1. He supposedly was born prematurely because his mother feared the coming of the Spanish Armada; and Hobbes referred to it as the cause of his timidity.
2. His father, a vicar, had to flee after having struck another clergyman.
3. Under the sponsorship of his uncle, he went to Oxford University in 1603, graduating with a B.A. in 1608.
4. He started a long association with the Cavendish family--becoming a secretary, friend, and tutor to William Cavendish.
5. He visited Francis Bacon during the 1620s, visited Galileo in 1636, wrote objections to Descartes' Meditations during the 1640s, and knew personally the French philosophers Mersenne and Gassendi.
6. He held various tutoring positions, including a short period as mathematics tutor in Paris to the future Stuart king, Charles II.
7. About 1640 the manuscript of his Elements of Law was sufficiently controversial that Hobbes felt it best to flee to Paris.
8. He published the Leviathan in 1651 as a solution to civil war in England, although it did not endear of him to either side.
9. He returned to England in 1651, without losing his head.
10. The Elements of Philosophy Concerning Body was published in 1655.
11. He was continually criticized in England for his philosophical positions.
12. After Charles II was restored to the throne in 1659, he eventually saw that Hobbes received a pension of a 1000 pounds per year.
13. In his later years, he was something of an institution in England.
14. He translated both the Iliad and the Odyssey while in his eighties.
1. Hobbes is probably known as much for the disagreements with his philosophy by other philosophers as for the acceptance of positions he held.
2. Hobbes was an influential advocate of use of scientific and mathematical methods in philosophy.
3. Leviathan is one of the world’s great political classics.
4. His emphasis in philosophy on the clear definition and analysis of terms in language marks him as a precursor of twentieth century linguistic analysis.
5. His treatment of free will and determinism is an early statement, perhaps the original statement, of the modern compatibilist position.
1. His treatment of God and religion is ambiguous and he was sometimes accused of atheism. Generally, he argues for maximum glorification of God although, functionally, God serves mainly as a supporter of a philosophical system already worked out on grounds of reason alone.
2. God’s nature is not a subject for philosophy, because philosophy deals with the generation of effects from causes and of causes from effects and God is not subject to generation (Supplementary Readings, p. 33). This does not stop from making passing references to God however. Philosophy also excludes consideration of angels, divine inspiration, and worship of God in so far as these can be the subject about reasoning concerning cause and effect.
3. Also, God's nature is rationally incomprehensible―including the concept of God as a Spirit, since an incorporeal body is contradictory. ". . . our faith therein consisteth not in our opinion, but in our submission; as in all places where God is said to be a Spirit; or where by the Spirit of God, is meant God himself. For the nature of God is incomprehensible; that is to say, we understand nothing of what he is, but only that he is; and therefore the attributes we give him, are not to tell one another, what he is, nor signify our opinion of his nature, but our desire to honour him with such names as we conceive most honourable amongst ourselves." (Lev., Ch. XXXIV)
4.. Like incorporeal body, Transubstantiation is a logically contradictory concept.
5. Religion should serve the interests of the state as a stabilizing force rather than being disruptive. Accordingly, there can be no claims to personal covenants with God that can serve to undermine sovereign authority.
1. Reasoning consists in computation, that is, addition and subtraction. Example of addition: body, animated body, rational-animated body, man.
2. Reasoning about how one generates a circle is superior to merely observing it, since it makes possible greater exactitude.
3. The method of philosophy is either analytic or synthetic.
4. Knowledge is power and philosophy should serve practical purposes: So it is not surprising that Hobbes is so concerned with trying to end the English civil wars.
1. If you just read the early chapters On Names and On Propositions in the Elements of Philosophy Concerning Body, you would be inclined to think that Hobbes is a nominalist―that is, that he denies the existence of any real things outside the stipulations of language.
2. He says: (1) “True & false belongs to speech, and not to things.” and (2) “. . . the first truths were arbitrarily made by those that first of all imposed names upon things, or received them from the imposition of others. For it is true (for example) that man is a living creature, but it is for this reason, that it pleased men to impose both those names on the same thing.” (Supplementary Readings, p. 40)
3. Universal names (that is, common names such as human being) are "never the name of any thing existent in nature, nor of any idea or phantasm formed in the mind, but always the name of some word or name" (SR, p. 36). They have no import of their own aside from the individual names they denote.
4. There are brief references to the senses and to phantasms of the mind however. And Hobbes' basic materialism becomes clear as you read further into the Elements of Philosophy.
5. In this nominalistic phase, I take him to be making statements about the enormous importance of language rather than his trying to deny the ultimate origin of ideas in matter in motion―RY.
1. Matter (bodies) in motion, understood in terms of cause and effect, constitute the basic reality.
2. Knowledge originates in the senses which, in turn, function according to bodies in motion.,
3. Thought too has a materialistic basis—as shown by the computational nature of reasoning, philosophy dealing with the generation of causes and effects, and the origin of thought in the senses.
4. Cause-effect relations are interpreted by Hobbes in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, with the sufficient condition for an effect being the sum of all the necessary conditions. For example, light requires a light source, a transparent medium, a fitting disposition of the organs, motion of parts through the medium (the original motion) and a sensory system (animal motion)--SR, p. 45.
1. He advocates a compatibilist solution to the free will-determinism problem. That is, we cannot deny causal determinism; but we can reinterpret free will so that it does not conflict with determinism.
2. The ordinary notion of "a free agent" is contradictory because it involves saying that when all the causal conditions for an effect are present, the effect does not occur.
3. “Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent” (SR, p. 65). (This is his reinterpretation of free will--RY.) So if our hands and feet are tied, we do not have the liberty to move around. But if I happen to be an aggressive person by nature and I act aggressively, then I am acting with liberty in acting aggressively. Even if there is a causal determinism behind my being an aggressive person, I am not acting due to external impediments in acting aggressively. (The aggressive person example is mine, not Hobbes--RY.)
1. Ethical judgments in terms of human nature in a state of nature are wholly relative to the person. Whatever we have an appetite for is good; and whatever we have an aversion for is evil. (Lev., Ch. VI)
2. Only in a civil society, where there is a common power to keep people in awe (for fear of what might happen to them) are there objective moral judgments, as represented by laws of nature known through reason. (Lev., Chs. XIV & XV)
3. The natural condition of human beings in a state of nature (where there is no established sovereign authority) is a state of war of every person against every other person. (Lev., Ch. XIII)
4. The establishment of a commonwealth with an extremely powerful sovereign authority is necessary to establish peace. (Lev., Chs. XIII-XV)
According to Thomas Hobbes, an account of ethics and of social organization must begin with an understanding of human nature. Careful examination of this nature reveals that we are material (physical) beings whose activities, even our ideas, are ultimately traceable to the motions of physical bodies. We have neither an immortal soul (that we can know about) nor a separate faculty of free will. With respect to human nature itself, there can be no objective account of right and wrong. Good is whatever is an object of personal desire; and evil, whatever is an object of personal aversion. Hobbes says, in Leviathan,
But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good, and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth; ...
People may generally value such abilities as wit, discretion, and prudence; but they do not thereby establish any absolute goods. Even a universal inclination of human beings is not an absolute good, although it describes human nature. Such an inclination is power. He says,
So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.
Power does not consist simply in the ability to exert physical force; rather it is the presence of the means “to obtain some future apparent good.” Accordingly, wealth, knowledge, honor, reputation, eloquence, generosity, friends, practical skills, prudence, “good form,” and good luck are all varieties of power.
Hobbes proceeds to describe what life would be like where people live in a state of nature, that is, where they act according to their nature without the presence of a civil government, or commonwealth. Thinking themselves relatively equal in ability with everyone else, persons have equal hopes of attaining their goals. Accordingly, when more than one person desires the same thing and it cannot be shared, they struggle as enemies to satisfy their desire. Given this competitive struggle, persons distrust one another and thus struggle all the more to gain dominance so as to prevent some future injury. Finally as a matter of pride, persons will fight to insure that others show proper respect. Thus, according to Hobbes,
... in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; second, diffidence; thirdly, glory.
The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.
Left to act according to their nature, without being in awe of any govemment's power, human beings live in a state of war--fighting actively or always being willing to fight. Hobbes offers the following description:
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth: no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
For skeptics, Hobbes (writing in the seventeenth century) offers the following sorts of evidence from experience in support of his description: (a) nations exist in a state of war relative to each other; (b) “savage people in many places of America” live this way; and (c) the fact that people arm themselves, lock their doors, and lock their chests--even when there are laws and law enforcement officers--shows their opinion of their fellow human beings.
In offering this description, Hobbes does not assert that human nature is evil because, in the state of nature, there is no morality. Ethical notions such as the inviolability of the person, property rights, and justice are simply nonexistent as guides to action. Without some common power to enforce these notions, only fools would respect them.
What can get human beings out of a state of nature is a combination of reason and several, specific passions--namely, fear of death, a desire for comfortable living, and the hope to attain this comfortable living through work. Since they cannot satisfy these passions sufficiently in a state of nature, human beings have some inclination to establish a state of peace. Reason provides the means of establishing this state of peace by making us aware of certain Laws of Nature. With these Laws of Nature and the subsequent government set up, objective moral obligations start to appear. According to Hobbes, an understanding of these Laws of Nature is the “true and only moral philosophy.”
Although they set up objective moral obligations, the Laws of Nature clearly rest upon self-interest That is to say, rational persons with those passions inclining them toward peace find that they can best serve their own self-interest by recognizing the Laws of Nature. No altruism or “love of humanity” is involved. The first three Laws are the most important:
That every man, ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war.
That a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.
That men perform their covenants made.
Note the tentative nature of the first two Laws. We are morally obliged to want peace and to will the means to attain it, including a willingness to renounce that right in the state of nature of acting in whatever way see fit--but only if other people cooperate. The third Law, performance of covenants made, is the basis for justice. A covenant is a contract upon the parties to act in specific ways in the future. In this context, the covenant establishing a civil government or commonwealth, is meant. Any breach of the covenant by a party to it is an injustice. We should be clear however, that justice and injustice only have meaning when parties to the covenant are in awe of some common power capable of enforcing it.
Therefore before the names of just, and unjust can have place there must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant and to make good that propriety, which by mutual contract men acquire, in recompense of the universal right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a commonwealth.
Given Hobbes' account of human nature, a strong civil authority is necessary for human beings to live in a state of peace. Moreover, no objective moral obligations, beyond the tentative ones stated in the two Laws of Nature, exist prior to establishment of that strong authority.
All the Laws of Nature are rules of enlightened self-interest. That is, we best serve our own interests by bringing about a state of peace if at all possible, rather than by taking the simple, superficially promising course of just fighting on in a state of war. Once he has enunciated his nineteen Laws of Nature, Hobbes has a foundation for judging the moral worth of numerous actions. Thus, injustice, ingratitude, unwillingness to make minor accommodations to the needs of others, vengeance, cruelty, hatred, contempt, pride, arrogance, and insistence upon more than a deserved share, are morally condemnable--because they do not foster those conditions of peace that serve our genuine self-interest. On the other hand, justice, gratitude, modesty, mercy, and equal treatment of others are morally praiseworthy. Remember, however, the tentative nature of this morality based upon the Laws of Nature--that is, the morality only applies when others are also willing to abide by these rules. If others are unwilling, then a state of war, without any civil government, exists and no moral rules apply.
Human nature is such that human beings live in a state of war unless there exists a civil government, or commonwealth, possessing awesome power, great enough to keep people under control. Human beings are too power-seeking, competitive, distrustful, and proud to live in peace by themselves. In their natural condition, all human beings are equal and possess the right of nature which “is the liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which in his own judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.” That is, persons are entitled to seek their self-interest as they see fit. And the result is a state of war. In this natural condition, or state of war, moral absolutes, justice, and property rights are simply meaningless words. Hobbes relies upon the commonwealth as our only really safe refuge from this horrifying state of war.
The ultimate motivations for establishing a commonwealth are fear and self-interest. Fearing for our lives and well-being, we enter into covenants whereby we forgo various liberties accorded to us by the right of nature and agree to submit ourselves to a commonwealth, which is:
one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defense.
And he that carrieth this person , is called sovereign, and said to have sovereign power; and everyone besides, his subject.
As subjects, we then owe allegiance to this artificial person, or sovereign, and must accord to the sovereign assorted rights necessary to maintain the sovereign power. According to Hobbes, it makes no difference whether we enter into a commonwealth through common agreement (“commonwealth by institution”) or through submission to a conqueror (“commonwealth by acquisition” through “despotical dominion”). In either case, our depth of allegiance and the rights of the sovereign should remain the same.
In laying out the rights of the sovereign in the Leviathan, Hobbes wants to insure the possession of sufficient centralized power so that there will be no resumption of the state of war. These rights grant extensive, lasting, indivisible powers to the sovereign. (See the list of rights listed at the end.) The sovereign cannot breach the covenant, because the sovereign only accepts the power offered by the subjects and is not a party to the covenant itself; hence, in effect, the sovereign is “above” the laws. Moreover, since the sovereign cannot break the covenant, subjects cannot accuse the sovereign of injustice. Indeed, Hobbes goes so far as to insist that the subjects are the real authors of whatever the sovereign does:
... because every subject is by this institution author of all the actions and judgments of the sovereign instituted; it follows that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his subjects, nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice. For he that doth anything by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: but by this institution of a commonwealth, every particular man is author of all the sovereign doth: and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his sovereign, complaineth of that whereof he himself is author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himself; no nor himself of injury, because to do injury to one's self, is impossible. It is true that they that have sovereign power may commit iniquity, but not injustice, in the proper signification.
Just as subjects authorize all that the sovereign does, they also are bound by any assembly vote conferring the sovereign power, regardless of the way they voted themselves--for, according to Hobbes, their participating in the assembly itself signifies their agreement to abide by the will of the majority. From all this, it is clear that Hobbes wants to establish a commonwealth where (1) subjects cannot disavow their allegiance to the sovereign (except under two conditions to be mentioned later); and (2) the sovereign holds enormous power--including control over declarations of war, treaties of peace, foreign policy, legislation, judicial decisions, the armed forces, taxation, appointment of officials, spoken or printed opinions and doctrines, rules for acquisition and ownership of property, and distribution of honors, rewards, or punishments.
Hobbes' reluctance (refusal may be the better word) to allow grounds for disavowal of allegiance to the sovereign is evident in circumstances other than those already mentioned. For example, persons may enter into a covenant, and owe allegiance to the sovereign, simply by their silence, or their refusal to resist the imposition of sovereignty. Thus, there need not be an explicit agreement to become a subject. Similarly, children become subjects of the commonwealth without any opportunity in life to choose whether or not they want to be subjects of that sovereign. Furthermore, conquered peoples who accept a sovereign simply in order to save their lives cannot later claim (1) that they acted out of overwhelming fear and (2) that they thus may disavow their allegiance at an appropriate time, for, as far as Hobbes is concerned, fear is the ultimate motivation for entering into a commonwealth, regardless whether it originates through common agreement or conquest.
No doubt many of us would be wary of the extensive powers of sovereignty and the rigid, irreversible conditions of allegiance that Hobbes lays out. We might well envision the subjects of the commonwealth living in abject misery. We should remember however that Hobbes wants to establish a civil government strong enough to prevent a state of war, which is the worst form of misery. Any diminution in the powers of sovereignty or the conditions of allegiance, he thinks, leads sooner or later to a state of war. Hobbes also thinks that the interests of the sovereign and the best interests of the commonwealth as a whole coincide so that subjects need not fear a life of misery due to the powers of sovereignty. The strength and prosperity of the sovereign is not well-served by subjects living in abject misery. And Hobbes specifies ways by which the sovereign can advance the interests of subjects, for example, by making sure that justice is administered equally to all people regardless of their social or economic position. Finally, apart from the rights of the sovereign, there are also the liberties of subjects.
In general terms, the liberties of subjects rest upon the right of self-preservation and the silence of
above. The right of self-preservation is the law. A list of these liberties appears at the end. The right of self-preservation is simply the right of nature mentioned earlier. While we can give up some liberties present in the state of nature when we enter into a commonwealth, we cannot surrender the right to preserve ourselves because, according to Hobbes, self-preservation is the basic reason for entering into a commonwealth. Most of the liberties of subjects follow from this right of self-preservation. For example, if the sovereign no longer protects us, that is, no longer contributes to our self-preservation, then we can forgo further allegiance. Hobbes is absolutely consistent on this point. Even in an extreme case, for example, where a subject has committed murder and the sovereign takes steps to punish the person, there is no obligation to accept, without resistance, a sentence of death and a subject may take whatever steps are necessary to assure self-preservation.
The right to sue the sovereign at first seems inconsistent with the assertion earlier that the sovereign is not party to the covenant and is therefore above the law. Hobbes distinguishes, however, between acts of sovereign power which are “above” the law and acts not in accord with laws established already by the sovereign. For example, if the sovereign establishes a law requiring payment of debts but then refuses to pay a debt, the subject, by suing, is not really acting contrary to the will of the sovereign because the sovereign established the law about paying debts.
As we have seen, Hobbes does not want to weaken the commonwealth by allowing subjects to disavow their allegiance to the sovereign. In fact, there are just two conditions which justify such disavowal: (1) the sovereign directly attacks your life; or (2) the sovereign is unwilling or unable to protect you. Only direct threats to your self-preservation, in effect, absolve you of allegiance. In other cases, no matter how ill seems to be your treatment at the sovereign's hands, you maintain your allegiance. Hobbes' goal is always the maintenance of absolute sovereign power to prevent the dissolution of the commonwealth and a consequent state of war. With this goal in view, Hobbes also warns against various measures that “weaken, or tend to the dissolution of, the commonwealth.” The major such measures include:
1) The sovereign settling for less than absolute power;
2) Granting subjects the right to judge for themselves what are right or wrong actions;
3) Allowing subjects the right to refuse participation in actions they judge as being contrary to their conscience;
4) Allowing subjects the right to claim that their judgments occur through divine inspiration;
5) Requiring that sovereign power be subject to the civil laws;
6) Granting subjects the right to acquire and own property independent of the rules of acquisition and ownership laid down by the sovereign; and
7) Dividing the sovereign power, for example, by establishing separate and equal branches of government.
There are more minor, but still dangerous, threats to the commonwealth as well:
1) Lack of money to finance actions of the sovereign;
2) Concentrations of wealth in persons or groups other than the sovereign;
3) A rise in the popularity of certain subjects who also happen to be powerful, untrustworthy, ambitious persons;
4) Concentration of wealth and power in particular units of government (counties, cities, etc.) or corporations;
5) “Pretenders of political prudence” who constantly dispute against the sovereign power; and
6) Wounds and disunity engendered by an insatiable appetite to expand dominions through conquest.
Basically, Hobbes argues that competing centers of power and the right of private opinion on public issues interfere with the sovereign's ability to carry out those actions necessary for the peace and protection of the commonwealth.
Hobbes' preference for monarchy (or a dictatorship) as a form of government is probably clear from what has been already stated. If the sovereign power resides in an aristocracy, where a small group rules, or in a democracy, where the many rule, the measures and threats tending toward the dissolution of the commonwealth, which were just mentioned, are likely to arise. Moreover, Hobbes thinks that any vices attributable to monarchy are simply multiplied in the other forms of government. If one person is subject to flattery or persuasion, is not an assembly of persons that much more subject? Will an assembly not be more irresolute than a single person? Will an assembly not be more likely to disagree within itself because of envy or conflicting interests than a monarch? Will an assembly not be less wise and less selective in choosing counsellors than a monarch? Finally, Hobbes argues that private interest and the public interest are most likely to coincide in a monarchy. A monarch personally has everything to gain through actions conducive to the welfare of the commonwealth as a whole. In other forms of government, however, some corrupt, ambitious individuals holding political power are more likely to benefit personally from actions contrary to the common welfare such as treachery.
Hobbes' Commonwealth and Rights of Sovereignty
1. Subjects cannot disband the commonwealth and enter into a new covenant without the permission of the sovereign.
2. There can be no breach of covenant by the sovereign and therefore also no forfeiture of the sovereign power because of the sovereign's actions, no matter how reprehensible.
3. A sovereign chosen through the will of the majority in an assembly has a right to the allegiance of those members in the minority;
4. A sovereign cannot be accused of injustice by subjects, nor punished, nor put to death.
5. A sovereign is entitled to use those means necessary to the peace and defense of the commonwealth-including the power to:
a. Control what opinions or doctrines may be spoken or printed;
b. Prescribe the rules by which subjects are able to acquire and own property of any kind;
c. Hear and decide all controversies regarding the law;
d. Make either war or peace with other nations;
e. Raise and command armed forces;
f. Levy taxes;
g. Choose all counsellors, ministers, magistrates, and officers;
h. Determine and mete out any rewards or punishments to be conferred on subjects.
Hobbes' Commonwealth and the Liberties of Subjects
1. Subjects are at liberty to do whatever is not required or forbidden by the laws.
2. Subjects cannot be commanded to kill, maim or wound themselves.
3. Subjects can resist, regardless of the reason, any attempt by the sovereign to kill them.
4. Subjects cannot be commanded to confess to a crime or accuse themselves.
5. Subjects may refuse to obey a command to kill someone else, unless the refusal frustrates the purposes for which sovereignty is established.
6. In time of war, a subject may send someone else willing to serve in the armed forces as a way of discharging duties for the defense of the commonwealth.
7. Subjects may end their allegiance if the sovereign is no longer willing or able to protect them.
8. Subjects may sue the sovereign, if the sovereign violates laws already established.
Return to Phil 336: Modern Philosophy page
Last updated 2/24/04
© Copyright 2004 by Ron Yezzi