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The (alleged) Normativity Problem |
In
the course of criticizing those who would appeal to dispositions to answer the
sceptical challenge, Kripke makes the following claim:
Suppose I do mean addition by '+'. What is the relation of this supposition to the question how I will respond to the problem '68 + 57'? The dispositionalist gives a descriptive account of this relation: if '+' meant addition, then I will answer '125'. But this is not the proper account of the relation, which is normative, not descriptive. The point is not that, if I meant addition by '+', I will answer '125', but that, if I intend to accord with my past meaning of '+', I should answer '125'. Computational error, finiteness of my capacity, and other disturbing factors may lead me not to be disposed to respond as I should, but if so, I have not acted in accordance with my intentions. The relation of meaning and intention to future action is normative, not descriptive.
In the beginning of our discussion of the dispositional analysis, we suggested that it had a certain air of irrelevance with respect to a significant aspect of the sceptical problem -- that the fact that the sceptic can maintain the hypothesis that I meant quus shows that I had no justification for answering '125' rather than '5'. How does the dispositional analysis even appear to touch this problem? Our conclusion in the previous paragraph shows that in some sense, after giving a number of more specific criticisms of the dispositional theory, we have returned full circle to our original intuition. Precisely the fact that our answer to the question of which function I meant is justificatory of my present response is ignored in the dispositional account and leads to all its difficulties. (K, p. 37).
This passage
has been hailed by some to contain a great insight about meaning but most
importantly, a great insight about what is wrong with appealing to dispositions
in order to determine what someone means. In my commentary on the text, I suggested that there are no
such insights to be found here. On
the contrary, the so-called "normativity problem" is not really a
problem at all and betrays a confusion on Kripke's part. The simplest way to bring out the
confusion is by appeal to what takes place in translation, including radical
translation.
In translation, we begin with someone's signs (syntax) and attribute a meaning
(semantics) to his/her signs. But
the meanings so attributed are attributed on the basis of someone's
dispositions to use the sign. (An
aside: If we accept Kripke's case
against the appeal to dispositions, we seem to be rejecting Wittgenstein's
dictum that meaning is use. After
all, dispositions just are how we use a term, either presently or in the
future). And I agree with Quine that there is
really no other way to go about the business of translation other than appeal
to dispositions. So, when we
claim, "Jones means plus by '+'", we do so on the basis of Jones' use
of '+'. Clearly, we would make
this claim if Jones' use of '+' is in line with '+' meaning addition.
Kripke's
sceptic, however, brings up a worry. He claims that insofar as we confine ourselves to (past?)
actual use, we can always find any number of functions which mirror plus or
addition on the actual cases in which Jones has used '+', but which differ
wildly from plus in cases yet to be considered by Jones. So for all we can tell, someone who has
used '+' in accord with plus so far may not mean plus by '+', but something
else (e.g., quus). Herein is where
dispositions come into their own. Rather than forcing us to confine
ourselves to actual uses of '+', we can appeal to Jones' dispositions to use
'+' in the future, in "future cases". If we find that Jones is disposed to say 68 + 57 = 125, 68 +
58 = 126, etc., then we would say, with confidence, that Jones means addition
and not quaddition, by '+'.
Now,
presumably, Kripke, with his "meaning is normative" slogan, is
claiming that there is something illegitimate about this appeal to dispositions
to dismiss the sceptic. But what? The only answer I can find is Kripke's claim
above: " . . . the fact that
the sceptic can maintain the hypothesis that I meant quus shows that I had no justification for answering '125' rather
than '5'. How does the
dispositional analysis even appear to touch this problem? . . . Precisely
the fact that our answer to the question of which function I meant is justificatory of my present response is
ignored in the dispositional account and leads to all its difficulties." (K, p. 37). Here
we see the problem. The problem is
that Kripke has been unfair to the dispositionalist. For the dispositionalist denies that it is a fact that the
sceptic can maintain the hypothesis that Jones meant quus, in the face of Jones
having dispositions to go on in
accord with addition rather than quaddition. For Jones' dispositions show which of plus or quus he means.
For related
reasons, Kripke is also wrong to claim that dispositionalists "ignore . .
. the fact that our answer to the question of which function I meant is
justificatory of my present response." Kripke says this because he thinks that establishing what
someone meant/means requires finding something about him/her that shows what
s/he should say in some arbitrarily
chosen "future" case. Since
dispositionalists tell us only what someone is (actually) disposed to say, they
do not, by Kripke's lights, touch the sceptical problem. Kripke's mistake here is that he
misunderstands the relationship between dispositions and the normativity of
meaning. Kripke asks: Is there
something about Jones that shows what he should
say in particular cases (e.g., 68 + 57)?
Finding that there is nothing to fit this bill (so long as we leave the
question of what Jones means open) and in particular, finding that dispositions
are of no use in answering this question (since they tell us only what Jones is
disposed to say, not what he should
say), Kripke concludes that dispositions cannot solve the sceptical problem
about what Jones means. But Kripke has started with the wrong
"should" question, precisely because he fails to appreciate the force
of the dispositional account. The
proper question is as follows: Is Jones disposed to respond
as a plusser should? Unlike Kripke's question, this question
is both clear and easily answered (as Kripke himself agrees). Most importantly, if Jones is disposed
to respond as a plusser should, then we are justified to say that Jones means
plus. If not,
not.
Once
Kripke's mistake is clear, it is clear that Kripke has failed to appreciate the
power of the dispositionalist approach.
The power of the dispositional approach to meaning is that it allows us
to ask and answer the question of whether Jones is disposed to respond as a
plusser should (or as a quusser should, etc.), and thus to answer the question
of what Jones means. This question
cannot be raised, let alone answered, so long as we confine ourselves to
someone's past answers. Only the
appeal to dispositions allows us to raise the right question about what Jones
means, viz., is Jones disposed to use '+' as a plusser (or quusser) should?
As such, Kripke doesn't succeed in showing that dispositions cannot solve the
sceptical problem. At best, he
succeeds in showing that without it, without appeal to dispositions, the
sceptical problem cannot be solved.
One final
thought on all of this. Although
Kripke's claim, "What Jones means is justificatory of Jones' present
response", appears innocuous enough, it masks a confusion. One problem with Kripke's claim is that
it suggests that Jones' "present response", as well as any
"present responses" yet to come, cannot be used in a determination of
Jones' meaning. For Kripke clearly
holds that we must first determine what Jones means in order to be able to say
what Jones should say in the present
case, which of course, constitutes a justification of Jones' present response. For Kripke, if Jones' meaning depends on
his present response, Jones' meaning cannot be justificatory of that response. But it should be clear from the above
that Kripke is off base. Whether
Jones means one thing rather than another by '+' is to be determined by looking
at Jones' dispositions to use '+'.
And once we know what Jones means by '+', we can see whether his present
response is justified, given that meaning. That is, we can say that since Jones means plus by '+', 125
is a correct and so justified response to 68 + 57. And since he means plus, 5 is an incorrect and so unjustified
response to 68 + 57.
Of course, nothing prevents Jones, a la
Humpty Dumpty, from altering his use of '+'. As such, Jones could justify giving any answer he likes to 68
+ 57, so long as he was willing to change his use of '+', i.e., willing to
change his dispositions to use '+'. So, Jones can justify saying, 68 + 57 = 5, only by saying
that he is not plussing. The
upshot then is that justification of a response by meaning requires saying what
the meaning is, e.g., that Jones means plus, or Jones means quus, etc. It is illegitimate to speak of
justification of a present response by meaning simpliciter. Kripke
seems to me to be guilty of this mistake in this part of his text.
Last
modified October 3, 2011
JAH, Professor
Dept. of Philosophy