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Kripke's
Case against Simplicity Considerations |
On
pp. 37-39, Kripke seems to cease being a mere expositor of "Wittgenstein's
argument as it struck Kripke" and to himself make a case against using
simplicity considerations (SCs) to "solve" the sceptical puzzle,
problem, or challenge he has found in Wittgenstein. It is clear from the text that Kripke himself believes that
there is a fundamental mistake in supposing that appeals to simplicity can save
the day against the sceptic. Unfortunately
for Kripke, his certainty about the irrelevance of simplicity considerations is
much stronger than any argument that he gives against SCs. Kripke's case
against using SCs to solve the sceptical problem comes down to two (I think)
considerations.
First, Kripke contends that without facts of the sort denied by the sceptic,
there's no telling what our hypotheses state. And if we can't tell what our hypotheses state, there's no
sense to the claim that one hypothesis is more likely than another because it
is simpler. The other
consideration seems related to the first (hence my hesitation in speaking of
two considerations). Kripke claims
that in the absence of facts of the sort denied by the sceptic, our meaning
hypotheses are not "genuine hypotheses", not "assertions of
genuine matters of fact". The
implicit assumption here seems to be that simplicity considerations can be used
only for choosing between genuine hypotheses. Thus, the appeal to simplicity considerations to solve the
sceptical problem is misplaced, wrongheaded, according to Kripke.
For my
response to Kripke's case against using simplicity considerations to a
Last
modified October 3, 2011
JAH, Professor
Dept. of Philosophy