Ron Yezzi
(Note: *'s before an item indicate relative degrees of importance.)
pp. 83 - 85
**Explain in some detail how Spinoza arrives at the conclusion stated at the beginning, "experience had taught me that all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile." Be sure to consider what he says about sensual pleasures, riches, and fame. How are these apparent goods relevant to his distinction between a "good uncertain by reason of its nature" and "a good not uncertain in its nature" (p. 83, 2nd full paragraph, right column)? Is his assessment of sensual pleasures, fame, and riches outdated? Why or why not?
**Spinoza's refers to "continuous, supreme, and unending happiness" (p. 83, first paragraph), "love towards a thing eternal and infinite" (p. 84, middle left column), the “chief” or "highest" good (p. 84, right column), and "supreme human perfection" (p. 85, top paragraph) as goals. In your Spinoza reading, try to decide whether or not these are realistic goals.
How does he define "the chief good" and how does it differ from "true good" (p. 84, right column)?
Following Descartes (in the Discourse on Method), Spinoza lays out some provisional (preliminary) rules of living to follow while seeking the chief good. What are they?
pp. 85 - 89
His preliminary remarks complete, Spinoza turns to the "amendment" (improvement or purification) of the understanding.
**Summarize his explanation of "the four modes of perception or knowledge" (pp. 85-86). Why is the fourth mode the most desirable (pp. 86)?
*How does Spinoza propose to avoid the trap of an infinite regress in searching out a method to attain the fourth mode of perception or knowledge (pp. 86-87, the paragraph beginning in the middle of the right column)? (Hint: Give some attention to his analogous account of "the making of material tools.")
Does his proposal make sense as a way of avoiding the trap? Explain.
**Spinoza's account of "a true idea" (pp. 87-89) is hard to follow, but important.Give special attention to (1) how ideas take on separate existence through the idea of an idea; (2) how an idea becomes true self-evidently in the possession of the idea itself rather than through correspondence between the idea and its ideatum, that is, that of which it is the idea ("the true method does not consist in seeking for the signs of truth after the acquisition of the idea," p. 87, middle, right column); (3) how the relation between ideas can replicate the relation between actual realities (pp. 87-88, beginning near the end of p. 87); and (4) how "our mind must deduce all its ideas from the idea which represents the origin and source of the whole of nature, so that it may itself become the source of other ideas" (p. 88, top, right column). From his account of a true idea, you get a better grasp of Spinoza's rationalism and the method of development in the Ethics.
(Note: To avoid some possible confusion, check out footnote 7 on p. 87.)
*The last paragraph of the left column on p. 89 is important as a summary of what Spinoza has tried to establish thus far and what he plans to do next.
pp. 89 - 96
**Spinoza now wants to distinguish true ideas from fictitious (pp. 89-92), false (pp. 92-94), and doubtful (p. 94) ones.
**How does Spinoza distinguish the terms impossible, necessary, and possible (p. 89). How do these distinctions lead to his assertion that God cannot hypothesize a fictitious idea and, likewise, that "fiction cannot be concerned with eternal truths"? How do they apply to his assertion, "as its [the mind's] understanding increases, its capacity for entertaining fictitious ideas becomes less" (p. 90, second full paragraph)? Would you agree with his position here? why or why not?
*According to Spinoza (p. 90), we can conceive,as fictitious ideas, that the earth is "like a half apple carved in relief on a dish" and "this burning candle is not burning." What distinction however has to made between the two for them to be fictitious ideas?
**Explain in some detail how clearness and distinctness removes any fears we may have about hypothesizing fictitious ideas, according to Spinoza (p. 91)?
**False ideas are very much like fictitious ideas (p. 92), so that we can avoid problems in the same way as we do in the latter case. Note his reference to confused ideas as opposed to clear and distinct ones. What is the one major difference, however, between a fictitious and a false idea?
**The two paragraphs beginning with the new one in the right column of p. 92 is valuable as a way of further clarifying Spinoza's insistence on the truth of an idea somehow residing in the idea itself. What does he say? Do you agree? Why or why not?
*On pp. 93-94, Spinoza points out we may form "simple ideas" without fear of error and then goes on to explain how we make some mistakes: (1) the origin of "inadequate ideas," top, right column, p. 93, (Hint: the "thinking being" is God); (2) the way imagination's presence in the understanding causes problems (p. 93, right column); and (3) an incorrect ordering based upon abstractions rather than nature (pp. 93-94). Explain these types of mistakes.
*Doubtful ideas (p. 94) have the same problem as fictitious and false ideas, according to Spinoza. What is it? How does the example of a "deceitful Deity" illustrate his point?
**On p. 94, Spinoza begins a brief account of memory. The really significant explanation here however deals rather with imagination. Explain in some detail how he distinguishes imagination and understanding on pp. 94-96.
**The paragraph beginning just below the middle of the left column on p. 96 is important. What can be conceived "solely through its essence" and what can be conceived through its "proximate cause"? What are the two ways of conceiving something through its essence?
pp. 96 - 99
**Spinoza's account of the importance, nature, and rules of definition (pp. 96-97) is important particularly as a way of understanding what he does with definitions at the beginning of each part of the Ethics. Summarize his account.
**Explain Spinoza's statement near the top, right column, of p. 97, "But it must be observed that, by the series of causes and real entities, I do not here mean the series of particular and mutable things, but only the series of fixed and eternal things."
*In the first full paragraph on p. 98, Spinoza mentions the method for seeking "knowledge of particular [and mutable] things." What does he say? Also note however that he plans instead to seek "knowledge of eternal things."
**According to Spinoza, "the definition of the understanding makes itself manifest, if we pay attention to its properties, which we know clearly and distinctly." What then are the properties of the understanding (pp. 98-99)? Would you agree that each property is known clearly and distinctly? Explain your answer.
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Last updated 2/23/04
© Copyright 2004 by Ron Yezzi