David Hume (1711 - 1776)

1. He was born in Scotland.
        a. His family ancestry included noble connections and they were a family of some means.
        b. When his father died in 1722, the estate went to David Hume’s older brother.

2. At age twelve, he entered Edinburgh University and studied there for three years—at which point he left and decided to direct his own education.

3. He probably began writing A Treatise of Human Nature when he was eighteen; and it was published in 1739--after he had spent some time both in London and in France.
        a. In his own words, the book "fell dead-born from the press."
        b. He even tried writing an anonymous abstract to promote the book; but this tactic accomplished nothing.

4. In autobiographical remarks, Hume says that the pursuit of literary fame was the driving force of his life.

5. In 1740, he published a third volume of the Treatise, dealing with morals.

6. Later, he reworked the ideas of the Treatise in An Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding (1748) and An Enquiring Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751).

7. Hume supported himself primarily by holding secretarial posts.

8. In 1751, he wrote Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion--although acceding to the urgings of friends, it was not published until after his death.

9. In 1752, he became keeper of the library in Edinburgh--which gave him the opportunity to write a History of England--a work that brought him the literary fame he always craved.

10. During the 1760s, he brought Rousseau to England, although they had a falling out.
    a. Hume began by writing friends about how friendly and compatible he and Rousseau were (although he had heard about Rousseau’s being so difficult to get along with) and ended by suggesting that Rousseau might end up in an insane asylum.

11. Hume was a large man of joyous spirit, a witty conversationalist, and a welcome person at any salon.

12. Among his close friends was Adam Smith, who offered this tribute at his death, "Upon the whole, I have always considered him . . . as approaching as nearly to the idea of a wise and virtuous man as perhaps the nature of human frailty will admit."

1. If "to humiliate" means "to humble," then David Hume could be described as "The Great Humiliator of Western Philosophy.

2. Hume presented a number of perplexing problems that persist in the twentieth century in much the same fashion as he posed them--problems regarding substance, personal identity, causation, induction, free will and determinism, the basis for morality, and natural religion.
        a. He would have enjoyed all this attention enormously.

3. Hume sets the stage for Kant by showing how we are closed off from reality itself and how cause and effect depend upon habits of mind rather than direct experience.
        a. He was very careful in trying to determine what was the basic reality that we encounter empirically and did not assume--as others before him often did—that our ideas are passive, accurate reflections of an external reality.
          b. Kant wrote that Hume awoke him from his dogmatic slumbers.

4. Points 1. and 2. are extremely important in understanding his influence.

5. For some philosophers, he represents the culmination of British Empiricism (although the result of the movement then seems to be skeptical conclusions); for others, John Stuart Mill continues the tradition and takes British Empiricism beyond Hume.

        a. Although Hume associated himself with skepticism, it turns out that he almost always provides a positive way of explaining concepts (in contrast to a skepticism that refuses to judge anything); his explanations however turn out to claim less than preceding philosophers generally did.

        b. Hume grants that, in practice, we do not abide by the theoretical demands of his skepticism. "Nor need we fear that this philosophy, while it endeavors to limit our inquiries to common life, should ever undermine the reasoning of common life and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action as well as speculation. Nature will always maintain her rights and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever." (Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sect. V)

        c. His bow to the demands of practice makes sense largely because of the way he offered positive explanations for concepts, even if they now stand for something less than the views of other philosophers—RY.

        Hume was interested in applying the new methods of science to investigating the origins of our knowledge and its relations to morals.

        a. Note the subtitle of his Treatise of Human Nature: "An Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning Into Moral Subjects."

        b. By "moral subjects," Hume means "issues concerning human actions" rather than just ethics as we know it today—RY.

        c. "Moral philosophy" is the "science of human nature" (Inquiry, Sect. I)

        a. The perceptions of the mind consist in either impressions or ideas.

        b. Impressions include sensations, passions, and will; they are the most lively perceptions—"By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will." (Inquiry, Sect. II)

        c. "The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation." So the various perceptions of the mind differ in their force and liveliness.

        d. Ideas arise through operations upon what we take in through the senses or experience. And the simplest ideas are copies of precedent feelings or sentiments—although less lively than the originals.
                1) Proof 1: Our simplest ideas are always traceable to these origins.
               2) Proof 2: If there is a defect in a sense organ, then we can not have the corresponding ideas for that organ—for example, a blind person can not have the idea of colors. Likewise, persons who have never had particular sensations or feelings will never have an idea of them; for example, someone who has never tasted wine will not have an idea of what it tastes like.
               3) An exception that does not destroy the basic claim: If one has sensed various colors over a long period of time, including various shades of blue, one may be able to have an idea of a shade of blue never sensed, through interpolation. But this is only possible because of the prior experience with different shades of blue through sensation.
               4) To the extent that sense impressions are the origin of our simple ideas, we cannot know anything about the nature of reality in itself beyond our sense impressions—Hume’s view gives rise to a position often called "phenomenalism" in 20th century philosophy.—RY

            d. Ideas may be associated together through resemblance, contiguity, or cause and effect.

            a. They may be divided into relations of ideas and matters of fact

            b. Relations of ideas consist of affirmations or denials that are intuitively or demonstratively certain—although, as mere operations of thought, they do not depend upon anything that actually exists in the universe.
                    1) Mathematics provides prime examples.
                    2) Denial of the claims involve contradictions

            c. Matters of fact consist of affirmations or denials that do not become absolutely certain, and their truth depends upon the present testimony of the senses or records of memory.
                    1) Example: "The sun will rise tomorrow."
                    2) Denial of the claims, e.g. "The sun will not rise tomorrow," does not involve contradictions.

            d. Reasonings concerning matters of fact are based on cause and effect; and this is the only way we can go beyond the senses and memory with respect to matters of fact.

            a. The relations of particular causes and effects are not discovered through a priori reasoning; they must be discovered through experience.
                    1) Examples: two smooth pieces of marble, explosion of gunpowder, attraction of a magnet, what will happen when one billiard ball hits another, what happens when a stone or piece of metal is raised into the air and left without support.

            b. Every effect is a distinct event from its cause; so we cannot infer the one from the other without observation and experience.

            c. There is a limit to the search for causes. For example, elasticity and gravity probably are ultimate causes for which we will not find further causes.

            d. When we see similar sensory qualities, we expect similar effects based upon experience; but we never experience the "secret powers" by which causes bring about effects. For example, we encounter the sensory qualities associated with bread and we expect, through experience, that nourishment of the body (after eating bread) will occur; but we never experience the secret powers by which bread causes nourishment. (Even if you went to the level of a chemical analysis, Hume would still not grant that one had experienced the "secret powers" between a cause and effect.—RY)

            e. The true meaning of a cause-effect relation: When we observe two objects constantly conjoined in our experience, we form the custom or habit of treating them as cause and effect.
                    1) We do not recognize a cause-effect relationship merely from a single instance.
                   2) Without the influence of custom, we would not recognize cause-effect relationships and thus could not consider matters of fact beyond what is immediately present through the senses and memory.

            f. The concept of a necessary connection in a cause-effect relationship also reduces, upon careful inspection, to the appearance of constant conjunction.

            a. Although he does not accept Berkeley’s idealism, Hume endorses two important claims of Berkeley in the Inquiry (Sect. XII): (1) The equivalence of primary and secondary qualities such that primary qualities are as much dependent upon the senses as secondary ones; and (2) The denial of general abstract ideas and acceptance of particular ideas—for example, the idea of a particular isosceles triangle but no general idea of a triangle. Accordingly, one cannot associate substance with independently existing primary qualities; and general ideas have no substances corresponding to them.

              b. All ideas are traceable to impressions; but there is no impression of a substance. (Treatise, Bk. I, Part 4. Sect. 5)

            c. If we interpret substance to mean "something which may exist by itself," the closest we ever come to that would be distinct, separate impressions (perceptions); but philosophers do not conceive impressions to be what they mean by the idea of substance. (Treatise)

            d. So the concept of substance is unintelligible. (Treatise)

            e. "The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the imagination, and have a particular name assigned them, by which we are able to recall, either to ourselves or others, that collection." (Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. I, Part I, Sect. VI)

            f. The idea of the soul as an immaterial substance also is unintelligible.
                    1) There is no impression of the soul.
                    2) The local conjunction of the soul with matter is unintelligible because the passions, desires, or moral reflections associated with the soul have no relation to place or extension. That is to say, a passion or a moral reflection is not to the left or right of anything.
                    3) In so far as cause and effect merely consists in constant conjunction, we can regard matter and motion to be the cause of thought.

            a. There is no impression of the self. Whenever I seek myself, "I always stumble upon some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, of light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure." (Treatise, Bk. I, Part 4, Sect. 6)
                    1) There is no reason to think that these perceptions would continue after death.

            b. "The mind is a kind of theater where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time nor identity in different, whatever natural propensity we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity."

            c. Because memory retains successive perceptions and there are resemblances among the successive perceptions, the idea of personal identity is produced.

            a. Deductive demonstration, which is based upon contradiction, does not apply to matters of fact.

            b. On the other hand, inductive arguments by which we form experimental conclusions about matters of fact, already presume that the future will be like the past—which seems to beg the question-at-issue.

            c. We do, however, have an idea, based upon constant conjunction and our habits of mind, of a harmonious uniformity of causes and effects in nature. "If there is any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion.

(A "compatibilist" or "soft determinist position" in 20^th century philosophy) - Taken from my Directing Human Actions (quoted passages are taken from the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding):

    Hume thinks that people generally accept both free will and determinism, what he refers to as "liberty" and "necessity," in practice, if not in their more abstract speculation. Too often, unfortunately, they begin their speculation by "examining the faculties of the soul, the influences of the understanding, and the operations of the will." Instead, he thinks, they should begin with causation and necessity as it applies to physical bodies, "brute unintelligent matter,"--where people generally concede that determinism holds.

    In this realm, "Our idea ... of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity, which we ascribe to matter. Beyond the constant conjunction of similar objects, and the consequent inference from one to the other, we have no notion of any necessity or connection." When we observe human nature and conduct with this idea of causation and necessity in view, we find that determinism holds for human actions as well as for brute matter. Hume points out that people generally count upon constancy in human nature, character, and conduct rather than presuming some capricious sort of free will. For example, in everyday affairs, no one could make plans or have expectations involving other people, unless one could count upon some constancy in their character and conduct based upon what one knows to be their strongest motives and their actions in the past. Likewise, we expect human nature to be relatively constant in all times and places. As Hume says, in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,

Moreover, learned pursuits such as history, political science, ethics, and literary criticism could possess no value without some constancy in human nature, character, and conduct. Hume concludes, therefore, that people generally accept determinism with respect to human actions.

    Hume is well aware that, in details, people often differ according to their circumstances and that their conduct is sometimes either strange or contrary to their character; but he does not think that these facts affect the doctrine of necessity. The diversity of circumstances just increases the variety of maxims needed to account for human nature, character, and conduct. As for conduct either strange or contrary to character, unobserved causes rather than a capricious free will account for any anomalies:

Having argued firmly for general acceptance of determinism or necessity, Hume then argues firmly for general acceptance of free will. For Hume, however, the traditional conception of free will is inadequate: (1) because it suggests capriciousness, and (2) because it would require action contrary to character. Consequently, he presents a different conception of free will or liberty, which is compatible with determinism:

    By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will--that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then, is no subject of dispute.

    This conception is compatible because our actions are free in so far as they express our will, regardless of any deterministic conditions that produce a particular act of willing.

    Hume goes on to argue that these doctrines of liberty and necessity are "absolutely essential" for moral responsibility. He says,

Thus, without a character formed according to necessity, there is insufficient stability to attribute moral responsibility to a person's actions. More particularly, a capricious free will where a person is able to act in any way at any time is incompatible with moral responsibility. Liberty as the power of acting according to the determinations of the will, however, does not possess this capriciousness and preserves responsibility; it allows us to attach moral qualities to actions as well as moral approbation or dislike.

(Taken from my Philosophical Problems: God, Free Will, and Determinism (quoted passages taken from Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion):

    Hume thinks that the argument rests upon a highly questionable analogy between limited human experience and the whole universe. The argument moves from the way events purportedly function in human experience to a conclusion about the way events function for the universe as a whole-on the presumption that the whole universe functions just like, or analogously to, human experience. According to Hume however, human experience provides too limited a sample to be considered representative of the universe as a whole. Thus Philo in the Dialogues says,

    Even if we accept the analogy between human experience and the whole universe, problems remain. Intelligence and purpose are the source of order for human beings; and we observe this directly, but order occurs in the animal and vegetable kingdom without the direct observation of intelligence and purpose. Perhaps, if we are looking for analogies, the universe should be modeled after animal and vegetable life. (Hume rejects the claim that the order in animal and vegetable life is ultimately traceable to an intelligent being on the grounds that this begs the question-at-issue in formulating the design argument.) Furthermore, the analogy raises doubts about properties usually attributed to God such as infinity, perfection, and unity. After all, if God must be like human beings in possessing intelligence, why should God not also be finite and imperfect like them? With respect to unity, Hume says,

            a. While we have reason to accept the reports and testimony of eyewitnesses, there also are indicators that such reports or testimony is unreliable: contradictions among eyewitness accounts, few accounts, accounts from persons of dubious character, a special interest in affirming something, hesitation about their testimony, or too strong affirmations. Reports of the marvelous or extraordinary are especially suspect.

            b. Since a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature, all the evidence for the laws of nature, with their uniformity, must count as proof against the existence of a miracle.

            c. For testimony of a miracle to be accepted, the falsehood of the miraculous claim must seem, on the basis of evidence, to be more miraculous than the miracle itself.

             d. Particular reasons for questioning the authority of miraculous claims:
                    1) There is no miracle in history so strong supported by a sufficient number of eyewitnesses of such undoubted wisdom and integrity that the miracle cannot be doubted.
                    2) People have a tendency to believe accounts that produce surprise and wonder.
                    3) A number of past miraculous claims have proved to be fraudulent.
                    4) Accounts of miracles seem most prevalent among "ignorant and barbarous nations"; and it is strange that the miracles occurred in the past, but seldom if ever in present times.
                    5) Since every religion has its own miracles, it would seem that the miracles of one religion contradict and cast doubt upon the miracles of every other religion.

(Taken from my Directing Human Actions (quoted passages taken from the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals):

    According to Hume, reason is useful to us with respect to moral judgments to the extent that it makes clear the consequences of actions for ourselves and others; but reason cannot establish that an action is good (that is, worthy of approbation) or bad (that is, worthy of blame). For example, reason can tell me that refusal to report income on my tax return deprives the government of revenue and that my willingness to report income fully does not; but reason cannot tell me which alternative is good, and which is bad. Although reason can aid in the establishment of facts and can demonstrate rational relationships, it cannot certify judgments of value.

    The certification of value judgments rests, rather, on moral sentiments, that is, immediate feelings of human beings about values. Moreover, Hume asserts that there are moral sentiments common to all human beings; so he is not a moral relativist. He says:

These common moral sentiments lead us to approve qualities of the following sort: honesty, fidelity, truth, benevolence, wit, ingenuity, cheerfulness, decency, and courage. We can label Hume's position a "moral sense theory" about the origin of -values, because it attributes to all human beings an inherent moral sense consisting of common moral sentiments.

    Foremost among the qualities approved of by our common moral sentiments, for Hume, is benevolence-a very general term which encompasses any of the following qualities: sociability, good-naturedness, humanity, mercy, gratefulness, friendliness, generosity, beneficence, natural affection, and public spirit. He says:

    Hume also attributes part of our approval of benevolence to its utility in promoting the happiness of society. And he concludes:

Return to Phil 336: Modern Philosophy page

Return to Home Page

Last updated 5/3/04

© Copyright 2004 by Ron Yezzi