With factualist friends, Kripke's Wittgenstein needs no enemies: On Byrne's case for Kripke's Wittgenstein being a factualist about meaning attributions

 


I. Introduction
One of the more obvious truths about commentary on Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is that it almost universally sees KW as offering, in his sceptical solution, an account of meaning attributions (i.e., statements of the form, "X means such-and-so by 's'"; hereafter, MAs) which takes their legitimate attribution to be a function of something other than facts or truth conditions. KW is almost universally read as having rejected any account of meaning attributions that takes them to be stating facts or corresponding to facts. In a word, KW is understood as offering a nonfactualist account of MAs. And given that KW's sceptical challenge to the possibility of meaning rests on his negative assertions that there are no meaning facts, and that KW offers a sceptical solution to the sceptic's claim that meaning is impossible, i.e., a solution that by definition "begins . . . by conceding that the sceptic's negative assertions are unanswerable" (K, p. 66), it seems impossible that there would be any doubts about the accuracy of the "almost universal" reading of KW as a nonfactualist.

That KW agrees with his sceptic about there being no meaning facts is one of the more obvious features of Kripke's book, and given such agreement, it appears that the only option for saving meaning attributions from being obviously false or nonsensical is to reject the idea that MAs are in the business of stating such facts, or that legitimately asserting them requires them to correspond to such facts. As Kripke himself says",

Now if we suppose that facts, or truth conditions, are of the essence of meaningful assertion, it will follow from the sceptical conclusion that assertions that anyone ever means anything [i.e., MAs] are meaningless. On the other hand, if we apply to these assertions the tests suggested in Philosophical Investigations, no such conclusion follows. All that is needed to legitimize assertions that someone means something is that there be roughly specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately assertable, and that the game of asserting them under such conditions has a role in our lives. No supposition that 'facts correspond' to those assertions is needed. (K, pp. 77-8; this passage is one of several in WRPL that make these points).

This passage (and others like it) leave little doubt that KW is to be read as offering an account of MAs which denies that "facts or truth conditions are of the essence of (their) meaningful assertion", and rejects the notion that "facts correspond" to MAs. And although this passage does not tell us anything about the "roughly specifiable circumstances" or the role in our lives which asserting MAs plays, nor anything about the relationship, if any, between these circumstances and role and the MAs themselves, it is as clear as anything else in Kripke's book that neither the circumstances nor role will be facts stated by MAs, or facts to which MAs "correspond". As such, it appears that the prevailing interpretation's nonfactualist reading of KW as being a nonfacctualist about MAs is and must be correct. However, this hasn't prevented some from claiming that the prevailing interpretation of KW as a nonfactualist is a serious misinterpretation of KW.

Alex Byrne, in his paper, "On Misinterpreting Kripke's Wittgenstein", claims that Kripke's book "has . . . been widely misinterpreted". (B, p. 339).  According to Byrne, the prevailing interpretation of KW is that he is a nonfactualist about meaning attributions "[b]ut it cannot be right." (B, p. 340).

I suggested above that the prevailing interpretation of KW is that he has a position on MAs of the sort sketched in the passage above. If such a position is what Byrne means by "nonfactualism", it seems that he must be wrong to charge the prevailing interpretation with misreading KW. Although it is not easy to determine what Byrne means by 'nonfactualism', or to determine whether the nonfactualism he ascribes to the prevailing interpretation is in fact to be found there, it seems, oddly enough, that Byrne does think the position contained in the passage above expresses the nonfactualism which the prevailing interpretation ascribes to KW.

On pp. 339-40, Byrne quotes two passages from Kripke's book, passages which, like the one quoted above, find Kripke suggesting, in even more forceful terms than the passage above, that the only way to beat the sceptic is to reject "the natural presupposition that meaningful declarative sentences must purport to correspond to facts" (B, p. 340). Byrne then makes clear that he thinks that the prevailing interpretation's KW does reject this "natural presupposition" and that this constitutes a misinterpretation of KW. Surprisingly then, there is little doubt that Byrne believes the passage above, and others like it in Kripke's book, constitute the nonfactualism which the prevailing interpretation ascribes to KW. Although I believe that Byrne is right to find such a "nonfactualism" in the prevailing interpretation of KW, it is surprising that he regards such a view as a misinterpretation of KW. For this "nonfactualism" appears to come straight from the horse's mouth (or Kripkeā€™s mouth, as it were).

More surprising still is the fact that Byrne's "factualist" KW appears to espouse a position that seems to be indistinguishable from the KW of the prevailing interpretation. In particular, Byrne's KW and the prevailing interpretation's nonfactualist KW agree that "no substantial truthmaker is needed to legitimate our linguistic practices." (B, p. 343).  Wither then the misinterpretation of the prevailing interpretation?  How could Byrne come to believe that the prevailing interpretation, in claiming that KW rejects the "the natural presupposition that meaningful declarative sentences must purport to correspond to facts", and that for KW, "no substantial truthmaker is needed to legitimate our linguistic practices", is guilty of misinterpreting KW?

One possible answer is that Byrne has been misled by terminology. In particular, it may very well be that Byrne's notions of nonfactualism and factualism are at odds with the prevailing interpretation's understanding of these terms and so there may be nothing more than a verbal dispute here. In particular, it may very well be that the prevailing interpretation's notion of nonfactualism is compatible with Byrne's notion of factualism. If Byrne fails to appreciate this, he will suppose, incorrectly, that showing that KW is a factualist in his sense is sufficient to show that the prevailing interpretation of KW as a nonfactualist is off the mark. In fact, it turns out that something like this is very close to the truth. Byrne, malgre lui, offers a factualist KW who has much in common with the nonfactualist KW of the prevailing interpretation.

More precisely, Byrne believes he has made a case for KW being a factualist, in a sense of factualism that is at odds with the prevailing interpretation's understanding of nonfactualism. It turns out, however, that his account of KW either cannot be sustained, as it is incompatible with the real KW, or else echoes the KW of the prevailing interpretation. So either Byrne has, malgre lui, offered us a factualist KW who has too much in common with the nonfactualist KW of the prevailing interpretation to be regarded as a substantive factualist, or else he has offered us a KW who is not and cannot be KW. Either way, Byrne's charge of a prevailing misinterpretation among Kripke commentators is off the mark.

II. Byrne's KW
The key to Byrne's attempt to make KW a factualist who is genuinely at odds with the nonfactualist KW of the prevailing interpretation is a distinction between superlative (meaning) facts on the one hand, and plain old ordinary, or nonsuperlative (meaning) facts on the other. It is clear that Byrne believes that no substantive factualist could possibly hold "that there is no fact as to whether someone means plus or quus", or hold that there is no fact that constitutes someone's meaning addition by 'plus' (or constitutes someone's meaning quaddition by 'plus'). As such, he believes that he must somehow explain away a host of passages in Kripke's book where Kripke explicitly says that Wittgenstein holds (with his sceptic) "that there is no fact as to whether someone means plus or quus", or holds that there is no fact that constitutes someone's meaning addition by 'plus'.

Relatedly, Byrne knows that his KW must offer a sceptical solution to the sceptical paradox, i.e., a solution which "begins . . . by conceding that the sceptic's negative assertions are unanswerable" (K, p. 66). And given that KW's sceptic appears to deny the very possibility of meaning facts, it would appear that if KW offers a sceptical solution to the paradox, he too must deny the very possibility of meaning facts. And such a denial would mean, by Byrne's lights, that KW cannot be a factualist. Needless to say, it appears that Byrne has his work cut out for him if he is going to show that KW is a factualist. For if anything is clear about Kripke's book it is that Kripke has his Wittgenstein agreeing with his sceptic that there are no meaning facts, i.e., no fact that shows whether someone means plus or quus, or shows whether someone means addition by '+'.

According to Byrne, neither KW nor his sceptic really claim that there are no meaning facts at all. Rather, claims Byrne, KW and his sceptic agree on something that is, by Byrne's lights anyway, a bit weaker, viz., they agree "only" that there are no "superlative" (meaning) facts.

According to Byrne's KW, it is a "philosophical misconstrual" to suppose that the lack of a superlative (meaning) fact means the lack of any and all (meaning) facts. (B, p. 342). For Byrne, although KW holds (with his sceptic) that there are no superlative meaning facts, it is a mistake (a philosophical misconstrual at that) to suppose that this commits him to holding that there are no meaning facts at all. KW is not, claims Byrne, so committed.

More specifically, Byrne claims that his reading of KW is incompatible with, e.g., a passage from p. 65 of WRPL where Kripke says:

(a) "Wittgenstein holds, with the sceptic, that there is no fact as to whether I mean plus or quus"?

This passage is, according to Byrne, incompatible with a passage from p. 86 of Kripke's book, which allegedly "makes perfectly plain" that KW does not hold that there is no fact as to whether someone means plus or quus. Thus, Byrne sees himself as having to somehow explain away (a) above. Byrne's "explaining away" begins with appeal to a passage from p. 65 of Kripke's book where Kripke invokes the notion of a "superlative fact". (Neither Kripke nor Byrne bothers to explain how a superlative meaning fact differs from a nonsuperlative meaning fact; nor does either give any examples of either sort of fact). Byrne then claims that Kripke disagrees with his Wittgenstein about whether our ordinary notion of meaning is committed (or commits those who embrace it) to the existence of superlative meaning facts. (B, p. 342). Byrne's KW believes our ordinary notion of meaning is not so committed whereas Byrne's Kripke believes it is. Because Kripke, according to Byrne, believes that our ordinary notion of meaning embodies a commitment to superlative facts, Kripke also believes that if the "sceptical argument" is sound, and hence there is no superlative fact, then there is no fact simpliciter." (B, p. 342). For Byrne, "this is a thesis that Kripke believes . . . Wittgenstein (given the soundness of the sceptical argument) ought to hold." (B, p. 342). But, according to Byrne, he does not hold it. For Byrne, Kripke's disagreement with his Wittgenstein explains why Kripke "misleadingly" says that "Wittgenstein holds, with the sceptic, that there is no fact as to whether I mean plus or quus."" (B, p. 342), despite the fact that "Kripke makes perfectly plain in the passage from p. 86 [that] he believes that Wittgenstein does not hold it." (B, p. 342).

But is Byrne's account plausible? I don't believe it is. It seems implausible, to put it mildly, that Kripke's disagreement with his Wittgenstein as to whether our ordinary notion of meaning is committed to the existence of superlative facts would lead him to ascribe a position to Wittgenstein which he, Kripke, not only believes Wittgenstein doesn't hold but which is also explicitly at odds with another passage in his book (viz., p. 86, if Byrne is to be believed). Furthermore, how can Kripke believe that Wittgenstein ought to hold that there are no meaning facts at all, without also believing that Wittgenstein ought to hold that our ordinary notion of meaning is committed to the existence of superlative facts? And yet Kripke no where (misleadingly) says that KW holds that our ordinary notion of meaning is committed to the existence of superlative facts.

Surely Kripke knows that his disagreement with Wittgenstein on whether our ordinary notion of meaning is committed to the existence of meaning facts not only doesn't justify claiming that Wittgenstein ought to agree with him about this, but also doesn't justify claiming that Wittgenstein ought to hold that there is no fact as to whether I mean plus or quus. But even if Kripke did believe that he could justify saying that Wittgenstein ought to hold that there is no fact as to whether I mean plus or quus, surely the fact that he knew Wittgenstein ought to hold this but in fact did not hold it, would be sufficient to keep him from ascribing it to Wittgenstein. As such, it is difficult to believe that Kripke would say (a) despite knowing that it was false.

I propose a different and much simpler explanation for why Kripke says (a). Kripke says (a) (as well as many other things that echo (a)) because he believes that Wittgenstein holds, with his sceptic, that there is no fact as to whether I mean plus or quus, and no fact that shows that someone means addition by '+'. Of course, Byrne thinks he cannot accept this simple and utterly satisfying account of why Kripke says (a) without destroying the raison d'etre of his paper, viz., showing that KW has been widely misinterpreted as a nonfactualist. Thus he sees himself forced to offer a story, despite its obvious implausibility, whereby Kripke says (a) despite knowing that (a) is false (indeed, Kripke himself, according to Byrne, says something at p. 86 which makes (a) false!), because Kripke disagrees with his Wittgenstein, which disagreement leads Kripke to believe that KW ought to accept (a), even though he does not hold it. But there is no need at all for Byrne's implausible story, which is precisely why his story is so implausible.

III. Byrne's Key Mistake
Byrne is mistaken in thinking that KW cannot agree with his sceptic that there is no fact as to whether someone means plus or quus, (or no fact that shows that someone means addition by '+'), and still be a factualist about MAs. In fact, Byrne's KW, malgre lui, agrees with his sceptic that there is no fact as to whether someone means plus or quus, and no fact that shows that someone means addition by '+'. This is because the notion of 'superlative fact' is and must be used by KW as a label for any fact that shows whether someone means plus or quus, or any fact that shows that someone means addition by '+', IN THE SCEPTIC'S SENSE OF MEANING. As such, anyone who allows that there are no superlative facts, as Byrne's KW does, agrees that there are no meaning facts at all, in the sceptic's sense of meaning. So the bottom line is that for KW and his sceptic and Byrne's KW and the prevailing interpretation's KW (and, I believe, any sane soul at all), NO FACT is, or can be, a superlative fact. Once this is appreciated, it is clear that Byrne's KW, since he agrees with the sceptic that there are no superlative facts, thereby also agrees that there are no facts as to whether someone means plus or quus (and no fact that shows that someone means addition by '+'), in the sceptic's sense of meaning.

There is no need to explain away (a) above, or at least no need for Byrne's explanation. Properly understood, (a) informs us that KW agrees with his sceptic that no fact is or can be a superlative meaning fact. Byrne's felt need to explain (a) away is due to his misreading it as ruling out KW offering a notion of meaning different from the sceptic's which does make room for "meaning facts" (or claiming that the sceptic's notion of meaning is not OUR ordinary conception of meaning and then offering up "OUR" notion of meaning in contrast to the sceptic's notion of meaning, whatever that is). I suspect that Byrne's misreading of (a) is connected with another mistaken belief, viz., that the prevailing interpretation of KW as a nonfactualist arises from (a) and similar passages. Thus Byrne believes that if he can show that (a) leaves room for KW to invoke meaning facts of some sort or other then, together with the passage from p. 86 which allegedly finds KW committed to "meaning facts" of some sort, the case for a factualist KW, and against a nonfactualist KW, will have been made.

But KW's agreeing with his sceptic that there is no fact as to whether someone means plus or quus, etc., is not the source of the prevailing nonfactualist interpretation of KW. The prevailing interpretation is more than happy to grant that KW's agreeing with his sceptic that there is no fact as to whether someone means plus or quus does not prevent KW from invoking alternatives to the sceptic's notion of meaning (and labeling them, "OUR" ordinary notion of meaning) and offering up "meaning facts" in some sense or other as the essence of meaningful assertion. In Byrne's terminology, we can say that the prevailing interpretation is more than happy to agree with him that the nonexistence of a superlative meaning fact, i.e., the fact that no fact is or can be a superlative fact, does not mean the lack of any meaning fact at all, i.e., does not mean that KW cannot propose an alternative notion of meaning which makes room for meaning facts. (It should go without saying that KW agrees with his sceptic that no fact can satisfy the sceptic's demands on meaning facts. To suppose KW disagrees is to commit him to a straight, rather than a sceptical, solution to the paradox. And KW explicitly rejects any straight solution to the paradox).

The bottom line then is that the key manuever of Byrne's paper, viz., his explaining away of (a) as something which Kripke "misleadingly" says only because of a disagreement with KW about whether our ordinary conception of meaning is committed to "superlative facts", is an exercise in futility. The truth is that there is nothing misleading about (a) as long as one does not read it perversely, i.e., read it as ruling out the possibility of KW offering an alternative account of meaning whereby meaning facts are given an essential role in the meaningful assertion of MAs. Consider: If I argue that no restaurants in Los Angeles are able to satisfy my requirements for good food and service, and then express this by saying that there are no superlative restaurants in Los Angeles, it is the case that I have denied the possibility of any restaurant in Los Angeles satisfying my requirements. Clearly however, I have not ruled out the possibility of someone claiming that my standards of good food and service are too high and then offering different standards. And it may be that some restaurants are able to satisfy the new standards, although none satisfy the old ones.

Small wonder then that Byrne's explanation for why and how Kripke misleads readers sounds so implausible. The truth is that Byrne's paper is long on convincing us of the obvious, viz., that KW does not hold that the nonexistence of superlative meaning facts prevents one from claiming that the sceptic's notion of meaning is somehow mistaken and then offering a "better" conception of meaning, one which can make room for meaning facts but it is short on evidence that Kripke believes that the nonexistence of superlative facts prevents one from offering a conception of meaning which makes room for meaning facts, and shorter still on evidence that Kripke believes that Wittgenstein ought to believe that the nonexistence of superlative facts prevents one from offering a conception of meaning which makes room for meaning facts.

Kripke does, it is true, express doubts about KW's claim that the sceptic's notion of meaning, and attendent requirements for meaning facts, are somehow mistaken or misguided. Kripke is not, in short, sympathetic to KW's contention that the sceptic is aimed at the wrong target, i.e., is aimed at something other than OUR ordinary conception of meaning. But this lack of sympathy is not why Kripke says (a) above. He says (a) above because KW does agree with his sceptic that no facts do or can satisfy the sceptic's demands for meaning facts.

There is nothing in Byrne's discussion of Kripke to support reading Kripke as believing that Wittgenstein ought to believe that the lack of superlative facts prevents one from offering a conception of meaning which makes room for meaning facts. Rather, Kripke appears to hold that Wittgenstein ought to believe that the sceptic's notion of meaning is in fact our ordinary conception of meaning. And so Kripke can be read as claiming that Wittgenstein ought to believe that the sceptic's case against meaning facts does succeed in showing that on our ordinary conception of meaning, there are no meaning facts That is, Kripke can be read as saying that KW ought to believe that the lack of superlative facts means that, on our ordinary conception of meaning, there can be no meaning facts at all. But none of this would prevent Kripke from claiming that his Wittgenstein offers us an account of meaning, different from the sceptic's account of course, which does make room for meaning facts of some sort. Kripke would simply be sceptical of his Wittgenstein's contention that his account of meaning was in fact our ordinary notion of meaning. Thus, contra Byrne, it's too simplistic to say that Kripke believes that Wittgenstein ought to hold that there are no facts as to whether someone means plus or quus (because KW agrees with his sceptic that there are no superlative meaning facts).. We should instead say that Kripke believes that Wittgenstein ought to hold that our ordinary conception of meaning leaves no room for facts that show whether someone means plus or quus. But this belief, unlike Byrne's reading, certainly would not keep Kripke from appreciating that Wittgenstein may very well offer us a notion of meaning which he claims is our ordinary notion of meaning and which can or does make room for meaning facts. Kripke's beef with his Wittgenstein would not be that the suggested notion of meaning does not really yield us meaning facts. Rather, Kripke would claim that his Wittgenstein is mistaken to regard his proffered account of meaning as our ordinary notion of meaning.

Finally then, there is nothing at all in Kripke's book to support reading Kripke as believing that the lack of superlative facts means that one is prevented from offering a conception of meaning that makes room for meaning facts.  This reading of Kripke is not only tendentious, it's perverse. Most importantly, perhaps, there is also nothing in Byrne's paper that shows that it is KW's agreement with his sceptic about the nonexistence of meaning facts that leads the prevailing interpretation to brand KW as a nonfactualist.

In sum then Byrne's claim that KW denies that the lack of a superlative meaning fact means the lack of any meaning fact at all, is either false (if the sceptic's notion of meaning is used throughout, for KW and his sceptic agree that the sceptic's demands on meaning facts are unsatisfiable by any facts at all) or says something acceptable to everyone (i.e., if it says simply that KW denies that the lack of superlative facts rules out the possibility of offering an alternative notion of meaning which makes room for "meaning facts" in a sense different from the sceptic's). As such, Byrne's brain cudgelings about why Kripke "misleadingly" says (a) are inaccurate because unneeded. There is a perfectly natural and legitimate sense in which (a) is correct. Furthermore, the correct reading of (a) does not, contra Byrne, establish that KW is a nonfactualist about MAs. It merely establishes that if KW wishes to give "meaning facts" a role in the legitimate assertion of MAs, he must offer a notion of meaning different from that employed by the sceptic.

IV: Is KW a factualist or a nonfactualist?
It is clear that the mere fact that KW, along with everyone else, believes that the lack of superlative meaning facts does not mean that one cannot make room for meaning facts by altering the sceptic's notion of meaning, is not enough to show that KW in fact makes room for meaning facts by altering the sceptic's notion of meaning, let alone show that KW puts meaning facts to work in saving MAs from meaninglessness or falsity. That KW rejects some of the sceptic's assumptions is clear from the fact that he agrees with the sceptic that no fact can satisfy the sceptic's demands on meaning facts but does not agree with the sceptic that this leads, willy-nilly, to the meaninglessness or falsity of MAs. But whether KW offers an account of meaning whereby the legitimate assertion of MAs is a function of meaning facts is an entirely different issue. Indeed, just here is the heart of the matter, the point on which Byrne and the prevailing interpretation disagree. However, Byrne's case for holding that KW in fact makes room for meaning facts and makes them the essence of the legitimate assertion of MAs is slight and unconvincing. Worse yet, reading KW as a factualist involves, as I will show below, a misreading of KW and leads to a trivialization of KW's sceptical solution to the sceptical paradox.

If we agree with Byrne that KW is a factualist, we must, among other things, take KW to have doubts about the sceptic's requirements on meaning facts. For it is clear that KW agrees with his sceptic that no fact does or can satisfy the sceptic's demands on meaning facts. So long as we accept the sceptic's requirements, we cannot, KW believes, claim that there are meaning facts. But there is nothing in Kripke's book to suggest that KW thinks the sceptic's requirements on meaning facts are unreasonable or otherwise illegitimate. On the contrary, it is clear from Kripke's book that KW thinks the sceptic's requirements on meaning facts are unobjectionable. That is, KW believes that anything worth calling a meaning fact must satisfy the sceptic's requirements. The sceptic's mistake is not that of putting unreasonable demands on meaning facts. Rather, the sceptic's mistake, by KW's lights, is supposing that our ordinary notion of meaning requires meaning facts at all. It is one thing to claim that someone's requirements on meaning facts are too high or are unreasonable and need to be replaced by other, less stringent requirements. It's something else again to claim that the very idea of meaning facts is a bad one and needs to be rejected in favor of something "more vaguely defined". Byrne believes that KW claims the former while the prevailing interpretation sees him doing the latter. And herein lies the dispute.

If we see KW as a factualist, KW must offer us different requirements for meaning facts from those used by the sceptic. But this is surely a trivial maneuver for KW to make. If KW proposes that we can avoid the sceptic's conclusion that MAs (indeed all claims) are meaningless or false, while agreeing with the sceptic that there are no meaning facts, by simply proposing different standards for meaning facts, I don't see how he could avoid the charge that he has done nothing more than offer a verbal solution to the sceptical problem. Indeed, I don't see that KW and his sceptic can have anything more than a verbal dispute on the issue of whether MAs are meaningless or false. For, KW and his sceptic are obviously using different notions of meaning, and meaning facts.  If, on the other hand, KW is seen to propose rejecting the need for meaning facts at all, his solution to the paradox would avoid the charge of being merely verbal. KW and his sceptic would agree on what meaning facts are, or should be, and they would agree there are none. But they would disagree as to whether MAs require meaning facts for their legitimate assertion. And this is not merely a verbal dispute.

KW is, I believe, a nonfactualist about MAs but it is not his agreement with his sceptic that no fact is or can be a superlative fact that makes him one. Rather, KW is a nonfactualist about MAs because he solves the sceptical paradox by rejecting the idea that facts or truth conditions of any sort are of the essence of meaningful assertion. Relatedly, KW is a nonfactualist about MAs because he does not make the legitimate assertion of MAs a matter of stating, or corresponding to, facts of any sort, either superlative or nonsuperlative.

 

V. Byrne's misreading of p. 86 of WRPL (Forthcoming)

VI. On Misconstruing Kripke's use of 'philosophical misconstrual' (Forthcoming)


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Last modified September 9, 2011
JAH, Professor
Dept. of Philosophy