Democracy & Disagreement Amy
Gutmann & Dennis Thompson (Harvard, 1996)
Issue is how can a democratic system cope with conflicts
about fundamental values? Under what terms is moral deliberation possible? (p.
l )
Ch. l
The Persistence of Moral Disagreement
·
What counts as moral disagreement?
o Generality
(What are the morally relevant respects in which people are similarly
situated?) p. 13
o Three
characteristics especially important to democracy:
Reciprocity (kind of reasons that should be given,
p.52}-appeal to reasons that are shared or could come to be shared by
participants (p.14)
Publicity (forum in which reasons should be
given, p. 52) empirical claims consistent with reliable methods of inquiry
(p.15)
Accountability (agents)-agents by whom and to whom moral reasons
are publicly offered) (p. 15)
o Self-interest
o The
Human Condition
Scarcity
Limited generosity
Incompatible values
Incomplete understanding
o Procedural Democracy-"If political equals disagree on moral
matters, then the greater rather than the lesser number should rule." p.27
Majority vote alone cannot legitimate an outcome when the basic
liberties or opportunities of an individual are at stake (p.30)
Proceduralists need to incorporate deliberation as a precondition
for adequately resolving political disputes about procedures (p.32
Most proceduralists recognize two kinds of rights that limit
majoritarianism:
Equal Respect-rights that are integral to democratic procedures
(p.33)
Basic Freedoms-rights that are necessary for fair functioning of
democratic process (p.33)
o Constitutional
Democracy-Some rights have priority over majority rule (p.33)
To procedural and fairness rights, constitutionalists add rights
that protect the vital interests of individuals or produce justified outcomes
(p.33ff.)
However, the more abstract the constitutional standard, the more
contestable its interpretation (p.35)
·
Need for Moral Deliberation
o Proceduralists and Constitutionalists recognize fundamental moral
ideals that lie at the foundation of democratic institutions (Basic Rights and
Equal Respect) (p.39ff.)
If
moral arguments are essential to justify the foundations (equal respect) and
results (basic rights) of democracy, then why should they not also be essential
within the ongoing process of democracy ("middle democracy")? (p. 40)
Deliberative democracy offers a moral response to moral
conflict-it addresses the problem of moral disagreement directly in its own
terms (p.41)
o Four
general reasons in favor of deliberative democracy:
Scarcity: Contributes legitimacy to decisions made under scarcity
(p.41). Citizens strive for a consensus that represents a genuinely moral
perspective, one they can accept on reciprocal terms. (p.42)
Limited Generosity: Creates forums in which citizens are
encouraged to take a broader perspective (p.42)
Incompatible Values: Promotes an economy of moral disagreement in
which citizens manifest mutual respect as they continue to disagree about morally
important issues in politics (p. 43)
Clarifies
the nature of a moral conflict,
helps
sort self-interested claims from public-spirited ones,
identifies
among the public-spirited ones those that have greater weight (p.43)
o Moral
arguments can arouse moral fanatics, but it can also combat their claims on
their own terms. Extending the domain of deliberation may be the only
democratic way to deal with moral conflict without suppressing it. (p.44)
Ch.2 The
Sense of Reciprocity
Reciprocity
is the capacity to seek fair terms of social cooperation for their own sake
p.52ff. Even in the face of deliberative disagreement, reciprocity calls on
citizens to continue to seek fair terms of cooperation among equals p.53
Reciprocity stands between prudence (self-interest,
bargaining, seeking a modus vivendi) and impartiality (altruism, demonstration
of rightness, comprehensive view) p. 53
o What
reciprocity requires-"appeal to reasons that are recognizably moral in
form and mutually acceptable in content." p.57
Seek
agreement on substantive moral principles that can be justified on the basis of
mutually acceptable reasons (p.55)
Seek
reasons consistent with relatively reliable methods of inquiry (p.56)
o What prudence prescribes-using enlightened
self-interest, bargain for a solution (p.57)
Provides
no principled limitation on taking advantage of others, nor for giving others
an advantage over oneself (p.58)
Provides
no justification of outcomes for those who are disadvantaged from the start
(p.58)
o What impartiality implies-sees moral disagreement as a sign that
moral reasoning has failed (p.59)
Argument
for tolerance (staying neutral where there is no agreement and letting private
discretion decide) fails because it favors one side of the other (p.62)
o Bargaining in its place
o Dealing with deliberative disagreement
Deliberative disagreement
may be irresolvable because
Epistemic conflict (not clear which position
should be rejected)
Metaphysical conflict (controversy inherently incompatible)
Faced with
deliberative disagreement, government still must take a stand-based on
principle of "accommodation" p.79
·
The Meaning
of Moral Accommodation
Based
on core values of reciprocity and democratic deliberation, resolve deliberative
disagreement based on principle of "mutual respect"-which demands
more than simple toleration. p.79
o Civic
integrity-affirm moral status of own political position (p.81)
Consistency
in speech: espouse one's moral position independently of the circumstances in
which one speaks
Consistency
between speech & action (p.81)
Integrity
of principle: acceptance of broader implications of principles presupposed by
one's moral positions (p.81)
o Civic magnanimity-acknowledge the moral status of the positions
one opposes (p.82)
Acknowledgement
in speech-recognize that an opponent's position is based on moral principles
about which people may reasonably disagree (p.82) Do not impugn the moral
status of an opponent's position (p.83)
Open-mindedness-maintain
the possibility that one can be convinced by the moral merits of an adversary's
position (p.83)
Economy of
moral disagreement-seek the rationale that minimizes rejection of the position
one opposes (p.84ff.)
o The economy of moral disagreement in action
o Accept the need to promote substantive moral principles in
politics, unlike proceduralists (p.92)
o Accept that there is no single, unitary common good (as the
communitarians would have it)-maintain the significance and legitimate
persistence of moral disagreement (p.92)
|
o Aim is not to induce
citizens to change first-order moral beliefs; rather, encourage them to
discover what aspects of those beliefs could be accepted as principles and
policies by other citizens with whom they fundamentally disagree. p.93 |
Ch. 3 The
Value of Publicity
Publicity
may conflict with other values, such as liberty or opportunity or even
deliberation. Publicity has moral limits, but those limits themselves must be
publicly affirmed. p.96
·
Principle of Publicity
Bentham---public officials, in
virtue of their position, can be expected to be tempted to neglect the public
interest for their own ends (p.97)
Kant-a
policy is unjust if making it public would defeat its purpose (p.99) Public
policies should be justifiable to those who are bound by them.
From a
deliberative perspective, policy not only could, but should be public
Only
public justification can secure consent of citizens (p.100)
Making
reasons public contributes to the broadening of moral & political
perspectives (p.100)
Reasons
must be public to fulfill the potential for mutual respect (p.101)
Self-correcting
character of deliberation would be undermined if reasons for policies could not
be openly discussed (p.101)
o Necessity of Secrecy-Publicity is necessary
to justify any policy, but secrecy may also be necessary to effect some policies (p.101)
o Objections
to Necessity
Assumes
that a group of officials, without benefit of public review, will consistently
choose the most beneficial policy (p.102)
Some
policies may need secrecy to be effective, but only because the policy is
itself fundamentally morally flawed (eg, Iran-Contra) (p.102-3)
Neglects
the contribution of publicity to the desirability of the policy itself (p.103)
o Necessary
Exceptions
Public
accountability for the secrecy itself is necessary (p.104)
Works best
for ongoing policy; less suited to one-time exceptions
"If
first-order secrecy is sometimes necessary, second-order publicity should not
be far behind." p. 105
·
Secrecy in Service of Liberty and Opportunity
o General Secrets-Policies that refer to
indeterminate groups and categories of individuals (p. 106). Rarely
sustainable, either morally or politically.
o Particular Secrets-Secrets about private
individuals have a stronger claim, that of "not unnecessarily injur(ing)
innocent persons." (p. 109). For public officials, while in principle
their private lives should be treated as private, "(t)he boundaries
between public and private activities are not as sharp for officials as they
should be for ordinary citizens." (p. 111)
o
Conflicting
Claims of Secrecy
·
Secrecy in
Service of Deliberation-"exceptions to the publicity principle should
require prospective as well as retrospective accountability." (p. 115)
o Deceptive secrets-"concealing
information with the intention of causing citizens to believe something the
official knows is false" (p. 117)
Usually
directed against criminals or enemies during wartime
Can be
justified "only if they can be shown to be necessary to safeguard the
democratic values... and only if this showing can meet the test of
accountability." p. 121
o
Deep Secrets-a secret "the very existence of which is hidden."
(p. 121)
·
Beyond Publicity
Ch.4 The Scope of
Accountability
'`Representation poses
two challenges to universal accountability, one concerning who gives the
reasons [specialization] and the other concerning to whom the reasons should be
given [constituency]." p.128
"From a deliberative perspective
representation is not only necessary but also desirable. The number of people
who at the same time can have even a simple conversation, let alone an extended
moral argument, is limited." p. 131
·
Problem of
Specialization
o Is Deliberation
Elitist?
Argue that some groups may have diminished
capacity for deliberation (p.132)
Higher status has advantage due to power (p.
133)
Argue that different groups use different
argument style (passionate vs. rational) p.134
o Is
Deliberation too Populist?
What
should elected representatives do in face of persistent yet reasonable public
opposition? p. 141
Voting is
no substitute for deliberation (p. 142)
Except in
case of basic liberties or opportunities, deliberative accountability offers no
instructions (p.142)
"Reiterated
deliberation, punctuated by periodic elections, is the best hope for the
principle of accountability." (p.144)
·
Problem of
Constituency
o Beyond the
District (space)
Often
assumed that "invisible hand" is best served by each jurisdiction
looking after its own (p. 146) BUT
Principle
of reciprocity is general, embracing nonresidents as well as resident (p. 147)
Appeal to
"political necessity" is justified ONLY if one has first persuaded
electorate to take seriously the claims of their moral constituents! (p. 147)
·
Discounting
Future claims
·
Opportunity
costs-but practical result is to drive future claims to 0 p. 157
·
Uncertainty-becomes
"an excuse for myopia" p. 158
·
"Do unto
future generations as you would have them do unto you"-but what needs to
be represented are not the claims of future individuals but the moral value of
human flourishing (p. 161)
§
Deliberative
accountability cannot offer determinate answers to competing claims of moral
constituents, but at least it avoids mistaken efforts to provide a means for
closure. p. 163
Ch. 5 The
Promise of Utilitarianism
"The
utilitarian way of thinking ...pervades the public forum in middle
democracy." p. 165
"Unlike majoritarianism and constitutionalism,
utilitarianism puts morality directly into the political processes of middle
democracy... by positing a single sovereign principle that would enable
decision-makers to compare competing values and arrive at a uniquely correct
answer" to resolving moral conflicts (p. 166)
·
Elements of Utilitarianism
o Utility-"A single inclusive end ...that
is intended to accommodate all other ends...." p. 169 vs. Hobbes'
security, Lockes' life, liberty and property, or Rousseau's community. Utility
is some form of well-being, usually satisfaction of preferences, whether
revealed or "informed" (hypothetical). p. 169
o Consequentialism-refers primarily to a state
of affairs, not actions, motives, or character (p. 171)
o Maximization-translate all claims into
utility, and then maximize it. P. 172
·
Obstacles to Accountability-Difficult to hold policy makers accountable
for their methods, since any account they give presupposes the method (p. 173)
o Citizen preferences can be changed (p. 173),
often by the process of deliberation: "Deliberation in a public forum is
... quite different from informed political decision making carried out in
private." P. 174
o "Even the most justifiable processes
are likely to leave public opinion seriously divided on many issues.... So long
as citizens can only argue with, not overpower, one another ... complete
consensus on public policy will be rare in democratic politics. " p. 175
o Citizens have views about the political
process itself. "We care about not only what is decided but also how it is
decided." P. 176
o By giving up its comprehensive claims,
utilitarianism could makes its peace with democratic accountability. P. 177
·
Retreats from Publicity
o Utilitarianism assumes no values are
incommensurable (p. 179)
o To argue that popular attitudes are not
completely justifiable, utilitarians must enter the public debate, and on the
same grounds as everyone else. P. 184
·
Ambivalence Towards Reciprocity
May not
have access to information they need (p. 185)
·
Risks may not
be fully appreciated (p. 185)
"In general,
preferences reveal little about the conditions of choice." P. 186
o Comparing claims:
"...controversy
about what measures should be used... is often no less... morally loaded than
the political disagreements utilitarianism seeks to resolve." P. 186
Pareto
criterion, even if achievable, privileges the status quo. P. 187
Utilitarianism,
as a principle, says nothing about how welfare should be distributed. P. 193
·
Beyond
Utilitiarianismin qualified form, deserves a place in deliberative democracy
(p. 196)
Ch. 6 The Constitution of
Deliberative Democracy
"Appropriately
ordered and interpreted, liberty and opportunity join reciprocity, publicity,
and accountability as the constitutional principles of a deliberative
democracy." p. 199
·
Liberty-"citizens
should be free to act as they wish, so long as their actions do not harm other
citizens by means of force or fraud." p. 200
o Limits on
Liberty
Inclusive
definitions of liberty lead to violations of others' liberties p. 203
Robert
Nozick
"...no
government may require me to act without my consent to satisfy the claims of my
fellow citizens, no matter how worthy." p. 203
"Basic
liberty should not be expanded to include positive claims on society for all
those resources that one may need to pursue one's own way of life." P. 205
o Libertarian
Expansion of Liberty
Negative
liberty--"Although libertarians resist the expansion of liberty when a
citizen is making demands on the government, they encourage its expansion when
citizens are resisting the demands of democratic government." p. 205
"The
further that liberty is broadened beyond personal integrity, the weaker becomes
the claim that liberty is the supreme human good." p. 206
"To
reject any public policy that would redistribute income or wealth, libertarians
must assume that the given distribution is just." P. 206
·
Opportunity-Should
deliberative democracy restrain itself by more than a basic liberty principle?
P. 209
o Roots of
Opportunity
Egalitarianism-"...one's
life chances should not be determined by factors that are arbitrary from a
moral point of view." P. 209
"Citizens
do not deserve their place in the natural lottery. There is no reason to assume
that the current distribution of resources is justified, and some reason to claim
that the government is justified in acting to change that distribution."
P. 209
John
Rawls
Egalitarianism
does not demand equal results.
Difference
principle-"... certain `primary goods'... should be distributed so as to
maximize the life prospects of the least advantaged members of society."
P.210
"The
two powers of moral personality are a capacity for a conception of the good
life and a sense of justice." P. 211 John Rawls. [Basis for Urban
Studies?]
o Egalitarian
Opportunity
Rawls 2nd
principle-"fair equality of opportunity"
Norman
Daniels: four types of "goods":
Basic
liberty
Primary
goods (distributed by difference principle)
Basic
opportunity goods "condition
for enjoying almost all other opportunities in life," should be equalized
"within the normal range of human functioning" p. 213
BUT
o
"bottomless pit" problem, p. 214
o
does not include response to problem of scarcity (p. 214 & 215)
o leaves no room for 4th type of
goods-"quality of life goods." "Not everything in a good life or
in a good society is a need." P. 215
o Basic Opportunities-libertarianism is indiscriminate in its
defense of liberty, egalitarianism is extravagant in its devotion to
opportunity (p. 216)
Need a
principle of opportunity that reflects the constraints of scarcity and
imperfect knowledge.
"Fair
Opportunity principle"-deferred to Chapter 9
"Basic
Opportunity principle" "ensure
that citizens may secure the resources they need to live a decent life and
enjoy other (non-basic) opportunities." p. 217
Which
goods/services are basic?
What level
should be provided?
"Social
minimum" (Ronald Dworkin)-What would be prudent for most Americans to
secure for themselves? P. 218
Cannot
assume that any (or the current) level of scarcity should be taken for granted
(legislators must engage in discussion of raising taxes). P.222
· Deliberation in the Service of Liberty and
Opportunity
o Deliberation is self-limiting and self-transforming (p. 224)
o Deliberation has a role in developing standards of liberty and
opportunity that lie beyond the basic principles (p. 224)-while not
determinative, can still result in morally better decisions (p. 224)
·
The
principles of deliberative democracy do not guarantee morally right results,
but they offer a more defensible way of reaching mutually justifiable
policies
. (p.229)
Ch. 7 The Latitude of
Liberty
·
The Scope of
Basic Liberty-can moralist or paternalist arguments be used to limit liberty?
Mills' principles:
o "...the
self-regarding actions of citizens must be left absolutely free from
interference; their other-regarding actions may be subject to legal
sanction." P. 233
action
must cause definite harm or pose a definite risk of harm (p. 234)
definite
harm must be caused to other people, not to oneself only (p. 234)
·
Moralism-immorality
of a practice is adequate to limit it, provided can demonstrate three criteria:
(pp. 251-252)
o Violates
a fundamental social value
o May be
prohibited/regulated by law
o Would not
cause greater harm or wrong than it is seeking to prevent
·
Paternalism-restricts
an individual's liberty for his own good (p. 261). Again, 3 criteria: (pp.
263-264)
o Some
action that individuals take is not in their own interest
o Conduct
in question may be legitimately regulated or prohibited
o Does not
cause more harm than it prevents
o Must not
restrict basic liberty (pp. 264-266)
Person's
decision must be impaired in some way (e.g., lack of information)
Intervention
is limited
Goal of
intervention must either be one that the person accepts, or (if person is
impaired) excludes as few future choices as possible.
· Goal of intervention must either be one that the
person accepts, or (if person is impaired) excludes as few future choices as
possible
Ch. 8 The Obligations of
Welfare-Basic Opportunity Principle
·
Basic
opportunities are health care, education, security, income, and work (p. 273)
·
Deliberative
democracy requires adequate level of basic opportunity goods (p. 273)
·
Citizens
should not be denied basic opportunities on the basis of factors for which they
are not responsible (p. 274)
·
More
controversial issue is on what grounds can citizens be denied such goods (p.
274):
o Using welfare/workfare as a model, demonstrates the value of
mutual dependence, and therefore mutuality of obligation-citizens needing
income support should be obligated to work, but only if fellow citizens fulfill
obligation to enact public policies that provide adequate employment and child
support (p. 276)
o Further,
deliberative democracy requires that citizens who will be supported have a
voice in forming the policy, rather than having it imposed hierarchically
Ch. 9 The Ambiguity of
Fair Opportunity
Problem is more difficult
to resolve. No clear preference between liberal and egalitarian perspectives