consists in (1) obeying the moral law, or "categorical imperative," and (2) doing so from a sense of duty. According to Kant, genuine morality is impossible without a moral law--that is, a principle that commands rational beings universally (without exception) and necessarily (without the possibility of error). Without a moral law, different persons judge right and wrong differently according to their particular circumstances-thereby creating a situation where a discussion of any common morality is impossible because values become relative to anyone's personal, or subjective, judgment. The escape from this relativity, the recognition that there must be a moral law, the understanding of what the moral law is, and its application are all activities that depend upon reason. More precisely, it is reason, not our inclinations (namely, our appetites, desires, and emotions), which make these activities possible. Stated differently, Kant maintains that the proper function of reason, which distinguishes human beings from other earthly beings, must be to produce a good will that is, a being who wills actions in accordance with, and for the sake of, the moral law.
In obeying the moral law, our actions have moral worth only when we act out of respect for the law itself, according to Kant. In other words, for actions to have moral worth, we must obey the moral law because of the requirements of duty, and not because of any personal inclinations. For example, we should treat others honestly because duty requires this, and not because we gain some personal advantages by so acting. Thus, no moral worth accrues to the business person who treats customers fairly out of the conviction that such treatment is the best business practice in the long run. Although this person acts in accordance with the moral law, the person is not acting from a sense of duty but rather is trying to protect and assure profits.
What is this moral law, or "categorical imperative"? According to Kant: We should always act so that the rule governing our action can be willed as a universal law for all rational beings. The following example aptly illustrates his use of the categorical imperative:
Another man felt driven by need to borrow money. Well aware that he could never repay it, he realized also that he could not get a loan without a firm promise to pay at a fixed time. He felt like
making such a promise, but his conscience still prompted him to ask, "Isn't it unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of trouble this way?" Suppose, however, that he had decided to do it that way; the rule by which he acted would be: "When I am short of money, I'll borrow it and promise to pay even though I know I'll never do it. This principle of self-love or private advantage is a matter of my whole future welfare; but is it right? Let me change the requirements of self-love into general law and put the questions this way: How would it be if my rule became general? I see at once that it would never do as a general law for nature, for I would necessarily be self-contradictory. If everyone who needed something made promises to suit himself and intended not to keep them, promises generally and even the purposes of promises would soon be impossible, because no one would believe he was promised anything and would simply laugh at the hypocritical farce."
A lying promise cannot be willed as a universal law because it is a contradiction and therefore meaningless. Promising sets up an obligation to act in a certain way; but the lying negates the obligation. As further examples of using the categorical imperative, Kant discusses the obligation to develop our talents and to help others in need as well as the obligation not to commit suicide. He is convinced that this single moral law is sufficient to guide our actions and that reason assures its unambiguous application in the varied affairs of life.
Kant also offers an alternate statement of the categorical imperativeone which emphasizes the infinite moral worth of each human being and forbids the exploitation of one human being by another: Always treat rational beings, whether yourself or others, as ends-in-themselves and never merely as a means to serve some other purpose. This alternate statement has attracted a good deal of attention in the twentieth century because of the frequent attribution of moral wrongs to exploitation. We exploit other persons when we use them as means to serve some purpose without consideration of their best interests. For example, the insurance salesperson who preys upon the fears of the elderly to sell them unneeded insurance is exploitative. Exploitation is a serious problem; but its meaning requires careful consideration. Thus, actions to mutual advantage, it should be noted, need not be exploitative since they may take into account the best interests of everyone involved. (Actions to mutual advantage, however, have questionable moral worth since, as we saw earlier, Kant regards only actions willed for the sake of duty to have moral worth.) Note also that the alternate statement of the categorical imperative asserts that it is possible to exploit oneself Forgoing reason in order to submit to our inclinations constitutes self-exploitation. For example, committing suicide is forbidden because we would thereby deny our infinite worth in ending our life out of a desire to end our misery. We cannot use ourselves as a means in this way.
The moral worth of acts in accordance with the categorical imperative must be judged entirely with respect to the motive, or intention of an act, and not with respect to its consequences, according to Kant. He thinks that concern with consequences leads to a relativity of values-and hence a breakdown of morality-because everyone can judge consequences differently. This stress on intentions can lead to judgments quite alien to some common ways of thinking. Consider the following example: Someone comes up to you, gun in hand, and asks, "Where did your brother go?" In acting according to the categorical imperative, you cannot consider the consequences for your brother if you tell the truth, from Kant's standpoint. Instead, if the person expects you to tell the truth, you are morally obligated to do so, since no rational person can will lying as a universal law-that is, since lying is contrary to what we mean by communication, no rational person can willingly communicate a lie and still obey the categorical imperative. Of course, having settled this first moral question, whether you should lie or not, you then must turn to a second one-whether you should try to stop this person from killing your brother-and must apply the categorical imperative again. So you cannot simply tell the truth and then turn away with no further concern. If Kant's analysis here goes against our normal inclinations, he would reply that reason, not inclinations, must be the basis for morality-in order to assure the existence of a moral law. We should also remember that we often do associate higher moral worth with a good intention. For example, we have greater moral respect for the member of Congress who votes out of a sense of principle than we usually have for one who votes out of expediency in order to be reelected. Thus, Kant's analysis is not as farfetched as it first may seem.
Looking at the gun example a little differently, we can say that lying here would involve treating the person as a means rather than as an end. In other words, by lying, you would be treating the person as a means to save your brother's life. According to the altemative statement of the categorical imperative, however, you are obligated to treat other rational beings as ends-in-themselves rather than as means to serve some other purpose. By lying, you would be exploiting this other person. But would you then exploit your brother by telling the truth? No, because what might consequentially happen to your brother is not the question-at-issue. The moral issue is: Should you lie to this person or not? As we can see, Kant would apply the rule against exploitation in a rigorous, unrelenting way. He associates a dignity and infinite worth with every human being because the faculty of reason permits action according to the conception of moral laws-actions beyond the capability of other earthly creatures. Only rational beings can be moral. Therefore, human beings do not ever forfeit their dignity and infinite worth no matter how desperate their circumstances or despicable their actions. And we cannot justify exploiting them for any reason.
Given this infinite worth, we might easily conclude that no taking of a human life for any reason could ever be morally justified. Kant, however, disagrees. Consider the following statement about capital punishment:
If, however, he has committed a murder, he must die. In this case, there is no substitute that will satisfy the requirements of legal justice. There is no sameness of kind between death and remaining alive even under the most miserable conditions, and consequently there is also no equality between the crime and the retribution unless the criminal is judically condemned and put to death. But the death of the criminal must be kept entirely free of any maltreatment that would make an abomination of the humanity residing in the person suffering it. Even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by common agreement of all its members (for example, if the people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse themselves around the world), the last murderer remaining in prison must first be executed, so that the bloodguilt thereof will not be fixed on the people because they failed to insist on carrying out the punishment; for if they fail to do so, they may be regarded as accomplices in this public violation of legal justice.
(From The Metaphysical Elements of Justice)
For Kant, the execution is a just act of retribution that does not deny the murderer's infinite worth. Vengeful maltreatment such as torture, however, would not be justifiable because it "would make an abomination of the humanity residing in the person suffering it." Execution solely as a means of deterring others from committing murder (a justification often given for capital punishment in our own time) would also be a denial of the murderer's infinite worth. In such a case, we would be exploiting one human being as a means of benefiting others.
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